

CICERO'S ART OF QUOTATION: POETRY IN THE *PHILOSOPHICA* AND  
*RHETORICA*

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CICERO'S ART OF QUOTATION: POETRY IN THE *PHILOSOPHICA* AND  
*RHETORICA*

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This dissertation focuses on those poetic quotations which Cicero employs both in his rhetorical and philosophical works and aims to identify the role of these citations and to determine his art of quotation. Poetry is an important component of his desire to make publicly available a Romanized version of Greek philosophical and rhetorical theories, a desire which supports his convictions that knowledge of this literary medium is an essential part of the orator's make-up and is a valuable tool of instruction and a source of learning for the philosopher.

Previous studies of poetry in Cicero's works have neglected for the most part detailed analyses of his use of poetry in conjunction with that of his contemporaries – such analyses, however, are a necessary starting point if we want to acquire an informed picture of his art of quotation. Intertextual comparisons between his early rhetorical treatise *de Inventione* and the Auctor's *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and between his 'mature' treatises and Varro's contemporaneous linguistic treatise *de Lingua Latina* and his near contemporaneous dialogue *Res Rusticae* not only establish several basic and advanced fundamentals of a Latin prose author's employment of poetic quotations, but also confirm that Cicero's art of quotation is more innovative, flexible, and vibrant than that of his contemporaries.

In addition to Cicero's techniques of citation detailed intratextual examinations of his rhetorical treatise *de Oratore* and his philosophical treatise *de Divinatione*

reveal the often complex role poetry plays in the interaction between the interlocutors. The key to these two investigations is the interlocutors' practice to contest ownership of the same poetry by repetition or allusion. This struggle for poetic rights reflects the notion that poetry is public domain and, crucially, extends to the reader's reception of and involvement with the text. The examined evidence demonstrates that quotations are not only a malleable organizational tool for the formal structure of a treatise, but also constitute for the characters an important and emphatic means to support or refute key points, thereby helping to resolve the aporetic nature of the discourse.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Anthony George Hunter was born in Greymouth, New Zealand in 1974. In 1998 he graduated from the University of Canterbury with First Class Honours in Classics. Between 1998 and 2000 he earned an M.A. degree from the University of Canterbury. Between 2001 and 2010 he was a doctoral candidate and a teaching fellow at Cornell University.

*To Mum and The Chanticleer*

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION: POETICA FURTA

#### *Cicero: Appropriator of Poetry*

Cicero quotes a lot and in the ancient world there is a definite art of quotation.<sup>1</sup> The process of appropriating material is a phenomenon common to authors of every genre; prose authors such as Plato, Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius frequently intersperse their works with the thoughts or words of others and the same holds true for poetic authors.<sup>2</sup> These literary appropriations consist of three broad categories: direct quotations, indirect quotations, and more oblique references. Direct quotations, in either a metrical or a prose form, are purportedly verbatim. Indirect quotations, a technique of citation which in some way paraphrases the words of author, occur both explicitly and implicitly. More oblique references may be to a specific author or his work or, even to a mythological event.<sup>3</sup> Instances of all three categories of these literary appropriations appear in every area of Cicero's corpus, but the focus of this study is the sub-category of direct poetic quotations in his philosophical and rhetorical treatises. Cicero, as we shall see, quotes more direct poetry than prose and, for him, poetry, especially Latin poetry, plays an important part in his literary mission to bring Greek theories to a Roman audience.

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<sup>1</sup> German and French studies have traditionally led the way in the study of quotations from a theoretical standpoint, which, more often than not, prove too technical to be of use in the present study. Cf. Simon 1984 for a survey of the field.

<sup>2</sup> For studies of various ancient authors and their uses of citations, see, for example, Howes 1895, Mantel 1916, Apfel 1935, Hinman 1935, Householder 1941, Klotz 1944, Hagendahl 1947, McEnerney 1950, Tarrant 1951, 1958, Knauer 1952, 1964, Hines 1973, Conte 1974, Ahl 1976, 1985, Edwards 1981, Gambla 1981, Farrell 1983, Rissman 1983, Primmer 1985, Blaensdorf 1986, Hoek 1988, 1996.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Hoek 1996: 229.

### *Prose ‘Quotations’: Paraphrase and Anecdote*

While there are over four-hundred poetic quotations in Cicero’s philosophical and rhetorical treatises alone,<sup>4</sup> he does not often quote prose authors in any genre of his corpus. It might seem unusual to begin a study of poetry in the works of Cicero with an overview of material he draws from prose authors, but it is only by establishing the paucity of direct prose quotations in his corpus, that the frequent occurrence of direct poetic quotations is thrown into relief thereby hinting at the importance of poetry in a Ciceronian prose work.

Most prose quotations in Cicero’s works are from Greek authors and appear, in Latin, generally in the form of a paraphrase or anecdote.<sup>5</sup> In his philosophical treatises citations from and references to Greek philosophers are frequent, a phenomenon which is not to be unexpected in works where he is dealing with philosophical issues derived from Greek intellectual personages. Platonic quotations, mainly in the form of paraphrase, are especially common<sup>6</sup> and in the *Fin.*, for instance, he quotes or paraphrases Epicurus no less than eight times.<sup>7</sup> An interesting case of citation, which involves both prose and poetry, occurs in the *Diu.* when Quintus relates a scene from Plato’s *Crito*:<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See below 8-9.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Gotoff 1981. No comprehensive compendium exists for prose quotations in Cicero’s works (see, however, Clavel 1868 for a collection of Cicero’s translations from Greek sources), but a quick examination of his treatises, for example, confirms the paucity of direct prose quotations in comparison to poetic quotations.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. *Tusc.* 1.97-99 (= Pl. *Ap.* 40c-42a), 5.36 (= Pl. *Mx.* 247e-48a), *Sen.* 6-9 (= Pl. *R.* 328e-30a).

<sup>7</sup> *Fin.* 1.57 (indirect quotation), 63 (indirect quotation), 68 (nearly direct: *paene uerbis*), 2.84 (probable paraphrases), 96 (an extract from a letter which, Cicero says, Epicurus wrote to Hermarchus), 97 (apparent re-phrasing of part of the extract from the letter or a pithy quotation), 98 (pithy quotation), 100 (quotation from a book of Epicurus).

<sup>8</sup> ΣΩ. οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἥξειν ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἔκ τινος ἐνυπνίου ὃ ἐώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐγεῖραι με. ΚΡ. ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον; ΣΩ. ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν· “ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο.” ΚΡ. ἀτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων (Pl. *Cri.* 44a-b).

Est apud Platonem Socrates, cum esset in custodia publica, dicens Critoni, suo familiari, sibi post tertium diem esse moriendum; uidisse se in somnis pulchritudine eximia feminam, quae se nomine appellans diceret Homericum quendam eius modi uersum:

tertia te Phthiae tempestas laeta locabit.<sup>9</sup>

quod, ut est dictum, sic scribitur contigisse (*Diu.* 1.52).

Here, Quintus, although he paraphrases the prose of this passage, faithfully preserves the metrical form of the line of verse.<sup>10</sup>

Besides Greek philosophers Cicero also cites, but rarely quotes, other Greek prose authors, such as historians and orators. For example, Herodotus, whom he calls the “father of history” (*Leg.* 1.5), Cicero at all times paraphrases.<sup>11</sup> In his letters, where convention allows him to do so, he twice directly quotes Thucydides in Greek,<sup>12</sup> but outside of the epistles he primarily limits his comments on the historian’s work to matters of style.<sup>13</sup> And, despite having translated Demosthenes’ *De Corona* into Latin,<sup>14</sup> he tends only to summarize and describe extracts from the orator’s speeches.<sup>15</sup> The exactness of these Latinized prose quotations in relation to the original Greek varies, but for the most part it is clear that Cicero freely paraphrases and abridges his Greek prose sources.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Cic. 27 *FPL*; cf. Hom. *Il.* 9.363 where the speaker is Achilles: ἡματί κε τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἰκοίμην.

<sup>10</sup> It is interesting to observe that Cicero adheres to the Platonic version of Homer’s verse by translating ἴκοιο (*te ... locabit*) rather than ἰκοίμην.

<sup>11</sup> *Tusc.* 1.47, 113, *Fin.* 87, *Diu.* 1.53, 1.121, 2.116, *Off.* 2.41; cf. *de Orat.* 2.55, *Orat.* 39, 186, 219.

<sup>12</sup> *Att.* 1.6.10, 8.7.7.

<sup>13</sup> *De Orat.* 2.56, 2.57, 2.93, *Brut.* 27, 29, 43, 47, 66, 287, 288, 294, *Orat.* 30-32, 39, 151, 219, 234, *Opt. Gen.* 16., *Q. fr.* 12.4.5.

<sup>14</sup> *Opt. Gen.* 14 – no trace of this translation exists. Cf. Laughton 1961: 34-35.

<sup>15</sup> *Orat.* 26, 27, 57, 111, 133, *Diu.* 2.118; cf. for a *dictum* attributed to Demosthenes, *Brut.* 142.

<sup>16</sup> See Jones 1959, Powell 1995a.

Direct quotations from Roman prose authors are rare in Cicero's works. He often mentions, but does not directly quote, Roman philosophers.<sup>17</sup> This is not surprising if we consider that before the publication of his philosophical treatises Epicurean prose works constituted almost the entire store of philosophical literature in Latin and that at the beginning of the *Tusc.* he decries the quality of those works written by Amafinius, Rabirius, and Catus the Insubrian.<sup>18</sup> Also, despite Cicero's fondness for historical sources,<sup>19</sup> quotations from Roman historians do not feature in his works. Indeed, near the beginning of the *Leg.* he declares that "history is absent from Roman literature."<sup>20</sup> Even direct quotes from Roman orators are scarce in his corpus, including his dialogue on the history of oratory, the *Brutus*, as E. Rawson notes:

"The dialogue form, perhaps unprecedented for such a historical survey, greatly enriches the brief and somewhat abrupt style, enlivened by anecdote, though not alas by quotation, which is held to be the established style for such subjects as the history of literature."<sup>21</sup>

This lack of quotations from Roman orators is understandable if we acknowledge Cicero's statement in the *Orat.* that, apart from his own speeches, there exist only a few extant Latin orations.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, even in the event that a written version of a

<sup>17</sup> For an overview of the Roman philosophers in Cicero's philosophical treatises, see Kwapiszewski 1973.

<sup>18</sup> *Tusc.* 1.6. Cf. *Tusc.* 2.7, 4.6, *Ac.* 1.5, *Fin.* 1.8, 3.40. See, also, Reid 1885: 21.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Fam.* 5.12.5, where Cicero describes the pleasure one gets from reading Greek historians, and *Orat.* 120, where he notes the educative value of knowing history.

<sup>20</sup> *Abesse historiam litteris Romanis* (*Leg.* 1.5). Cf. Cicero's criticism of the style of the early writers of Roman history at *de Orat.* 2.51-54 and of L. Sisenna at *Brut.* 228..

<sup>21</sup> Rawson 1972: 41.

<sup>22</sup> *Vter exemplis domesticis, nisi ea legisses, uterer alienis uel Latinis, si ulla reperirem, uel Graecis, si diceret. sed Crassi perpauca sunt nec ea iudiciorum, nihil Antoni, nihil Cottae, nihil Sulpici; dicebat melius quam scripsit Hortensius* (*Orat.* 132). Cf. *Parad.* 41 where there are some brief snippets from an unnamed oration of L. Crassus.

speech survives, his reluctance to quote verbatim prose is clear. At *Sen.* 16 he quotes two lines from Ennius' *Annales* which Ap. Claudius Caecus recited during a speech he delivered to the senate, but he only mentions in passing that this speech is still extant.<sup>23</sup> And, even though he quotes a number of Cato's pithy *dicta*, Cicero is more apt to paraphrase the works and speeches of the orator "who is always on his lips" (*qui tibi semper in ore est*, *Leg.* 1.6).<sup>24</sup> Indeed, so rare are Roman prose quotations in Cicero's corpus that the most readily identifiable Roman prose sources which he quotes with any regularity tend to be of a documentary nature, such as the XII tables, the *leges sacrae*, and the *libri pontificales*.<sup>25</sup>

There is no question that material drawn from prose authors, both Greek and Roman, is an important component of Cicero's works, but, if prose sources are often the hidden foundations of a Ciceronian treatise, then direct quotations of poetry, a fundamentally foreign medium, are the architectural oddities deserving of closer individual inspection. In this respect it is necessary to analyze the frequency and nature of poetry in the several Ciceronian literary genres – the speeches, the letters, and the treatises – if we are to determine what poetry means to Cicero, and, in particular, to investigate the reasons why he quotes poetry in his prose treatises.

### ***Poetry in the Speeches and Letters***

Although this study does not formally consider the poetic quotations in Cicero's speeches and letters, it is nevertheless beneficial to provide an overview of

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<sup>23</sup> *Non dubitavit dicere illa quae uersibus persecutus est Ennius "quo uobis mentes, rectae quae stare solebant / antehac, dementis sese flexere uia?"* (= Enn. Ann. 194-95 R) *ceteraque grauissime, notum enim uobis carmen est, et tamen ipsius Appi exstat oratio* (*Sen.* 16). For Appius' speech in antiquity, cf. *Cic. Brut.* 61; *Plu. Pyrrh.* 19.

<sup>24</sup> Paraphrases, indirect quotes, and references to works of Cato: *de Orat.* 1.227, 1.228, *Off.* 1.36-37, 3.1, 104, *Tusc.* 1.3, *Diu.* 1.28, *Brut.* 75, 80, 89, 90, *Rep.* 1.27, 2.2, 2.37, *Planc.* 66; Cato's *dicta*: *de Orat.* 2.256, 2.279, *Diu.* 2.51, *Amic.* 76, 90, *Off.* 2.89, *Flac.* 106.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Rawson 1972: 37. Rawson, discussing the *Leg.*, also states (p. 37) that, apart from the historians mentioned in the proem, the only other "authors mentioned are two interpreters of the XII Tables, Sex. Aelius and L. Acilius, along with L. Aelius (Stilo) and M. Junius Congus (for his *De potestatibus*)."

the poetry in these two literary genres and, where applicable, to draw attention to the relevant scholarship. Quotations in the letters, especially, have drawn the interest of scholars and I will employ some of the methods they use to investigate the role of poetry in this study.

Cicero, in the public sphere, openly declares his enthusiasm for poetry. When defending the poet Archias (62 B.C.), Cicero reveals a general attachment to literature, in particular poetry.<sup>26</sup> When he defends P. Sestius (56 B.C.) he displays his affection for the talents (*ingenia*) of poets and describes the great applause they receive from the Roman audience.<sup>27</sup> His public approval of poets in his speeches does not, however, manifest itself in terms of poetic quotations. During his defense of Sex. Roscius Amerinus (80 B.C.), Cicero actually apologizes to the court for mentioning specific material from Caecilius.<sup>28</sup> And, even during his defense of Archias, he does not quote from the poets.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, only a few of his orations contain more than a handful of poetic citations: the defenses of Sex. Roscius Amerinus, M. Caelius (56 B.C.), P. Sestius, Rab. Postumus (54 B.C.), the prosecution of C. Verres (70 B.C.), and the denunciation of L. Calpurnius Piso (55 B.C.).<sup>30</sup>

The frequency of poetic quotations in Cicero's letters also varies. Those letters which he addresses to Atticus contain abundant literal quotations from Greek poets, those to L. Papirius Paetus and C. Trebatius Testa from Roman poets. Beyond these three recipients, however, poetic quotations in the letters are sparse. Nevertheless, the

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<sup>26</sup> *Arch.* 12-17.

<sup>27</sup> *Sest.* 123.

<sup>28</sup> *S. Rosc.* 46.

<sup>29</sup> Ennius (*noster ille Ennius*) is mentioned three times, Accius only once: *Arch.* 18, 22, 27. The absence of poetry in the *Arch.* might have been due to the fact that, since Archias was a Greek poet and composed poetry in his native tongue, Cicero may have felt direct quotations from Latin poets would be out of place.

<sup>30</sup> Speeches composed during the years 56-54 B.C. have, by far, a greater amount of poetic quotation than speeches delivered outside this time-frame, cf. Shackleton Bailey 1983: 242-43.

employment of both verse and prose quotations in Cicero's letters has drawn concerted scholarly interest.

R. B. Steele, focusing exclusively on the Greek in Cicero's letters, lists and briefly discusses both prose and verse quotations, proverbs, and individual words.<sup>31</sup> Steele's primary focus is to show how Cicero's use of Greek in his letters conforms to the existing social practice and is unfettered by the constraints associated with using Greek in his rhetorical and philosophical works.<sup>32</sup> Steele's analysis of poetry in the letters (pp. 394-400), while perfunctory, demonstrates the capacity of short quotations (in particular those from Homer, p. 394) to invoke for the reader an entire picture. A poetic quotation's capacity to conjure, *pars pro toto*, a milieu beyond the extent of the quoted portion is an important consideration when analyzing the function of poetry in Cicero's treatises, especially since in a dialogue-setting we, as readers, have laid before us not only the sender of a poetic communiqué but also the recipient.

Several decades after Steele's study P. J. Armleder investigated the roles which Greek and Latin citations, both prose and verse, play in Cicero's letters.<sup>33</sup> Regarding Latin poetry in the letters (pp. 79-93) Armleder makes the following conclusions: poetic quotations change or emphasize the tone of a passage,<sup>34</sup> shed light upon Cicero's character or interests,<sup>35</sup> enable a more effective or pithy means of expression,<sup>36</sup> and provide illustrative or authoritative material.<sup>37</sup> Throughout his study Armleder is at pains to demonstrate the ingenuity and care with which Cicero provides accurate citations and integrates a quotation into a letter's prose. Examining the ways

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<sup>31</sup> Steele: 1900.

<sup>32</sup> Steele 1900: 389.

<sup>33</sup> Armleder 1957. Cf. Dammann 1910 who likewise studies the quotations in the letters of Cicero, in particular his accuracy when quoting.

<sup>34</sup> E.g. *Fam.* 9.26.2 (= *inc. inc. trag.* 61 *ROL*); *Fam.* 7.10.4 (= *Ter. Hau.* 86).

<sup>35</sup> E.g. *Fam.* 9.7.2 (= *Enn. Ann.* 306 *ROL*); *Att.* 7.3.10 (= *Ter. Eu.* 539).

<sup>36</sup> E.g. *Att.* 2.19.2 (= *Enn. Ann.* 360 *ROL*); *Fam.* 9.26.2 (= *inc. inc. trag.* 61 *ROL*).

<sup>37</sup> E.g. *Fam.* 1.9.19 (= *Ter. Eu.* 440-45); *Att.* 14.20.3 (= *Atil. ex inc. fab.* 1 *CRF*).



in which Cicero integrates poetry into his prose is a method I will likewise apply to my analysis of quotations in his treatises. His task, as the appropriator of verse, is to shape and prepare a quotation to fit the context of his prose work; for that reason, as we shall see, there is much to be gained by paying close attention to the local quotation-environment and the immediate interaction between poetry and prose.

### ***Poetry in the Philosophical and Rhetorical Treatises***

It has long been noted that Cicero quotes poetry more frequently in his philosophical and rhetorical works than in his orations and letters.<sup>38</sup> This claim is true, but even within individual treatises on rhetoric and philosophy the number of poetic quotations, as it does in the speeches and letters, varies; Table 1 illustrates the total frequencies of poetic quotations in Cicero's philosophical and rhetorical treatises.<sup>39</sup>

Table 1  
Poetic Quotations in Cicero's Philosophical and Rhetorical Treatises

<b><i>Philosophica</i></b>	<b>No. of Quotes</b>	<b><i>Rhetorica</i></b>	<b>No. of Quotes</b>
<i>Tusc.</i>	106	<i>De Orat.</i>	54
<i>N.D.</i>	50	<i>Orat.</i>	30
<i>Diu.</i>	44	<i>Inu.</i>	13
<i>Fin.</i>	27	<i>Top.</i>	5
<i>Off.</i>	22	<i>Brut.</i>	4

<sup>38</sup> See, for example, Jocelyn 1973: 61; cf. Kubik 1887: 242, Zillinger 1911: 50-68.

<sup>39</sup> The totals of poetic quotations in Cicero's treatises, independently compiled, include instances of repetition, which, as we shall see especially in chapters four and five, constitute an important element of his art of quotation. Note that, for convenience's sake, I include the *Rep.* and *Leg.* as philosophical works even though they can rightly be defined as 'political' works.

Table 1 (Continued)

<i>Rep.</i>	13	<i>Opt. Gen.</i>	1
<i>Sen.</i>	12	<i>Part.</i>	0
<i>Luc.</i>	10	-----	-----
<i>Amic.</i>	6	-----	-----
<i>Fat.</i>	5	-----	-----
<i>Leg.</i>	3	-----	-----
<i>Parad.</i>	0	-----	-----
<i>Ac.</i>	0	-----	-----

These direct poetic quotations fall into three discernable categories: Latin quotations, Latinized Greek quotations, and self-quotations from Cicero's own poetry. An outline of the peculiarities of these categories and a review of the relevant scholarship will provide the foundation for a better understanding of the form and function of poetry in Cicero's treatises.

The first category of direct quotations, those taken from Latin poets such as Ennius, Accius, and Pacuvius, as well as from now anonymous sources, occurs frequently in Cicero's treatises. The presence of a direct Latin poetic quotation, a pure form of literary appropriation, in a prose work most clearly brings to the foreground the fusion of these two literary genres. Cicero, when he quotes from Ennius' *Annales*, elects to include in his prose narrative a selection from a work written in an entirely different register, a selection which, once inserted into the prose environment, no longer belongs exclusively to the poet. This fusion of prose and verse is always to the advantage of the prose medium – the verse, while it is generally allowed to maintain its poetic meter and some semblance of its original function, is de-poeticized: the

precise form of the verse is now subject to the prose author's handling and desired presentation and its import is defined by the context of the surrounding prose-environment.<sup>40</sup> Without these two basic conditions the insertion of a poetic quotation into a prose work would lack a defined purpose and its meaning, if any, would be obscure.

It has not passed unnoticed that Cicero only appropriates these direct Latin quotations from the early Roman poets. Apart from his own poetry, there is a virtual absence of poetic quotations from and very few references to contemporary poets, most notably Lucretius and Catullus.<sup>41</sup> Cicero's decision to disregard contemporary Latin poetry places him in an interesting position; not only does he neglect contemporary poets and their works, but he promotes himself as the foremost representative of the poets of the second half of first century B.C. The preponderance of quotations from older Roman poets in his treatises is to be explained, in part, by his desire to avoid anachronisms in those dialogues which have an early dramatic date: *Rep.* (129 B.C.), *Sen.* (150 B.C.), and *Amic.* (129 B.C.). Shackleton Bailey, who posits a connection between Cicero's dislike of the so-called 'neoteric' poets and his increased use of the old poets during the years of 56-54 B.C., views the abundance of poetic citations in his works of this period not only as representative of his Greek sources, but also as "literary seasoning" and an outlet "to air his enthusiasm for the

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<sup>40</sup> In terms of a prose author who quotes poetry there is, to my knowledge, no exclusive theoretical study of this phenomenon, but it is treated in passing by authors such as Plett 1988: 324, who says on this topic:

"As compared to the non-poetic types of quotations, the POETIC QUOTATION is characterized by its lack of an immediate practical purpose. Such a purpose can, however, be achieved, when a politician, a journalist or a salesman employs a poetic quotation in a non-poetic text. In this case the poetic quotation is de-poeticized, i.e. divested of its autotelic function and invested with the practical function of the respective quotation context."

Plett does not, however, examine this phenomenon in further detail, concentrating only on those instances where an author re-employs poetic material in his own poetic text.

<sup>41</sup> E.g. Q. Scaevola's epigram at *Leg.* 1.2. Cf. *Q. fr.* 2.10.3: *Lucreti poemata ut scribis ita sunt, multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis, sed cum ueneris.*

good old writers whom Euphorion's disciples scorned".<sup>42</sup> Shackleton Bailey further conjectures that Cicero lacked the inspiration to utilize quotations from contemporary poets such as Catullus and Lucretius, and that this shortcoming was perhaps due to personal vanity and self-esteem issues (see, esp., pp. 241, 249).

While it is possible that Cicero felt threatened by the literary success of these contemporary poets, such psychological arguments are not particularly helpful for attempting to understand the actual roles which quotations play in a treatise. Indeed, Shackleton Bailey, although he establishes some useful limits, both temporal and topical, to Cicero's use of poetry, gives little consideration to individual instances of quotations in his works. In order to gain a better understanding and appreciation of the worth of these Latin quotations and the roles they play within a treatise, there is a need for specific analyses of poetry which take into consideration the context and conditions of their new prose environment.

The second category of poetic quotations in the works of Cicero consists of those which he draws from Greek authors such as Homer and Aeschylus and then translates into Latin.<sup>43</sup> His practice of translating Greek poetry into Latin is in keeping with the protocol of his rhetorical and philosophical works wherein he consciously avoids Greek words, phrases, and quotations.<sup>44</sup> This category of quotation, then, involves poetry which is further removed from the original poetic source by virtue of its being translated from Greek into Latin. In turn, this process of translation affords Cicero (or an interlocutor) a greater opportunity than exists in the case of a direct Latin

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<sup>42</sup> Shackleton Bailey 1983: 243-44.

<sup>43</sup> On Cicero as a translator of Greek, see, for example, Ewbank 1933, Jones 1959, Powell 1995a.

<sup>44</sup> For this point, see Jocelyn 1973: 65. Cf. *de Orat.* 1.144, *Tusc.* 1.15, *Orat.* 132, *Ac.* 1.25, *Fin.* 2.13, 3.15, *Off.* 1.111.

quotation to manipulate, for a specific purpose, the meaning and language of the poetic source-text.<sup>45</sup>

In his study of these Latinized quotations, H. D. Jocelyn argues that the haste with which Cicero composed his philosophical treatises produces errors or inconsistencies that allow the underlying Greek model to shine through.<sup>46</sup> According to Jocelyn the ‘Greek’ poetry which he employs in these works plays a part in uncovering or, rather, betraying this haste and he conjectures that Cicero either merely replaced Greek quotations with an available Latin equivalent, replaced Greek quotations with a closely related but not exact Latin equivalent, or added quotations beyond those found in the source material.<sup>47</sup> This kind of reductionism in the case of Cicero’s philosophical treatises runs the risk of circularity, since, for the most part we have do not have the prior Greek models. Jocelyn does not, however, discount the productive nature of these Latinized poetic quotations as this comment makes clear (p. 77):

A decisive indication that Cicero at least very often took quotations of and references to Greek poems from his philosophical sources is provided by his tendency to translate Greek verses with more attention to the argument they were supposed to support than to their original context or actual wording.

Jocelyn follows this statement concerning Cicero’s adaptation of his sources with a comparison between eight Latinized quotations and their Greek originals. Jocelyn’s analysis of these eight examples is terse and he concludes that Cicero adapted both the

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<sup>45</sup> Jocelyn 1973: 73 notes that, while other characters in Cicero’s dialogues often refer indirectly to Greek poetry, it is Cicero himself (or to be more precise Marcus) who customarily quotes Latinized Greek verses.

<sup>46</sup> See, especially, Jocelyn 1973: 74-75.

<sup>47</sup> Jocelyn 1973: 75.

verse and the argument from a single Greek source (p. 79). When, however, Jocelyn applies (pp. 98-111) his source-based method to Cicero's translation of a section from Aeschylus' *Prometheus Lyomenos* (*Tusc.* 2.23-25 [= Cic. 33 *FPL*]), his findings suggest to us the expertise with which he employs poetry.

Cicero's translation from Aeschylus' *Prometheus Lyomenos* is one of the few from a Greek tragedy where the original is not extant.<sup>48</sup> Jocelyn's approach is to compare the details of Cicero's translation to the story found in the *Prometheus Desmotes* and to draw attention to the differences between them, which, among others, are as follows: (1) Cicero adapts or omits details in his version to suit the context; (2) Cicero, helpless to do otherwise, inserts into his translation traditional Roman beliefs and (religious) practices; (3) Cicero (or his source) are guilty of outright error.<sup>49</sup> These findings, while designed to demonstrate Cicero's inaccuracy as a translator, equally suggest that he is striving for originality in his use of poetry. If he adapts a poetic quotation to suit the new Roman prose context, then we should view this manipulation as a component of his art of quotation rather than an error or the product of haste. As we shall see, even in the case of direct Latin quotations, Cicero is willing and able to manipulate and emphasize various aspects of the verse, thus further subordinating the poetry to the new prose environment.

The final category of direct quotation in Cicero's treatises, while it is perhaps a subset of direct Latin quotations, nevertheless deserves special mention. This category comprises those quotations which stem from Cicero's own poetry, which, as we have seen, are the primary instances of contemporary poetry in his works.<sup>50</sup> A notable

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<sup>48</sup> For two other Latinized quotations in Cicero's works where the Greek 'original' is lacking, see Jocelyn 1973: 98 n. 292.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Douglas 1985: ad loc., who, besides summarizing Jocelyn's findings, states: "It should be added that no one would have found these departures from the original the least shocking or even surprising in a 'translation'. Sheer errors are another matter."

<sup>50</sup> See above 10-11.

feature of Cicero's use of his own poetry in his dialogues is that it is invariably either himself or his brother Quintus who quotes it. The reasons for this restriction, beyond the risk of anachronism, are unclear, but B. Krostenko, for example, views the passages which Quintus cites in the *Diu.* from the *Mar.* and *Cons.* as Cicero's "attempt to distance himself, as part of a larger effort to grapple with the issue of the use of religious symbols in public life, from a mode of symbolic expression that ... become distasteful to him."<sup>51</sup> Krostenko's analysis of Cicero's self-quotations reinforces the need to consider at all times the context in which the poetry appears, since, as the coordinator of a prose narrative, he distances himself from his station as a poet when he (or his brother) quotes his own poetry.<sup>52</sup>

### ***In Defense of the Roman Poets of Old***

Now that we have observed the various categories of poetic quotation in Cicero's treatises, it still remains to determine some specific reasons for what poetry means to him and why he chooses to employ poetry in his philosophical and rhetorical treatises. The answer to this query is threefold: his fondness for the early Roman poets, the nature of philosophical discourse, and the training involved for an orator. Consideration of key passages in Cicero's treatises will demonstrate that he quotes poetry for deliberate and significant purposes, rather than for the sake of mere adornment or variety or because he unthinkingly copied his sources.

In the *Fin.* Cicero defends the older poets of Rome against a perceived Hellenistic bias (1.4-5). By way of justifying his rendering of Greek philosophy into

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<sup>51</sup> Krostenko 2000: 355.

<sup>52</sup> In his commentary on Cicero's poetry W. W. Ewbank (1933) focuses, where applicable, "on Cicero's merits and demerits as a translator" (vii). Ewbank's propensity to concentrate his efforts on comparisons between Cicero's poems and the Greek originals de-contextualizes the poetic quotation in question, with the result that one is often left to wonder why Cicero has made certain changes (omissions or additions) in his translations. Cf. Courtney 1993, whose section on the poems of Cicero consists of that verse which can be truly considered fragmentary and Roman (pp. 149-78).

Latin, he implies that anyone who would profess a contempt for Latin writings and reject the *Medea* of Ennius or the *Antiope* of Pacuvius in favor of the corresponding plays of Euripides is “hostile, one might almost say, to the very name of Roman.”<sup>53</sup> Following this anti-Hellenic statement and even though he admits that Atilius’ translation of Sophocles’ *Electra* is poor, he argues that it is a translation which should still be read.<sup>54</sup> Cicero continues to promote Roman literature when he claims that anyone who is completely ignorant (*rudis*) of Latin poets either suffers from extreme mental inactivity or has a most excessive and capricious refinement in literary taste.<sup>55</sup> Conversely, he also argues that knowledge of native Latin literature is necessary for someone to be considered truly well-educated (*eruditi*, 1.5).<sup>56</sup> A sense of nationalistic pride, then, is part of the reason why Cicero quotes Latin poetry and, in particular, the older Roman poets.

In the *Tusc.* Cicero reveals another reason for why he quotes poetry in philosophical discussions. After the interlocutor M. has quoted his own version of a lengthy passage from Aeschylus’ *Prometheus Lyomenos*,<sup>57</sup> A. asks him where the verses are from (*unde isti uersus? non enim agnosco*, *Tusc.* 2.26). M. responds to this question by reminding A. of how some philosophers at Athens include verse in their discourses (*animaduertebas igitur, etsi tum nemo erat admodum copiosus, uerum*

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<sup>53</sup> *Quis enim tam inimicus paene nomini Romano est, qui Enni Medeam aut Antiopam Pacuui spernat aut reiciat quod se isdem Euripidi fabulis delectari dicat, Latinas litteras oderit?* (*Fin.* 1.4). Cf. Reid 1925: ad loc. for a discussion of various issues related to this statement.

<sup>54</sup> *A quibus tantum dissentio ut, cum Sophocles uel optime scripserit Electram, tamen male conuersam Atili mihi legendam putem, de quo Licinius ‘ferreum scriptorem’, uerum, opinor, scriptorem tamen, ut legendus sit* (*Fin.* 1.5).

<sup>55</sup> *Rudem enim esse omnino in nostris poetis aut inertissimae segnitiae est aut fastidi delicatissimi* (*Fin.* 1.5).

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *Opt. Gen.* 18, where, in a passage admittedly fraught with textual difficulties, Cicero answers two related objections concerning his translations of Demosthenes and Aeschines: “The Greeks do it better (*uerum melius Graeci*), so why should I read the Latin translation (*quid istas potius legem quam Graecas?*)” In response, Cicero tersely asks whether they could do any better in Latin and then points out that people have no aversion to reading translations of Greek poetry, such as the plays of Terence, Caecilius, and Ennius.

<sup>57</sup> 33 *FPL*.



*tamen uersus ab his admisceri orationi*, *Tusc.* 2.26). M. then discloses to A. his preference, following the apt model of Philo rather than the mechanical method of Dionysius the Stoic, for quoting Roman poets in “declamations of the elderly”.<sup>58</sup>

A. Ac multos quidem a Dionysio Stoico. M. probe dicis. sed is quasi dictata, nullo dilectu, nulla elegantia. Philo et proprium numerum et lecta poemata et loco adiungebat. itaque postquam adamaui hanc quasi senilem declamationem, studiose equidem utor nostris poetis; sed sicubi illi defecerunt, uerti etiam multa de Graecis, ne quo ornamento in hoc genere disputationis careret Latina oratio (*Tusc.* 2.26).

It is important to note that, in the absence of appropriate and desired Latin poetry, M. will translate Greek poetry into Latin, thus ensuring a presence of poetry in this type of discussion. These statements from the *Fin.* and the *Tusc.* indicate how highly Cicero regards the Roman poets as well as justify and explain the use of poetry in his philosophical treatises – if his literary project is to create for Romans a corpus of Greek philosophy, then he will do all he can to bring the older Roman poets and their works with him.

A further significant reason why Cicero is fond of quoting poets is that poetry and the dramatic arts play a fundamental part in the training of the orator. On more than one occasion he draws a connection between the orator and the poet. At *de Orat.* 1.11 he states that it is among the orators and poets where the smallest number of outstanding men (*egregii*) is found, while at *de Orat.* 1.70 Crassus asserts that the poet is a near kinsman to the orator (*finitimus oratori poeta*) in terms of using rhythm.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Cf. *Tusc.* 1.7; for the *senilis declamatio*, see Douglas 1962: 47.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *de Orat.* 3.27.

Later in the *de Orat.* Crassus mentions the utility of reading and knowing poetry (1.154) and maintains that it is essential for the perfect orator to read and analyze the works of poets, along with other forms of writing (1.158). Plutarch relates that the Roman actor Roscius taught Cicero elocution (*Cic.* 5) and at *de Orat.* 1.128 Antonius declares that the orator must have a near poetic diction (*uerba prope poetarum*), the voice of a tragedian (*uox tragoedorum*), and the bearing almost of the best actor (*gestus paene actorum*).<sup>60</sup> Indeed, at *de Orat.* 3.217-19 Cicero has Crassus make liberal use of poetic quotations to illustrate the art of the orator's delivery. In Cicero's view, then, poetry is both an educational and illustrative tool for the orator, who finds in the dramatic actor a stage-based parallel to his real-life oratorical pursuits.<sup>61</sup>

Beyond the specialized philosophical and rhetorical applications of poetry, it is also worth noting that verse provides an element of pleasure for the reader or listener. At *Orat.* 174 when discussing the origins of prose rhythm, Cicero asserts that Isocrates, upon noticing that people listen to poetry with pleasure (*cum uoluptate*), sought a rhythmic counterpart for prose. Similarly, Balbus, at *N.D.* 2.104, before he quotes extensively from Cicero's translation of Aratus says that it gave him so much delight (*delectare*) that he committed many passages to memory, while at *Diu.* 1.17 Quintus prefaces a quotation from his brother's *Cons.* with a confession that he has learned the poem by heart and with pleasure (*lubenter*).<sup>62</sup> The simple enjoyment which comes from knowing poetry, then, is part of the equation for why Cicero and his interlocutors have at hand and are able to quote a variety of poetic passages in the course of their philosophical and rhetorical discussions.

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<sup>60</sup> Cf. *de Orat.* 3.39, 3.48, where an increased diction is attributed to reading the works of orators and poets.

<sup>61</sup> *Haec eo dico pluribus, quod genus hoc totum oratores, qui sunt ueritatis ipsius actores, reliquerunt; imitatores autem ueritatis histriones occupauerunt* (*de Orat.* 3.214).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *Diu.* 2.14.

Conversely, Cicero, true to the skeptical tendencies of the New Academy, also reveals a critical attitude with respect to the poets and their works.<sup>63</sup> Following his declaration at *Tusc.* 2.26 that he likes to use poetry during a discussion (*disputatio*) M. remarks that poets make too much of pain in their works and lead men into effeminacy.<sup>64</sup> Later in the *Tusc.*, at 4.69-71, M. blames the poets, in particular the comic poets, for their excited portrayal of erotic love and ironically exclaims: *O praeclaram emendatricem uitae poeticam!* (4.69). M. follows each of these critiques of poets with a parallel attack on Epicurean philosophy, while, in the *Fin.*, the Epicurean Torquatus reveals his own contempt of poetry.<sup>65</sup>

Individual poets also receive criticism as well as praise. Cicero, while he hesitantly declares Pacuvius and Caecilius the supreme tragic and comic poets,<sup>66</sup> both praises and criticizes their style.<sup>67</sup> His opinion of Lucilius also vacillates; on one occasion he calls him a *homo doctus et perurbanus* (*de Orat.* 2.25), while on another (*Fin.* 1.7) he declares that his works, while they display a ‘consummate wit’ (*urbanitas summa*), are also ‘moderately learned’ (*doctrina mediocris*). Even Ennius, Cicero’s favorite poet, receives censure for his disparaging comments regarding his literary predecessor Naevius.<sup>68</sup>

Cicero’s vacillations of praise and censure with respect to the poets and their works are, as we shall see, reflected in his use of the poetry itself. These apparently conflicting views are not only explained by his adherence to the skeptical stance of the New Academy and by his training as a legal advocate, but also by a sense of dramatic

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<sup>63</sup> For Cicero’s relationship to the tenets of the New Academy, see Burkert 1965. Cf. D’Alton 1962: 147-49.

<sup>64</sup> *Sed uidesne poetae quid mali afferant? lamentantes inducunt fortissimos uiros, molliunt animos nostros, ita sunt deinde dulces, ut non legantur modo, sed etiam ediscantur* (*Tusc.* 2.27).

<sup>65</sup> *An ille tempus aut in poetis euoluendis, ut ego et Triarius te hortatore facimus, consumeret, in quibus nulla solida utilitas omnisque puerilis est delectatio?* (*Fin.* 1.72).

<sup>66</sup> *Opt. Gen.* 1.2.

<sup>67</sup> *De Orat.* 1.187, 3.27, *Orat.* 155, *Brut.* 258.

<sup>68</sup> *Brut.* 71, 75-76; cf. *Orat.* 171.

propriety within a dialogue,<sup>69</sup> since it is to a large extent the characters that define and, ultimately, contest the meaning of poetry.<sup>70</sup>

### ***Cicero's Originality and Literary Worth***

*Scito enim conferentem auctores me deprehendisse a iuratissimis ex proximis ueteres transcriptos ad uerbum neque nominatos, non illa Vergiliana uirtute, ut certarent, non Tulliana simplicitate, qui de re publica Platonis se comitem profitetur, in consolatione filiae "Crantorem", inquit, "sequor," item Panaetium de officiis, quae uolumina ediscenda, non modo in manibus cotidie habenda, nosti (Plin. Nat. praef. 22).*

Before we turn to our investigation of Cicero's use of poetry and his art of quotation, it is necessary to address a now fading criticism which scholars have directed at his treatises, that is: his philosophical and rhetorical works are, in some way, deficient as works of literature.<sup>71</sup> The philosophical works, for instance, are often criticized for lacking originality and for being little more than a hodgepodge of translations from Greek to Latin.<sup>72</sup> This perceived reliance on Greek sources has led some scholars to conclude that Cicero composed his works in haste and in error. To take the *Off.* as an example, A. Dyck claims that the three books of this work were "written with speed and with the argument not seldom delineated in broad strokes", were "dashed off at a remarkably quick rate," and were composed with "little specific

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<sup>69</sup> Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 2.17.5-6: *Quidam naturalem esse rhetoricen uolunt et tamen adiuuari exercitatione non diffitentur, ut in libris Ciceronis de Oratore dicit Antonius obseruationem quandam esse, non artem. quod non ideo ut pro uero accipiamus est positum, sed ut Antoni persona seruetur, qui dissimulator artis fuit: hanc autem opinionem habuisse Lysias uidetur.*

<sup>70</sup> Cicero was also keenly aware of the poet's pre-eminence in terms of achieving dramatic decorum. For example, at *Off.* 1.97 he tells his son how the poets assess and provide for each person fitting (*decorum*) characters, thus providing a fruitful resource for illustrating correct behavior. Cf. *Orat.* 74.

<sup>71</sup> See, for example, Douglas 1965.

<sup>72</sup> E.g. Douglas 1965: 136; cf. Striker 1995: 56, who, in comparison to the treatment given to Cicero's philosophical works, points to the increasing seriousness with which scholars treat the philosophical works of Philo and Antiochus; in this respect, see, for Philo, Tarrant 1985, Brittain 2001; for Antiochus, see Glucker 1978.

preparation.”<sup>73</sup> Likewise, Griffin and Atkins, although they do not go so far as to allege that Cicero did little more than transcribe his Greek sources, conclude that the *Off.* was written quickly and that this haste engenders “a certain carelessness in structure and argument, a tendency to repetition, and occasionally irrelevance.”<sup>74</sup>

Charges of haste and sloppiness are also leveled at Cicero’s rhetorical treatise the *de Orat.*<sup>75</sup> G. Kennedy, who views Cicero as an unoriginal thinker, feels that the dialogue form of the *de Orat.*, although it has some merit, merely “covers up imprecision”.<sup>76</sup> Kennedy criticizes the dialogue’s speeches for their resemblance to real conversations in which the interlocutors forget or change their views and in which any agreement is the result of lassitude or politeness, stating that “the dramatic situation and the characterization are not really good enough to make the work stand alone as a purely literary achievement.”<sup>77</sup> Similarly, K. Barwick, on the basis of what he perceives to be Crassus holding differing opinions on the kinds of knowledge the orator should possess (*de Orat.* 1.46, 48-73, 3.19-147), argues that Cicero copied his sources oblivious to their conflicting views.<sup>78</sup>

Fortunately, there is currently an increased readiness to regard Cicero both as an accomplished philosophical adherent in his own right and as a literary composer of note. G. Striker, for example, who is sympathetic to the intrinsic worth of Cicero’s philosophical corpus, argues that philosophical originality was not a prerequisite or even a desideratum in Cicero’s time, a period which was characterized instead by the effort to link doctrines with the earlier pre-eminent philosophical thinkers – e.g. Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, the belief that originality and worthwhile

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<sup>73</sup> Dyck 1996: 37, 39.

<sup>74</sup> Griffin and Atkins 1991: xix.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Vickers 1988: 34, 36; Kennedy 1972: 212, 226, 1994: 145-46.

<sup>76</sup> Kennedy 1994: 146.

<sup>77</sup> Kennedy 1994: 146.

<sup>78</sup> Barwick 1963: 35-39.

<sup>79</sup> Striker 1995: 56. Cf. Sedley 1989.

philosophical thought are one and same is a notion difficult to apply to the works of Cicero, since for the most part his sources are lost. Even in the case of his *Rep.* and *Leg.* – treatises that are likely to be his most ‘original’ – their fragmentary nature hinders any efforts to discern the level of their originality.<sup>80</sup> Even A. Dyck, a self-confessed proponent of philosophical ‘Source-Criticism’, devotes a considerable amount of space in the introduction to his commentary on Cicero’s *Off.* to distancing himself from the earlier efforts of such scholars as M. Pohlenz.<sup>81</sup> Indeed, Dyck states that “it will be clear that source-criticism is practiced here not as an end in itself but as one of several ways of shedding light on the background of *Off.* as we have it.”<sup>82</sup> As for positive critiques of Cicero’s rhetorical works, J. Hall views the distinctly Roman aristocratic exchanges in the *de Orat.* as evidence for his skill as a writer of dialogue,<sup>83</sup> while May and Wisse point out that the techniques of repetition and variation in the *de Orat.* are a necessary part of the persuasive element of the dialogue and that variations, such as that which Barwick criticizes, are “carefully orchestrated”.<sup>84</sup>

This renewed enthusiasm for the literary worth of Cicero’s treatises is important. It is only once we recognize that his treatises are worthy literary products that any study of his art of quotation is elevated above mere triviality. The view that Cicero merely replaces Greek quotations in his sources with Latin variants or rushed translations precludes a serious treatment of the occurrence the poetic quotations in his treatises – a treatment which must acknowledge the form and function of poetry in, above all else, the context of its new Ciceronian prose environment.

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<sup>80</sup> Striker 1995: 56, who also points out that a great deal of work remains to be done just to reconstruct the actual arguments in the *Rep.* and the *Leg.* never mind identifying the Greek authorities behind them.

<sup>81</sup> Dyck 1996: 18-21.

<sup>82</sup> Dyck 1996: 21.

<sup>83</sup> Striker 1995; Hall 1994.

<sup>84</sup> May and Wisse 2002: 18-19.

### *Cicero as Source Material: Taking Back the Poetry*

An issue related or consequential to the criticism of Cicero's literary worth and originality is the tendency to utilize his works as source material, most notably for the study of the Hellenistic schools of philosophy. The inclination to treat his philosophic works as convenient reservoirs containing excerpts from other philosophical schools is evident in such collections as those of R. Hirzel, E. Usener, and H. F. A. von Arnim.<sup>85</sup> These editions, while they provide a convenient resource for scholars, undercut the unity and validity of Cicero's philosophical corpus, instead prioritizing its role as a preserver of Hellenistic material and affording the student of this field the means to dispense with extraneous details.

A situation equivalent to this industry of Hellenic source material is found in the study of poetic material in Cicero's works. As is the case when one treats his works as depositories of Hellenistic philosophical thought, so too various compendiums of poetry run the risk of depriving the quotations of their full function within a particular work. Thus, for example, poetic fragments of Ennius are first extracted from the Ciceronian text and then compiled in a separate edition exclusive to the poet. This process undergoes further sub-division depending on whether a specific Ennian fragment derives from his *Annales* (Skutsch: 1986), his tragedies (Jocelyn: 1967), or other, more obscure, works (Courtney: 1993). If, as is the case with these editions, the fragments are accompanied by comments, then the student of Cicero is provided with much useful and important information, e.g. textual observations and emendations, comparative investigations of other sources, and concordances to other collections. In addition, the attempted reconstruction of an Ennian narrative, whether from the *Annales* or a tragedy, affords us an insight into the possible imagery and allusion which an isolated fragment may have suggested to the Roman reader when he

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<sup>85</sup> Hirzel 1877-83, Usener 1887, Arnim 1903-24.

encounters it in a work of Cicero. Nonetheless, at all times it is paramount to bear in mind that the various poetic fragments found in his treatises fulfill this function first and foremost and that their preservation is simply a by-product of his desire to quote it in a prose work. My primary approach in this study, then, is to consider philologically the poetic quotations in the works of Cicero on their own terms, that is: in the context of the prose environment and narrative of a Ciceronian treatise.

### ***Outline of the Project***

The recent publication of L. Spahlinger ably demonstrates the potential benefits of studying citations in Cicero's works. Spahlinger assesses Pliny the Elder's comment (*Nat. praef.* 22) which reduces Cicero's philosophical works to the mere Latinizing of Greek sources.<sup>86</sup> In an effort to refute Pliny's view Spahlinger considers instances of verse and prose citations in the philosophical works of Cicero, instances which he analyzes according to the following basic criteria: (1) citation content; (2) original context of the citation; (3) new context into which the citation is inserted.<sup>87</sup> Among the conclusions which Spahlinger reaches are the following: citations outline the character and the *persona* of the speaker more closely (*Ethopoie*; esp. ch. 2.1), provide historical plausibility (esp. ch. 2.2), and help to organize the philosophical material (esp. ch. 2.3). While Spahlinger restricts his examples to Cicero's philosophical treatises,<sup>88</sup> his work, the first extended treatment of citations outside of the letters (see above pp. 5-8), demonstrates the productive value in studying citations in Cicero's treatises. Indeed, as he admits at the conclusion of his study, more work

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<sup>86</sup> Spahlinger 2005. For the passage from Pliny's *Nat. praef.*, see above 19.

<sup>87</sup> Here, Spahlinger adapts the theory of quotation expounded by Plett 1991a: 24.

<sup>88</sup> Chapter 2.1: speeches in the *Sen.*; chapter 2.2: Epicurean and Stoic speeches in *N.D.*, *Fin.*, and *Q.* Cicero in *Diu.*; chapter 2.3: book 1 of the *Tusc.*; chapter 2.4: Cato and self-citations in *Off.*



needs to be done in order to fully appreciate the role citations play in Cicero's prose works.<sup>89</sup>

The foundation of this study, which focuses solely on advancing our knowledge of Cicero's use of poetry, comprises two simple albeit fundamental elements. First, my investigation into his use of poetic quotations includes both his philosophical and rhetorical treatises. His treatises, even though they are frequently classified as either philosophical or rhetorical works, often contain a mixture of philosophy and rhetoric.<sup>90</sup> For this reason and due to the philological nature of my investigation, I consider instances from a wide cross-section of the treatises. Second, my study revolves around a series of inter- and intratextual analyses. Previous studies of poetry in Cicero's works have by and large neglected detailed intertextual comparisons between his use of poetry and that of his contemporaries – such comparisons, however, are a necessary and essential starting point if we want to acquire a broad yet informed picture of his art of quotation. Intratextual analyses, on the other hand, provide the opportunity to examine poetry's role in the wide expanse of a dialogue – it is especially in Cicero's philosophical and rhetorical treatises, works which consist of a much more intricate structure than the letters or even the orations, that we can appreciate the variegated functions of poetic quotations. My inter- and intratextual studies of these quotations are as follows.

In chapter 2, "Beginnings: The *De Inuentione* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*", Cicero's early rhetorical treatise the *Inu.* finds, in the form of the *Rhet. Her.*, a work containing a parallel treatment of rhetorical theory and numerous poetic quotations, several of which are common to both treatises. In chapter 3, "Cicero and Varro: The Farming of Linguistics and Ciceronian Correspondences", we move

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<sup>89</sup> Spahlinger 2005: 343.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Gaines 2002: 445-80 for discussion of Cicero's fusion of rhetoric and philosophy in the *Part. and Top.*

forward several decades after the publication of the *Inu.* in order to compare Cicero's 'mature' treatises with Varro's contemporaneous linguistic treatise the *de Lingua Latina* (*L.*) and his nearly contemporaneous dialogue the *Res Rusticae* (*R.*). Both of these intertextual analyses will not only demonstrate several basic and advanced fundamentals of a Latin prose author's employment of poetic quotations, but they will also reveal that Cicero's art of quotation is more innovative, flexible, and vibrant than that of his contemporaries.

With the knowledge that Cicero uses poetry in a unique and highly significant manner, I will then turn my attention to detailed intratextual examinations of the role that poetry plays in two of his treatises: Cicero's rhetorical treatise the *de Orat.* (chapter 4) and his philosophical treatise the *Diu.* (chapter 5).

In chapter 4, "Staged: Poetic Occurrence and Re-Occurrence in the *de Oratore*", I will examine in detail various poetic quotations which the interlocutors Crassus and Antonius employ in the *de Orat.* In chapter 5, "Overturnings: Poetic Quotations in Book 2 of the *De Divinatione*", I will investigate the various ways in which poetic quotations facilitate a degree of interconnectivity between the first and second books of the *Diu.* In addition, I will consider how Marcus uses poetry to refute of the views of his brother and interlocutor Quintus. The key to these two intratextual investigations will be the repetition of or referencing to poetic quotations. Of particular interest is the practice of interlocutors to contest ownership of the same poetry during the course of their discussions. The malleable nature of poetry in a prose work (a feature which we will examine in chapters 2 and 3) is increased in these extended environments and quotations constitute within a dialogue a key element in resolving several aporetic situations.

Ultimately, even though Cicero was not the only Republican Latin author to use poetry in a prose work, it is my aim to demonstrate, through direct comparisons

and discrete investigations, that the various uses of verse in the *Inu.* and his later 'mature' treatises set his art of quotation apart from and above his literary contemporaries, the author of the *Rhet. Her.* and Varro.

## CHAPTER 2

### BEGINNINGS: THE *DE INVENTIONE* AND THE *RHETORICA AD HERENNIIUM*

Cicero's earliest treatise, the *de Inuentione* (*Inu.*), and the nearly contemporary *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (*Rhet. Her.*) are, broadly speaking, sister-texts.<sup>1</sup> These two works treat a similar rhetorical subject and are written in a comparable style.<sup>2</sup> Both works date to the early part of the first century B.C. and as such comprise the two earliest extant rhetorical treatises in Latin. Both works include brief expository prologues which situate rhetoric in a specifically Roman cultural and philosophical context and which reflect the distinctly Roman material both authors draw upon to illustrate the tools necessary to become a successful public speaker. And, important for our purposes of investigating the art of quotation, both works not only have roughly the same amount of poetic quotations, they also feature several instances where the same quotation is employed. In fact, these treatises are so similar in many respects that the *Rhet. Her.* was once thought to be the work of Cicero; despite various attempts, however, the author of this treatise remains unknown (henceforth referred to as Auctor).<sup>3</sup>

These two works, then, because of the many similarities between them and because there is a dearth of any prior or contemporary extant Latin prose texts featuring poetry, provide an ideal and natural starting point for examining the use of quotations in Cicero's works.<sup>4</sup> I will conduct my initial analysis of Cicero's art of

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<sup>1</sup> Adamietz 1960: 11-93 provides the most extensive examination of the correspondences between these two works. For a useful discussion of the relationship between the *Inu.* and the *Rhet. Her.*, see Fantham 2004: 140-42.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Walker 2000: 59-65.

<sup>3</sup> Despite various attempts to identify the author of *Rhet. Her.* no satisfactory conclusions have been reached, though several scholars have attributed the work to a certain Cornificius; for this identification, see, for example, Kennedy 1972: 111-12, 134, Adamik 1998: 280-81. Cf. Caplan 1954: ix-xiv who opposes this view.

<sup>4</sup> The *de Agri Cultura* of Cato, for example, our earliest piece of connected Latin prose, is devoid of poetry. Furthermore, his *Carmen de Moribus* is thought to be a work in prose (cf. Astin 1978: 185-86)

quotation by comparing the various techniques the two authors use to quote poetry in the *Inu.* and the *Rhet. Her.* An investigation of how poetry is employed in these works will establish a basic outline of the techniques of citation and, in the process, create a frame of reference for when I examine quotations in Cicero's later, more mature, treatises as well as those in the works of his contemporary, Varro. Before I examine specific quotations in the *Inu.* and the *Rhet. Her.*, however, I will first provide a brief outline of the works.

The *Inu.*, treating only the topic of invention (*inuentio*), is Cicero's incomplete treatment of the five-fold division of rhetoric.<sup>5</sup> Conjectures of its precise date of composition range from 91-81 B.C.; the general consensus, however, argues for the earlier end of this spectrum.<sup>6</sup> The work consists of two books, the first of which opens with a prologue discussing the history and nature of eloquence (1-5), and then treats the six traditional parts of judicial oratory: exordium (20-26), narration (27-30), partition (31-33), confirmation (34-77), refutation (78-96), and peroration (98-109).<sup>7</sup> The second book, which begins with Cicero's defense of his eclectic method, discusses the three traditional types of oratory: forensic or judicial (*genus iudiciale*; 2.14-154), political or deliberative (*genus deliberativum*; 155-76), and epideictic or display (*genus demonstrativum*; 176-77).

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and the various sayings and maxims, some in hexameter, which are tenuously linked later to Cato are of little value when examining the use of poetry in a prose setting. Nonetheless, it is interesting that Cicero in the *de Senectute* has Cato quote liberally from the poets, e.g. *Sen.* 10, 14, 16, 20, 24.

<sup>5</sup> The *Inu.*'s original title *Rhetorici Libri* is indicative of Cicero's original plan to compose a thorough and systematic treatment of rhetoric.

<sup>6</sup> The only external evidence for the *Inu.*'s date of composition is Cicero's admission in the *de Orat.* that he composed the treatise as a 'boy or a very young man' (*de Orat.* 1.5). The only internal evidence is that it contains no reference to any event later than 91 B.C.; references to earlier periods of Roman history are, however, frequent, e.g. Crassus' consulship in 95 B.C. at *Inu.* 2.111. Cf. Greco 1998: 9-11 for a summary of the various views on the date of the *Inu.*

<sup>7</sup> Sections 5-9 of book 1 discuss the role, materials and divisions of eloquence; 10-19 the *constitutiones*; and 97 the digression (*digressio*). For a more comprehensive outline of book 1 of the *Inu.*, see Hubbell 1949: x-xi; for a full synopsis, see Murphy and Katula 2003: 159-66.

The *Rhet. Her.* is the first work to present in Latin a full treatment of the traditional five-fold division of the study of rhetoric: invention (*inuentio*), arrangement (*dispositio*), style (*elocutio*), memory (*memoria*), and delivery (*actio* or *pronuntiatio*). The date of its completion is unknown, though it is generally accepted that it was composed later than the *Inu.* most likely between 86-82 B.C.<sup>8</sup> The work, comprising four books, treats the topic of invention in the first two and at the beginning of the third (3.1-15), disposition (3.16-18), delivery (3.19-27), and memory (3.28-40) in the remainder of the third, and style in the fourth. The Auctor does not acknowledge the *Inu.* and there is no reason to believe that either work was dependent on the other. There remains the possibility, however, that the Auctor and Cicero share a common source; for example, the same teacher of rhetoric.<sup>9</sup>

### ***Poetry in the de Inuentione and the Rhetorica ad Herennium***

There are thirteen identifiable and discrete quotations in the *Inu.*, all of which appear in the first book.<sup>10</sup> Most of these quotations occur in three portions of the text: 1.27 (narration), 1.33 (partition), and 1.90-91 (refutation). The known poets which Cicero draws upon in this treatise are Ennius, Terence, Pacuvius, and Plautus. There are slightly more quotations in the *Rhet. Her.*, sixteen, which appear throughout all four books. Most of these quotations occur in two portions of the text: 2.35-42 (defective arguments) and 4.18 (artistic composition). The identifiable poets which the Auctor draws upon are Ennius, Pacuvius, and Plautus. I chart the occurrence of poetic quotations in these two works in Table 2:

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<sup>8</sup> For a summary of the various views concerning the date of the *Rhet. Her.* and for further references, see Corbeill 2002: 33.

<sup>9</sup> For an outline of the various theories regarding the nature of a possible common source for the *Inu.* and *Rhet. Her.* and for further references, see Corbeill 2002: 31-34.

<sup>10</sup> The certain identification of poetic quotations is, at times, an inexact science; by 'discrete' quotation I mean a portion of verse that in some way stands apart from nearby verse in the prose text, even if, for example, they together constitute in the original poetic source-text a continuous section of poetry.

Table 2

Poetic Quotations in the *De Inuentione* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*

Quotation Reference	<i>Inu.</i> Reference	<i>Rhet. Her.</i> Reference
Pl. <i>Trin.</i> 23-26	1.95	2.35 <sup>11</sup>
Enn. <i>Ann.</i> 109 <i>ROL</i>	-----	4.18
Enn. <i>Ann.</i> 238 <i>ROL</i>	1.27	-----
Enn. <i>sc.</i> 253-61 <i>ROL</i>	1.91 (= ll. 253-54)	2.34 (= ll. 253-61)
Enn. <i>sc.</i> 371-72 <i>ROL</i>	1.91	2.39
Enn. <i>fab. inc.</i> 432 <i>ROL</i>	-----	4.18
Enn. <i>spuria?</i> 41 <i>ROL</i>	-----	4.18
Enn. 125-28 Jocelyn	-----	2.38 <sup>12</sup>
Enn. 129-31 Jocelyn	-----	2.38 <sup>12</sup>
Ter. <i>Ad.</i> 60-64	1.27	-----
Ter. <i>An.</i> 49-50	1.33	-----
Ter. <i>An.</i> 51	1.27, 1.33	-----
Ter. <i>An.</i> 157	1.33	-----
Ter. <i>An.</i> 168	1.33	-----
Pac. <i>tr.</i> 242 <i>ROL</i>	1.27	-----
Pac. <i>tr.</i> 261-63 <i>ROL</i>	1.90	2.40
Pac. <i>inc. fab.</i> 37-46 <i>ROL</i>	-----	2.36
Acc. <i>tr.</i> 103-8 <i>ROL</i>	-----	2.42

<sup>11</sup> The Auctor interrupts the quotation from Plautus with a brief prose comment, see below 40-41.

<sup>12</sup> Marx 1894: 132, and 1923: 58 considered these lines to be the product of rhetorical schools as opposed to the work of a dramatist. On the basis of his arguments, Ribbeck in the third edition of his *TRF* (= Enn. 114-17 *TRF*) considered the first four trimeters suspect. Cf. Jocelyn 1967: 270-74 for an overview and analysis of the issues involved with these seven lines of verse.

Table 2 (Continued)

<i>Tr. inc. 49 ROL</i>	-----	3.34
<i>Tr. inc. 83-86 ROL</i>	1.83 (ll. 84-86)	2.42
<i>Tr. inc. 87 ROL</i>	-----	2.42
<i>Tr. inc. 139 ROL</i>	-----	2.39
<i>Inc. Inc. 2-4 CRF</i>	-----	1.14

I will undertake a select examination of how Cicero and the Auctor employ several of these quotations. This examination falls into two main parts.

The first part of my examination is an intertextual analysis of two of the five instances where Cicero and the Auctor employ the same quotation. In the *Inu.* Cicero employs these two quotations during his discussion of refutation (1.78-96) and I will compare them to the corresponding quotation found in the *Rhet. Her.*, each of which appears during the Auctor's discussion of faults (2.32-46). By examining Cicero's employment of these quotations alongside the Auctor's employment of the same, it will be possible to determine the basic art of poetic quotation in works of this style and period. These preliminary findings, derived from the first extant Latin prose works to feature poetic quotations, will also serve as a base of comparison for future investigation of quotations in Cicero's works.

In the second part of my examination, I will look at a fundamental difference between Cicero's and the Auctor's overall attitudes towards poetry. This examination first involves a return to Cicero's discussion of refutation and another intertextual analysis with the *Rhet. Her.*, through which we will observe the Auctor's hostile attitude to poets. Then I will consider a passage in the *Rhet. Her.* where the Auctor reveals his aversion to using poetry as a positive tool to strengthen or illustrate his



arguments. Following consideration of this passage, I will compare Cicero's discussion of narration (*narratio*) to the Auctor's almost verbatim account of the same topic, whereupon we will observe that while the Auctor chooses to dispense with verse altogether, Cicero is happy to employ poetry in a positive sense to illustrate his arguments.

### ***Intertextual Concordances: Accentuate the Negatives***

During his discussion of refutation (*reprehensio*; 1.78-96), Cicero employs five poetic quotations, all of which also appear in the *Rhet. Her.*; I will examine two intertextual sets of these quotations. Refutation, Cicero tells us, is a method of argumentation which an orator uses to weaken, invalidate, or make light of an adversary's proof (*confirmatio*).<sup>13</sup> The two quotations I will examine demonstrate, in conjunction with the corresponding treatments of the same quotations in the *Rhet. Her.*, the technique of authorial manipulation of verse. Specifically, we will observe the ability of a prose author to manipulate a selection of verse to meet his individual needs – needs which on occasion run counter to the poet's original intent. This ability to modify the impact of poetry on a case-by-case basis is a fundamental tool with which the prose author handles poetic material.

The first of the two quotations which illustrate the technique of manipulation appears at *Inu.* 1.83, where Cicero is discussing how to attack statements which are made with the implication that they are necessarily true. In particular, Cicero seeks to demonstrate the two ways by which one is able to answer a false dilemma: either by conversion or by the denial of one part. Cicero begins his demonstration of a false dilemma by quoting three anonymous lines of verse (*Inu.* 1.83):

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<sup>13</sup> *Reprehensio est per quam argumentando aduersariorum confirmatio diluitur aut infirmatur aut eleuatur (Inu. 1.78).*

Quae uero sicuti necessaria dicentur, ea si forte imitabuntur modo necessariam argumentationem neque erunt eiusmodi, sic reprehenduntur: primum comprehensio quae utrum concesseris debet tollere, si uera est, numquam reprehendetur; sin falsa, duobus modis, aut conuersione aut alterius partis infirmatione; [conuersione],<sup>14</sup> hoc modo:

nam si ueretur, quid eum accuses, qui est probus?  
sin inuerecundum animi ingenium possidet,  
quid autem eum accuses qui id parui auditum aestimet?<sup>15</sup>  
hic, siue uereri dixeris siue non uereri, concedendum hoc putat ut neges esse accusandum.

When considering a quotation and the environment in which it appears there are three basic elements to note: the introduction to the quotation, the content of the quotation, and the post-quotation prose. In this instance, Cicero caps the introduction to the quotation with the generic phrase *hoc modo*. This phrase indicates that an example, in this case poetic, is to follow;<sup>16</sup> here, the identity of the poet, the play, and the character are either assumed as understood or, perhaps, secondary to the quotation's purpose of providing an example of a statement which is made as if necessarily true. The quotation itself appears to contain a figure addressing someone on the verge of accusing a man on an unspecified charge, although it could conceivably also constitute

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<sup>14</sup> I follow Ströbel 1915: ad loc. in bracketing *conuersione*; indeed, it makes little sense for Cicero to introduce the quotation specifically as an example of answering a false dilemma by conversion, since the quotation serves not only as the basis for refutation by conversion, but also by the denial of one alternative. Furthermore, the quotation itself does not constitute in any way an example of conversion.

<sup>15</sup> *Tr. inc.* 84-86 *ROL*.

<sup>16</sup> For *hoc modo* ('in this manner or fashion'), see *OLD modus* 11a.

a character's monologue.<sup>17</sup> The first word Cicero writes after the quotation is the pronoun *hic*, which could be either the locative adverb form referring to the verse or the nominative pronominal form referring to the speaker and in agreement with the verb *putat*. In any case, this *hic* alerts the reader that the quotation is still under consideration and with this sentence Cicero interprets, in language borrowed from the quotation, what the speaker of the verse thinks (*putat*) someone will say in response to his arguments (*dixeris / neges*) – I will postpone for the moment discussion of the possible subject of the verbs *dixeris* and *neges*, only noting for now that this first line after the quotation facilitates the incorporation of the poetry into the prose narrative.

After the quotation and his preliminary interpretation Cicero applies the method of conversion to the verse in an effort to resolve the apparent incongruity of the argument found therein, that is: a false dilemma. For this task of conversion Cicero elects to reformulate the three lines of verse (repeated below for convenience) in prose form (*Inu.* 1.83):

[**nam si ueretur**, quid eum **accuses**, qui **est probus**?  
**sin inuerecundum animi ingenium possidet**,  
 quid autem eum **accuses**, qui id **parui auditum aestimet**?<sup>18</sup>]

Quod conuersione sic reprehendetur: “immo uero accusandus est. **nam si ueretur, accuses**; non enim **parui auditum aestimabit. sin inuerecundum animi ingenium possidet**, tamen **accuses**; non enim **probus est**.”

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<sup>17</sup> It is impossible to get an exact sense of the context of this scene. Cf. Müller 1994: ad loc., who believes that the scene is more characteristic of a comedy than a tragedy.

<sup>18</sup> *Tr. inc.* 84-86 *ROL*.

A comparison between the prose reformulation and the quotation indicates how much of the original verse (portions in bold) Cicero has chosen to utilize – he leaves intact the beginning of the first line and the entirety of the second. In and around these two portions he further borrows terminology and phrasing from the rest of the quotation. He directly challenges the poet and his verse with this prose reformulation, an accurate interpretation of which depends upon the sentence which he writes immediately after the quotation: *hic, siue uereri dixeris siue non uereri, concedendum hoc putat ut neges esse accusandum* (*Inu.* 1.83).

If we assume that the speaker in the quotation is addressing an unnamed person and not delivering a monologue, then the prose sentence afterwards would represent Cicero providing counsel to this addressee. In other words, he is advising the addressee that despite the speaker's claims to the contrary (cf. *putat*) the dilemma is false and that the addressee can in fact refute his arguments.<sup>19</sup> Consequently, the prose reformulation of the quotation creates a mock-dialogue not with speaker of the verse, but with whomever the speaker has addressed – this is one way, Cicero shows his imagined client, you can counter the arguments which the speaker of the quotation makes against you.

Cicero completes his use of the quotation when he next answers its apparent false dilemma by means of denial of one alternative: *alterius autem partis infirmatione hoc modo reprehendetur: "uerum si ueretur, accusatione tua correctus ab errato recedet"* (*Inu.* 1.84). Cicero borrows much less direct terminology from the quotation for this rebuttal (*si ueretur*), which is more succinct than the rebuttal by conversion. Nevertheless, with this second means of answering a false dilemma Cicero, who still

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<sup>19</sup> The possibility remains, of course, that Cicero is addressing the reader (with *dixeris* and *neges* used in an indefinite sense), in which case the reader then becomes the addressee and receives his counsel.

appears to be offering counsel to his voiceless client (*tua*), fulfills the promise he makes prior to quoting the verse that such a dilemma can be answered in two ways.

Taken together, Cicero's two rebuttals constitute a thorough and effective demonstration of how to answer the quotation's apparent dilemma. The role which the verse plays in this section is incomplete: Cicero uses the poetry as a means to an end. The quotation provides only an example and not a resolution of an apparent dilemma; it is Cicero's two reformulations of the quotation which complete the illustration. His initial and analytic acknowledgement of the speaker (*putat*) soon gives way to the twin addresses to a silent third figure, addresses which reinvent and extend the dramatic action. This dialogue, admittedly one-sided, engenders a sense of interaction between the prose and verse, which, as a result, produces an integrated and fused collaboration of the two media, a collaboration which is strengthened through shared and replicated language.

The Auctor employs this same poetic quotation during his discussion of defective arguments (*Rhet. Her.* 2.35-42). In particular, the Auctor wishes to illustrate the fault associated with the topic of contradictory arguments (2.42):

Item uitiosum est ipsum sibi in sua oratione dissentire et contra atque ante dixerit dicere, hoc modo: "qua causa accusem hunc?"<sup>20</sup> tum id exputando euoluere:

nam si ueretur, quid eum accuses qui est probus?

sin inuerecundum animi ingenium possidet,

quid autem eum accuses qui id parui auditum aestimet?<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> *Tr. inc.* 83 *ROL*.

<sup>21</sup> *Tr. inc.* 84-86 *ROL*.

The Auctor does not begin his example – after *hoc modo* – with the same three lines of verse as does Cicero, but first asks a question (*qua causa accusem hunc?*) which most editors presume he has culled from a preceding line of verse (= *tr. inc. 83 ROL*). The addition of a first-person presence of the speaker (*accusem*) provides us with direct access to his thoughts and this glimpse of the speaker’s state of mind together with the comment before the quotation (*tum id exputando euoluere*) make it clear that, unlike at *Inu.* 1.83, the verse contains a monologue, that is: we can see that the speaker is cognizant of and struggling with his own dilemma.<sup>22</sup>

After he has quoted the three lines of verse, the Auctor states that the speaker seems to have given himself (*sibi*) good reason not to accuse the unnamed man: *non incommoda ratione uidetur sibi ostendisse quare non accusaret* (*Rhet. Her.* 2.42). This diagnostic comment resembles Cicero’s interpretation of the speaker’s mindset at *Inu.* 1.83, but, instead of converting or denying the speaker’s argument, the Auctor poses a question: *quid postea? quid ait?* (2.42). For the answer to this question, the Auctor quotes another line of verse, thus giving the speaker an opportunity to answer personally: *nunc ego te ab summo iam detexam exordio* (= *tr. inc. 87 ROL*). The result of this additional line of verse is that character apparently contradicts himself, at which point the Auctor, feeling he has made his point, ceases to discuss the topic of contradictory arguments.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Warmington 1956-67: ad loc. reconstructs the lines preceding the three-line quotation as follows: “*nequeo ... / qua causa accusem hunc exputando euoluere*” (*tr. inc. 82-83 ROL*). Even though the addition of *nequeo* is conjecture on the part of Warmington, this reconstruction appears to capture the sense of the verse well enough.

<sup>23</sup> Warmington 1956-67: ad loc. translates *nunc ego te ab summo iam detexam exordio* (*tr. inc. 87 ROL*) as “now at last I will weave you completely, from top to bottom of the warp” and interprets this as “the speaker means ‘I will explain all about you.’” Clearly, however, the Auctor did not understand this line in that sense; rather he takes it to mean something like “now at last I will expose you from the beginning to end.” We cannot be certain whether the speaker will now proceed to outline for the audience what this man is guilty of or whether he is referring to his future actions, but, either way, we must understand the meaning of this line in the context of the *Rhet. Her.*, that is: the speaker has now decided that he will accuse the man after all, even though it appeared that he had given himself good reason for not doing so.

This intertextual comparison has revealed that Cicero and the Auctor handle the anonymous three line quotation differently in two main respects, one concerning the structure of the quotation, the other the function. On a structural level the difference in their treatments lies in the fact that Cicero develops and completes the scene through his prose reformulations of the quotation, whereas the Auctor guides and allows the dramatic action to unfold to the point where the character (*ait*) incriminates himself on a charge of inconsistency. The Auctor does not engage with the quotation in the same way that Cicero does; rather, he assumes the role of a director, adroitly marshalling various ‘scenes’ and determining the structure and pace of the dramatic action. The reader, through the Auctor’s manipulation and directing of the verse, observes something closer to the original dramatic scene rather than seeing the author of the textbook take the stage personally. On a functional or illustrative level the difference between the two treatments is pertinent to our study of the art of quotation: Cicero and the Auctor come to different conclusions regarding the argument made in the quotation.

Cicero, as we have seen, constructs two possible arguments (by conversion or by denial) for refuting the false dilemma. Cicero, by choosing not to include the speaker’s initial question (*qua causa accusem hunc?*, *tr. inc. 83 ROL*) and his ultimate decision (*nunc ego te ab summo iam detexam exordio*, *tr. inc. 87 ROL*), suppresses and curtails the probable true nature of the scene to suit his own needs. The scenario Cicero builds involves three figures – himself, the speaker, and the addressee – and the conclusion which he reaches, through either the process of conversion or of denial, is that the dilemma is in fact apparent and that the best course of action is for the addressee to accuse the man.

The Auctor, on the other hand, is not interested in applying the techniques of conversion or denial to the verse nor is he concerned with whether or not the quotation

contains a dilemma. Instead, the Auctor first takes the main quotation (*tr. inc.* 84-86 *ROL*) as evidence that the speaker has outlined sufficient grounds for not accusing the man, only then to catch him committing the fault of inconsistency when the speaker reveals, through the addition of an extra line (*tr. inc.* 87 *ROL*), his decision to accuse him after all. By employing the technique of question-and-answer, the Auctor removes the need to summarize and reformulate the first three lines of the quotation (as Cicero does at *Inu.* 1.83), since the speaker and the poet have provided him with all the ammunition he requires to prove his point.

The same quotation, then, serves as a pliable and versatile material able to be shaped and contoured according to the aims and needs of each literary craftsman. The Auctor, through his handling and presentation of the verse, criticizes the character for his decision to make an accusation after he has given good reason not to do so, whereas Cicero, through his handling and reformulations of the same verse, criticizes the speaker for the logic of the arguments which he makes to dissuade someone from making an accusation.

Cicero's and the Auctor's employments of the second quotation featuring an element of manipulation emphasize the control a prose author has over poetry in a different fashion, as both willfully undermine the original import of the verse by presenting an extra select portion. At *Inu.* 1.94 Cicero discusses the subject of a weak reason (*ratio infirma*), which is one of many defects that result when some part (*aliqua pars*) of the argumentation is not adapted to its purpose. In order to illustrate a weak reason Cicero quotes four lines from Plautus' *Trinummus* (*Inu.* 1.95):

Aut si ratio alicuius rei reddetur falsa, hoc modo: "pecunia bonum est,  
propterea quod ea maxime uitam beatam efficiat;" aut infirma, ut Plautus:  
amicum castigare ob meritam noxiam,



immune est facinus; uerum in aetate utile  
et conducibile; nam ego amicum hodie meum  
concastigabo pro commerita noxia.<sup>24</sup>

Cicero's presentation of this quotation is straightforward: he succinctly links its content to a weak reason (*infirma*), mentions Plautus as the source (*ut Plautus*), and quotes four lines of verse without interruption. In this scene Megaronides has heard some nasty rumors about his friend Callicles and has come to reprimand him. Cicero interprets the connective *nam* in the third line in a causal sense, but its proper force, in the context of the play, likely requires the addition of an intermediate thought: "It is a thankless task to reproach a friend, but this is the task with which I am currently faced and why I have reason for making this remark."<sup>25</sup> The ability to extract a select section of the play, however, permits Cicero to present the argument as if it were absolute. Inclusion of the next line, for example, would reveal the duress under which Megaronides is placed and remove the validity of the quotation as an example of a weak argument: *inuitus, ni id me inuitet ut faciam fides* (Pl. *Trin.* 27). As it stands, he leaves it to the reader to recognize what part of the argument (the *aliqua pars* at 1.94) is defective and where the argument transitions from proposition to reason (*nam*) and that this reason is weak. No further analysis is forthcoming and the quotation constitutes, for Cicero's purposes, a self-sufficient example.

The Auctor employs this same quotation from Plautus' *Trinummus* in order to illustrate similarly a reason which is weak relative to a proposition. The Auctor also identifies Plautus as the author of the verse in the introduction (*Rhet. Her.* 2.35):

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<sup>24</sup> Pl. *Trin.* 23-26.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Lindsay 1907: 100, who, when discussing these lines, maintains that *nam* often introduces in Plautus "a particular instance of a general statement."

Vitiosa ratio est quae ad expositionem non est adcommodata uel propter infirmitatem uel propter uanitatem. infirma ratio est quae non necessario ostendit ita esse quemadmodum expositum est, uelut apud Plautum:

amicum castigare ob meritam noxiam  
immune est facinus, uerum in aetate utile  
et conducibile.<sup>26</sup>

haec expositio est. uideamus quae ratio adferatur:

nam ego amicum hodie meum  
concastigabo pro commerita noxia.<sup>27</sup>

ex eo quod ipse facturus est, non ex eo quod fieri conuenit, utile quid sit ratiocinatur.

As we can see, the Auctor interrupts the quotation at the point where the proposition (*expositio*) transitions to the reason (*ratio*). Following the section of verse which outlines the reason, he further engages with the poetry when he interprets the speaker's justification for his forthcoming action.<sup>28</sup> Again, if the *nam* at the beginning of the reason is transitional rather than confirmatory, then the Auctor's charge of a false syllogism, in the context of the play, is unfair to Plautus. Nevertheless, by extracting only this part of the scene, he is able, like Cicero at *Inu.* 1.95, to provide a de-contextualized and self-contained section of verse containing a weak or false syllogism.

These two quotations in the *Inu.*'s discussion of refutation and their counterparts in the *Rhet. Her.* have supplied us with a general idea of the basic components of a quotation-environment: Cicero and the Auctor both compose

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<sup>26</sup> Pl. *Trin.* 23-25.

<sup>27</sup> Pl. *Trin.* 25-26

<sup>28</sup> Note, in particular, the repetition of *utile*.

introductions which are best described as perfunctory and which tend to distance the poetry from its dramatic origins and emphasize its demonstrational and illustrative value. The Auctor likes to disrupt the original flow of the poetry (*Rhet. Her.* 2.35 and 2.42), whereas Cicero is more content to allow the verse to run uninterrupted (*Inu.* 1.83 and 1.95). Both authors show a capacity to analyze, discuss, or utilize the quotation afterwards and thus extend its influence in the text; this discussion, however, is never for more than one or two sentences after which they both quickly move on to a new topic of discussion. The result of their concise handling of verse is that the quotation-environment is clearly and narrowly defined: a tendency perhaps not surprising in light of the textbook nature of the treatises.

These four examples have also demonstrated the significant authorial technique of manipulating the sense of poetic quotations. In the cases of the anonymous three-line verse and of the quotation from Plautus, Cicero and the Auctor focus on the logical strictures of the argument rather than the context within the play. They come to different conclusions regarding the strength and validity of the arguments which the speaker makes in the three-line verse, whereas they both treat Plautus and his work in a very narrow and defined manner and accuse him, out of context, of constructing an erroneous argument. It is important to note that this deliberate misrepresentation is the prerogative of the prose author who quotes verse; that both Cicero and the Auctor, for example, willfully subvert the original tone of Megaronides' situation, through a presumably considered selection process of the verse, reinforces the flexible and productive nature of the *pars pro toto* poetic quotation and serves to remind us of the primacy the new prose environment has over the original poetic source-text.

### *Intertextual ‘Disconcordance’: Poemata Non Grata*

While the above four examples have revealed a variety of techniques used in the presentation and manipulation of a poetic quotation, they have also shown that Cicero and the Auctor employ this poetry in a negative sense, that is: to illustrate particular rhetorical faults. The employment of poetry in this negative fashion is understandable in discussions of refutation and defective arguments, but, as we shall see, quoting poetry exclusively to illustrate faults constitutes a fundamental difference between their uses of quotations. The Auctor, it will be shown, remains steadfast throughout the *Rhet. Her.* in continuing to use poetry in a negative sense, whereas Cicero admits to its ability to provide positive proof or illustration for his arguments.

I begin this examination of the positive and negative employments of poetry with a return to Cicero’s discussion of refutation. At *Inu.* 1.91, Cicero quotes two lines of verse from the beginning of Ennius’ *Medea* to illustrate a far-fetched argument (*Inu.* 1.91):

Remotum est quod ultra quam satis est petitur, huiusmodi: “quodsi non P. Scipio Corneliam filiam Ti. Graccho collocasset atque ex ea duos Gracchos procreasset, tantae seditiones natae non essent; quare hoc incommodum Scipioni adscribendum uidetur.” huiusmodi est illa quoque conquestio:

utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus  
caesae accidissent abiegnae ad terram trabes!<sup>29</sup>  
longius enim repetita est quam res postulabat.

In this section, we can note that Cicero uses the compound *huiusmodi* to mark both the poetic and a prose example.<sup>30</sup> In the prose example, Cicero outlines a fanciful scenario

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<sup>29</sup> Enn. sc. 253-54 *ROL*.

<sup>30</sup> For *huiusmodi* meaning ‘of this kind’, see *OLD modus* 12d.

in which P. Scipio, through a chain of events, is ultimately to blame for the actions of the Gracchi.<sup>31</sup> In the case of the verse, the only information we receive concerning the quotation is that it is an *illa conquestio* and constitutes a further example (*quoque*) of a far-fetched argument.<sup>32</sup> After the quotation, Cicero concisely sums up its import (*longius enim repetita est quam res postulabat*) and discusses it no further.

When the Auctor utilizes the beginning of Ennius' *Medea* in order to illustrate a proposition (*expositio*) which is defective if it traces things too far back, he quotes a section of verse longer than that found at *Inu.* 1.91 – eight lines as opposed to two (*Rhet. Her.* 2.34):

Hic id quod extremum dictum est satis fuit exponere, ne Ennium et ceteros  
poetas imitemur, quibus hoc modo loqui concessum est:

utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus  
caesae accidissent abiegnae ad terram trabes,  
neue inde nauis inchoandi exordium  
coepisset quae nunc nominatur nomine  
Argo, quia Argiui in ea delecti uiri  
uecti petebant pellem inauratum arietis  
Colchis, imperio regis Peliae, per dolum;  
nam numquam era errans mea domo efferet pedem.<sup>33</sup>

nam hic satis erat dicere, si id modo quod satis esset curarent poetae: “utinam  
ne era errans mea domo efferet pedem.” ergo hac quoque ab ultimo repetitione

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<sup>31</sup> For the marriage between Ti. Gracchus and Cornelia, to which Cicero alludes, see Moir 1983.

<sup>32</sup> Cicero's use of the pronoun *illa* in conjunction with *conquestio* looks forward to the verse, but he makes no mention of the poet, the character, or the play. Admittedly, the context of this quotation, a particular favorite of his and, indeed, of all Romans (cf. Jocelyn 1969: 113-18), is likely familiar to the audience. For the employment of Enn. sc. 253-54 *ROL* in Cicero's rhetorical and philosophical works, see *N.D.* 3.75, *Top.* 61, *Fat.* 35; for Enn. sc. 253 *ROL* only, see *Fin.* 1.5.

<sup>33</sup> Enn. sc. 253-60 *ROL*.

in expositionibus magnopere supersedendum est. non enim reprehensionis  
sicut aliae complures indiget, sed sua sponte uitiosa est.

We can note that the Auctor, although also using the phrase *hoc modo*, introduces the quotation in a manner different than that found at *Inu.* 1.91. In particular, the Auctor places specific emphasis on Ennius, the author of the quotation, and other poets in general: although the poets are allowed to speak in this fashion we, as orators, should not imitate them.

Besides the Auctor's more openly critical stance towards the practice of poets contained in this statement, his analysis of the quotation also sets his treatment of the verse apart from Cicero's treatment at *Inu.* 1.91. The Auctor not only criticizes Ennius for tracing the exposition too far back, he also offers for his readers a tangible solution. By replacing the first two words of the eighth line (*nam numquam*) with the first two words of the first line (*utinam ne*), he creates an impromptu line of verse: *utinam ne era errans mea domo efferret pedem*.<sup>34</sup> It would have been enough, the Auctor suggests, for Ennius simply to have stated the desire that Medea had not ever set foot from home and his compression of Ennius' poetic thought in this way, from eight lines of verse into one, accounts for the expanded version we find at *Rhet. Her.* 2.34. The influence of the poetry, then, manifests itself in a meaningful manner outside of the quotation – the Auctor, by extracting content from the quotation and reshaping it, aggressively takes charge of the poetry he employs and corrects the error, as he perceives it, of the poet. Ennius, he maintains, should have done things this way. Cicero, on the other hand, while he integrates the same quotation into his text through the use of accompanying prose examples and a brief analysis, does not achieve the same level of interaction between poetry and prose that we find at *Rhet. Her.* 2.34 nor

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<sup>34</sup> At *de Orat.* 2.327 Cicero has Antonius use a similar method of impromptu poetic composition.

does he criticize Ennius and the poets as strongly or directly.<sup>35</sup> Thus, even in the case of a quotation which Cicero and the Auctor both use in a negative sense for nearly the same purpose, the Auctor adopts a more hostile attitude towards the poet – an attitude which, as we shall see, precludes him from employing poetry in any positive sense.

The Auctor's rationale for his dislike of using poetic examples in a positive sense is found at the beginning of the fourth book of the *Rhet. Her.* (1-10). He first points out, at 4.1, that he will use his own examples when demonstrating the topic of style (*elocutio*) and that this decision departs from the practice of those Greek writers who draw examples from the orators and poets.<sup>36</sup> These Greek writers, he tells us, believe that it is immodest (*pudor*) to create one's own examples (4.1-2); that using examples from orators and poets serves the purpose of testimony (*testimonio*) and adds a prestigious means of authority (*auctoritas*) to their doctrine (4.2); and, finally, that there is a high level of technical skill (*summum artificium*) involved in selecting the appropriate examples (4.3). The Auctor finds fault with all of these arguments.

The Greek writers, he maintains, are in fact being impudent and not modest when they select examples from orators and poets to further their own praise (4.4-5); examples, he argues, are not employed for the purpose of confirmation or bearing witness, but rather for demonstration (*exempla ponuntur nec confirmandi neque testificandi causa, sed demonstrandi*, 4.5) and, far from adding authority, undermine the Greek writers' stated design to teach others what they have invented (4.6); and, finally, he feels that their selection of the appropriate testimony from the many orators

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<sup>35</sup> Cf. *Rhet. Her.* 2.39, where the Auctor, after illustrating the fault of assuming as certain something which is still in dispute with a quote from Ennius (= Enn. sc. 371-72 *ROL*), criticizes Ennius' character Thesprotus. Cicero, on the other hand, at *Inu.* 1.91, neither mentions Ennius or Thesprotus when using the same quotation to illustrate a controvertible argument.

<sup>36</sup> *Quoniam in hoc libro, Herenni, de elocutione conscripsimus, et quibus in rebus opus fuit exemplis uti, nostris exemplis uti sumus et id fecimus praeter consuetudinem Graecorum qui de hac re scripserunt, necessario faciendum est ut paucis rationem nostri consilii demus. ... sed facilius nostram rationem intelleges si prius quid illi dicant cognoveris. compluribus de causis putant oportere, cum ipsi praeceperint quo pacto oporteat ornare elocutionem, unius cuiusque generis ab oratore aut poeta probato sumptum ponere exemplum* (*Rhet. Her.* 4.1).

and poets is not a difficult task nor does it reflect upon the technical skill of the rhetorician (4.6-7). In the end, the Auctor reiterates his promise to the reader that he will use examples of his own creation in his discussion of style: *ergo etiam ut magis ars cognoscatur suis exemplis melius est uti* (4.10). This decision ensures that any example he uses during his discussion of style will conform specifically to its purpose of clarification and that it will be proof of his own skill in that art.

The Auctor's promise not to employ examples from others holds, for the most part, true, but there is one section in the fourth book where he quotes poetry, 4.18. This section, which is the beginning of his treatment of composition (*compositio*), continues, however, his earlier tendency to employ poetic quotations in a negative sense. Indeed, since he is about to quote a string of otherwise innocuous quotations in an apparent contradiction of his declaration at the beginning of book 4 that he will not employ examples from others, he prefaces his employment of poetry at 4.18 with an admission that there is nothing forbidding him to use examples to illustrate faults:

Compositio est uerborum constructio quae facit omnes partes orationis  
aequabiliter perpolitae. ea conseruabitur si fugiemus crebas uocalium  
concursiones, quae uastam atque hiantem orationem reddunt, ut haec est:  
“bae aeneae amoenissime impendebant”;<sup>37</sup> et si uitabimus eiusdem litterae  
nimiam assiduitatem, cui uitio uersus hic erit exemplo – nam hic nihil prohibet  
in uitis alienis exemplis uti:

o Tite, tute, Tati, tibi tanta, tyranne, tulisti;<sup>38</sup>  
et hic eiusdem poetae:  
quoquam quicquam quemquam, quemque quisque conueniat, neget;<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> This line is not a verse; cf. Marx 1894: 118.

<sup>38</sup> Enn. *Ann.* 109 *ROL*.

<sup>39</sup> Enn. *fab. inc.* 432 *ROL*.



et si eiusdem uerbi assiduitatem nimiam fugiemus, eiusmodi:

nam cuius rationis ratio non extet, ei

rationi ratio non est fidem habere admodum;<sup>40</sup>

et si non utemur continenter similiter cadentibus uerbis, hoc modo:

flentes, plorantes, lacrimantes, obtestantes.<sup>41</sup>

The Auctor's use of these quotations, perhaps all taken from Ennius, is of a mechanical nature: he first defines the compositional vice in question and then supplies an illustrative quotation; the four verses, the language of which is fundamental to the various faults of composition, are self-sufficient and he feels there is no reason to elaborate. His mention of a *poeta* after the first quotation makes it clear that, in accordance with his explicit declaration in the quotation's introduction that examples from others are suitable to illustrate faults, these examples are not of his own making. What this passage at 4.18 reveals, then, is that the Auctor's tendency to employ poetry in a negative sense, such as in the examples we saw earlier, is a conscious and deliberate choice.<sup>42</sup>

Cicero, on the other hand, does not place any such restriction on his use of poetry in the *Inu.* A comparison between their discussions of narration (*narratio*) will

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<sup>40</sup> Marx 1894: 118 thought these iambic senarii to be in the style of Ennius.

<sup>41</sup> Enn. *spuria*? 41 *ROL*.

<sup>42</sup> An exception to the Auctor's exclusively negative employment of poetry might occur at *Rhet. Her.* 3.34, where, during his discussion of memory, he demonstrates a method by which one can remember a line of verse: "*iam domum itionem reges Atridae parant*" (= *tr. inc.* 49 *ROL*). It is not known whether the iambic senarius is the Auctor's own creation or comes from an unknown tragedy (perhaps the Iphigenia he mentions afterwards). At any rate, the function of the quotation is, at most, neutral. The Auctor ascribes no positive or negative comments to the verse and the post-quotation analysis focuses exclusively on the techniques one can use to remember the line of poetry.

Likewise, the possible verses at *Rhet. Her.* 2.38 do not constitute an exception to the negative employment of poetry. Here, the Auctor employs one, perhaps two, quotations to show how to refute a dilemma (which is contained within the first quotation and answered by the second). It has been suggested, but is not at all certain, that these quotations are from Ennius (cf. 125-31 Jocelyn); even if the verses are from Ennius, however, the Auctor clearly hides behind the practices of the *studiosi* of rhetorical schools (*utuntur igitur studiosi in confirmanda ratione duplici conclsione*, *Rhet. Her.* 2.38).

demonstrate clearly that while Cicero is prepared to use poetry to illustrate his arguments in a positive sense, the Auctor, even when he is making the same argument, elects not to quote any verse at all. Moreover, since these two discussions possess close verbal and structural similarities, the lack of verse in the *Rhet. Her.* is all the more striking.

Cicero, at 1.27 of the *Inu.*, defines narration as an exposition of events that have taken place or that are supposed to have taken place: *narratio est rerum gestarum aut ut gestarum expositio*. Under this definition he lists three kinds (*genera*) of narration, one which contains the case itself, a second in which there is a digression outside of the case, and a third which, either written or recited, provides both amusement and valuable training and is detached from public issues.<sup>43</sup> He further divides this third kind of narration into two classes (*duae partes*): one which deals with events (*negotia*) and one which deals with persons (*personae*). It is for these two classes of the third kind of narration that he provides verse examples: three to illustrate the class dealing with events (since he further sub-divides this class into the forms *fabula*, *historia*, and *argumentum*) and one to illustrate the class dealing especially (*maxime*) with persons.

To illustrate the three forms of narration dealing with events (*fabula*, *historia*, and *argumentum*) Cicero quotes three succinct selections of verse (*Inu.* 1.27):

Fabula est in qua nec uerae nec ueri similes res continentur, cuiusmodi est:

angues ingentes alites, iuncti iugo . . . <sup>44</sup>

historia est gesta res, ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota; quod genus:

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<sup>43</sup> *Tertium genus est remotum a ciuilibus causis quod delectationis causa non inutiles cum exercitatione dicitur et scribitur* (*Inu.* 1.27). This private kind of *narratio* stands in contrast to the first two *genera*, which concern forensic narrative.

<sup>44</sup> Pac. tr. 242 ROL.

Appius indixit Carthaginensibus bellum.<sup>45</sup>

argumentum est ficta res, quae tamen fieri potuit. huiusmodi apud Terentium:

nam is postquam excessit ex ephebis . . .<sup>46</sup>

Cicero's choice of poetic examples fit these forms of *narratio* well: the obvious fictitiousness of Pacuvius' winged serpents (*fabula*), Ennius' historical account of Ap. Claudius' declaration of war (*historia*), and the hypothetical fictitiousness of the beginning of Simo's narrative from Terence's *Andria* (*argumentum*). The means of introduction in each case is concise and simple and, as we can see, it is only in the case of *argumentum* that he provides specific and supplementary information concerning the verse he is about to quote, that is: the name of poet, Terence. After each quotation Cicero does not engage in any further discussion or analysis; the quotation, once supplied, is deemed sufficient for the task at hand.

Immediately following his illustrations of these three forms of narration dealing with events, Cicero turns to the class of narration dealing especially with persons. This class of narration, he informs us, exhibits not only events but also conversations and mental dispositions, and the poetry he selects to illustrate it comes, again, from Terence. He does not reintroduce the poet, however, and the play of choice is now the *Adelphoe* rather than the *Andria*. The quotation, Micio's soliloquy, is longer than the three preceding one-line verses, totaling six lines (*Inu.* 1.27):

Illa autem narratio quae uersatur in personis eiusmodi est, ut in ea simul cum rebus ipsis personarum sermones et animi perspicui possint, hoc modo:

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<sup>45</sup> Enn. *Ann.* 238 *ROL.*

<sup>46</sup> Ter. *An.* 51.

uenit ad me saepe clamitans:<sup>47</sup> quid agis, Micio?  
 cur perdis adolescentem nobis? cur amat?  
 cur potat? cur tu his rebus sumptum suggeris,  
 uestitu nimio indulges? nimium ineptus es.  
 nimium ipse est durus praeter aequumque et bonum.<sup>48</sup>

After the quotation (and in contrast to the prior three), Cicero provides a commentary on this class of narration, telling us that narration dealing with persons should possess a profusion of embellishments (*ornamenta*), such as fear, desire, pity, sudden change of fortune, and a happy ending (*Inu.* 1.27):<sup>49</sup>

Hoc in genere narrationis multa debet inesse festiuitas confecta ex rerum  
 uarietate, animorum dissimilitudine, grauitate, lenitate, spe, metu, suspicione,  
 desiderio, dissimulatione, errore, misericordia, fortunae commutatione,  
 insperato incommodo, subita laetitia, iucundo exitu rerum.

Ironically, this post-quotation analysis serves only to reveal the relative inadequacy of the poetry, since it is not possible that all such embellishments can be contained within so small a sample.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, Cicero postpones full discussion of the types of embellishment until his treatment of style (*uerum haec ex eis quae quae postea de elocutione praecipientur ornamenta sumentur, Inu.* 1.27), a treatment which he never

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<sup>47</sup> I have retained the manuscript reading *clamitans*, even though Bentley emends this to *clamans* on metrical grounds. Cf. Martin 1976: ad loc., who, although suspicious of the scansion *clamitāns*, retains this reading in his text of the *Adelphoe* due to the comparative evidence here at *Inu.* 1.27 and that of Donatus' commentary on this passage.

<sup>48</sup> Ter. *Ad.* 60-64.

<sup>49</sup> For an interpretation of this passage, see Barwick 1928: 261-87; cf. Pfister 1933: 457-60.

<sup>50</sup> It is also worth noting that, although Cicero's introduction mentions the conversations of characters (*personarum sermones*), Micio's soliloquy merely quotes Demea's agitated questions.

completed. In this sense the quotation from Terence's *Adelphoe* fulfils the role of a genuine *pars pro toto*, bringing to mind and hinting at the full range of embellishments contained within the entire play.

Taken as a whole these four quotations provide Cicero with positive examples of the two classes of narration detached from public issues and its various forms. The content of the quotations is by no means substantial (perhaps even insufficient in the case of the fourth), but their illustrative presence adds organization, ornamentation, and clarity to the section. Pacuvius' winged chariot provides vivid access to an established and fabulous allusion; Ennius' declaration of war constructs a bridge between the time of Cicero and a remote past; and Terence's extracts furnish scenarios, which, although fictitious, are conceivably applicable to the real world. The removal of the poetry from this section would not necessarily destroy the integrity of the text nor would it render its arguments incomprehensible, but the quotations constitute positive and recognizable points of reference, which, in turn, enrich the prose narrative.

The Auctor's discussion of *narratio* is very close to the treatment which we find in the *Inu.* At *Rhet. Her.* 1.12 he presents the same three kinds (*genera*) of narration, including the third kind dealing with those narratives detached from public issues.<sup>51</sup> The Auctor, at *Rhet. Her.* 1.13, likewise divides this third kind of narration into two classes (*duo genera*): events (*negotia*) and persons (*personae*). He then subdivides the class of events into the same three forms we find at *Inu.* 1.27: *fabula*, *historia*, and *argumentum*. The Auctor's description of these three forms of narration is an almost verbatim account of Cicero's, except, as I have indicated, he does not quote any poetry as a means of illustration (*Rhet. Her.* 1.13):

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<sup>51</sup> *Tertium genus est id quod a causa civili remotum est, in quo tamen exerceri conuenit, quo commodius illas superiores narrationes in causis tractare possimus* (*Rhet. Her.* 1.12).

Id quod in negotiorum expositione positum est tres habet partes: fabulam, historiam, argumentum. fabula est quae neque ueras neque ueri similes continet res, ut eae sunt quae tragoediis traditae sunt. historia est gesta res, sed ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota. argumentum est ficta res quae tamen fieri potuit, uelut argumenta comoediarum.

Thus, as we can see, for the form of *fabula* the Auctor simply mentions tragedies (*tragoediae*) as a whole without providing any specific example; for *historia* he cites no example of literature; and for *argumentum* he simply refers to the genre of comedies (*comoediae*). These amorphous references to tragedy and comedy circumvent the need for him to use poetry in a positive manner as Cicero does when he quotes from a tragedy of Pacuvius or a comedy of Terence.<sup>52</sup> An inquisitive reader is instead left to bring to mind a favorite comic or tragic passage or seek a nearby text.

When the Auctor discusses the class of narration dealing with persons he again quotes no poetry. Nevertheless, his account of this class of narration strongly resembles Cicero's post-quotation discussion of the same (*Rhet. Her.* 1.13):

Illud genus narrationis quod in personis positum est debet habere sermonis festiuitatem, animorum dissimilitudinem, grauitatem lenitatem, spem metum, suspicionem desiderium, dissimulationem misericordiam, rerum uarietates, fortunae commutationem, insperatum incommodum, subitam laetitiam, iucundum exitum rerum. uerum haec in exercendo transigentur; illud quod ad ueritatem pertinet quomodo tractari conueniat aperiemus.

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<sup>52</sup> The lack of any reference to literature for *historia* is perhaps to be explained by the idea that such information, despite its remoteness (*historia ... ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota*, *Rhet. Her.* 1.13), would be in some way accessible without the aid of written accounts.

As we can see, the Auctor does not promise any future expansion of this category of narration; without a focalized quotation he perhaps feels that the broad and comprehensive ‘tags’ suffice. He does, however, expand upon character delineation (*notatio*) later in the *Rhet. Her.*, when he constructs a lengthy and detailed prose narrative which, in places, resembles certain scenes and situations in the works of Plautus.<sup>53</sup>

The Auctor, then, although he discusses the exact same classes of *narratio* dealing with events (including the forms *fabula*, *historia*, and *argumentum*) and persons as Cicero, does so conspicuously without the assistance of verse. The specific illustrations which Cicero draws from the world of poetry, the Auctor either reduces to references to tragedies and comedies in general or, in the cases of *historia* and narration dealing with persons, removes entirely. His reluctance to illustrate narration through the medium of poetry accords with his programmatic stance towards illustrative evidence found at the beginning of the fourth book. Poetic examples, he feels, are a valuable tool to demonstrate an assortment of errors and faults, but should not be used as a vehicle for positive instruction. Cicero, on the other hand, is willing to utilize both the negative and positive aspects of poetic quotation, thus providing himself with a greater range of uses for verse in his prose narrative.

### ***Conclusion***

While the occurrence of the same poetic quotations in these two treatises is perhaps attributable to the presence of a common source, the different, sometimes subtle, ways in which the two authors handle verse demonstrates the malleable and adaptable nature of the poetic quotation even within the restricted setting of a

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<sup>53</sup> *Rhet. Her.* 4.63-64; cf. Caplan 1954: ad loc.

textbook. Both authors are capable of extracting, manipulating, and, if necessary, misrepresenting portions of verse to suit their particular needs, whether this is to illustrate a rhetorical point, to provide a recognizable and, perhaps, authoritative source, or to criticize the practices of poets. This pliable nature of poetic quotations is a key consideration when observing a prose author's use of verse – poetry, in the hands of a prose author, ceases to belong to the poet and is subject to the needs of the prose text.

Moreover, Cicero's use of poetry in the *Inu.*, due to his willingness to quote verse for positive illustration, is broader than that of the Auctor. The importance of Cicero's penchant for employing poetry in either a positive or negative fashion will become evident in several of the examples which I will consider in subsequent chapters – not only does the flexibility of a positive-negative spectrum increase the possibilities for individual employments of a quotation, but, within the same (dialogic) work, it constitutes a fundamental precept for the interlocutors when they quote and discuss poetry.

These findings, then, represent the beginning of a framework for Cicero's use of poetry and his art of quotation. Cicero would not write another treatise until 55 B.C., the *de Oratore* (*de Orat.*), which is a replacement for his youthful *Inu.* Accordingly, in the next chapter I will expand my investigation to consider instances of poetic quotations in his later works, as well as some examples of verse found in the contemporaneous work of Varro, the *de Lingua Latina* (*L.*). The basis of this investigation will again be intertextual repetition of poetry: Cicero's use of poetry in his later works, we shall see, is not only more varied and intricate than the employment of quotations in the *Inu.* and the *Rhet. Her.* (where the role of verse is limited to a very structured and strict portion of the prose text), but also more varied and intricate than the employment of poetry in Varro's treatise the *L.* In addition, I



will also consider the role which poetry plays in Varro's dialogue the *Res Rusticae* (*R.*). Similar to the Auctor's explicit aversion to using poetry as tool for positive instruction, Varro, in the *R.*, openly disavows poetic sources despite the liberal use of verse in his *L.* An intertextual comparison between the works of Cicero and Varro will help to establish the primacy of Cicero as the leading practitioner, in his time, of the art of poetic quotation.

CHAPTER 3  
CICERO AND VARRO: THE FARMING OF LINGUISTICS AND CICERONIAN  
CORRESPONDENCES

*Cicero's 'Mature' Treatises and the Works of Varro*

It would be several decades after the publication of the *Inu.* before Cicero published another treatise, the *de Orat.* (55 B.C.). This work was the first in what was a period of frenzied composition for Cicero; a period which spanned twelve years (55 B.C.-44 B.C.) and produced some eighteen treatises, several of which appear in the form of a dialogue. Poetic quotations figure heavily in many of these works, e.g. the *de Orat.* and the *Tusc.*,<sup>1</sup> and in order to gain an understanding of these quotations and to note the increased complexity with which Cicero handles his poetic sources, I propose to examine select quotations found in his works alongside those found in two works of his near contemporary Varro: the *de Lingua Latina* (*L.*) and the *Res Rusticae* (*R.*).

Such a comparison between the two authors is a productive approach for several reasons. First, besides the *Rhet. Her.* the *L.* and the *R.* are the only other extant Latin prose works either prior to or contemporaneous with Cicero which feature the use of poetic quotations. Second, Varro, like Cicero, was a noted poet – as is evidenced by his fragmentary Menippean satires.<sup>2</sup> Third, Varro's *R.*, composed in a dialogue form in the 30's B.C., was presumably influenced at least in part by Cicero's dramatic dialogues of the 50's. The more we know about contemporary practices of quoting poetry outside the works of Cicero, the more we will, in turn, understand his

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<sup>1</sup> See above 8-9.

<sup>2</sup> It is difficult to reconstruct the precise nature of Varro's 'Menippean satires'. These works contained a mixture of prose and verse and were in some form of dialogue; due to the nature of the text and the manner of transmission it is not possible to include the satires in this study for the purpose of any worthwhile comparison.

art of poetic quotation; to be exposed to the simplistic style of Varronian quotations – if that is how they should be viewed – is to have an increased awareness of and appreciation for the complexity and richness of Cicero’s use of poetry.

My investigation falls into four parts. First, I will establish the form and function of poetry in Varro’s *L.* and demonstrate how Cicero’s use of poetry at times overlaps with Varro’s preferred method of quotation. Second, I will draw attention to a significant difference between Cicero’s and Varro’s employments of verse: the use of characters and generic intermediaries in a quotation-environment. Third, I will undertake a case-study of a particular quotation found in the works of both authors. This intertextual study will demonstrate the most striking feature of Cicero’s art of quotation: the extended role a quotation plays in a prose narrative. Lastly, I will end my comparison between Cicero and Varro with a brief analysis of poetry in Varro’s *R.*, where we will see that, despite the dialogue format of the work and his fondness for verse in the *L.*, he deliberately eschews poetry in favor of prose sources, thus clearing the way for us to consider Cicero the leading Latin author of his time in terms of using poetry in a dialogue setting.

### ***Varro’s De Lingua Latina: The Form and Function of Poetry***

Varro composed the *L.* during 47-45 B.C. and published it before Cicero’s death in 43 B.C. The work originally comprised twenty-five books, all but four of which were dedicated to Cicero. Only six of the twenty-five books are now extant, five through ten, and even these contain considerable gaps and textual difficulties, though the general structure is intact.<sup>3</sup> Books 5-7, which deal with the *impositio uocabulorum* (the origin and application of words to things and ideas), contain numerous poetic quotations: book 5 contains forty-three, book 6 twenty-nine, and

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<sup>3</sup> For the state of the text, see, for example, Kent 1936.

book 7 one hundred and fifty-one. Books 8-10, on the other hand, which deal with the derivation of words from other words, contain far fewer poetic quotations than books 5-7: there are no quotations in book 8, while book 9 contains five and book 10 two.<sup>4</sup> Varro quotes from an extensive range of poets in these six books, including Ennius, Plautus, Terence, Accius, Lucilius, Naevius, Manilius, Juventius, Matius, and Pocius.

Varro's employment of Latin poetry in the *L.* follows a reasonably consistent and straightforward pattern; a typical quotation-environment is found at 5.23 where he seeks to demonstrate that *humus* and *terra* are synonyms:<sup>5</sup>

Terra, ut putant, eadem et humus; ideo Ennium in terram cadentis dicere:  
cubitis pinsibant humum;<sup>6</sup>  
et quod terra sit humus, ideo humatus mortuus, qui terra obrutus.

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<sup>4</sup> There are, in addition to the two-hundred and thirty substantial quotations found in books 5-10, a total of forty-nine references to poets and their works. Most of these references break down into three broad categories: references to an individual poet in conjunction with one or two words which he wrote in one of his works – book 5 (x9); book 6 (x3); book 7 (x15); book 8 (x3); book 9 (x1); book 10 (x3); references to poets as a whole in conjunction with a short phrase consisting of two words – book 5 (x1); book 6 (x2); book 7 (x1); and paraphrases of a word or words which appear in a poet's work – book 5 (x2); book 6 (x1); book 7 (x3). Miscellaneous references include: an indirect and non-metrical citation of Ennius (5.60); a reference to a poet (Porcius Licinus) who wrote about Ennius, though a lacuna makes it difficult to reconstruct the nature of the citation (5.163); a reference to a short phrase sung by the Salii (6.49); a quotation from the Salii which is corrupt and might be an interpolation (7.26); a Greek proverb, in Latin, which also happens to appear in Terence (7.31); and a reference to a word, in Greek, used by Homer (7.74).

<sup>5</sup> I define a typical quotation-environment as one in which Varro quotes a substantial selection of poetry in order to provide evidence of a particular word or words – I do not consider references to individual words (see n. 4 above) as being representative of this kind of environment. Typical quotation-environments in the *L.* occur in the following frequencies: book 5 – thirty-nine of forty-three quotations (90%); book 6 – twenty-nine of twenty-nine quotations (100%); book 7 – one-hundred and twenty-four of one-hundred and fifty-one quotations (82%); book 9 – four of five quotations (80%); book 10 – two of two quotations (100%). Thus, the overall percentage of quotations in the *L.* which appear in this typical environment is 84.9%. Those quotations which do not appear in a typical environment, Varro employs in the following ways: as an initial illustration of how poets fashion words (5.7 [x3]); as a means of explanation or further definition of a topic (5.64, 7.7, 7.11 [x3], 7.21, 7.50, 7.60, 7.87); and as part of a general list, e.g. the names of fish (7.47 [x3]), derivations of names (7.82 [x3]), clear sounds (7.103 [x5]), unclear sounds (7.104 [x8]), and formation of nominative regularity (9.78).

<sup>6</sup> Enn. sc. 421 *ROL*.

Varro first provides the name of the poet, Ennius, before the quotation; this is his favorite means of literary identification, though on occasion he provides the name of the play or of a character.<sup>7</sup> The content of the verse, while not irrelevant to his illustration, is secondary to its containing the word *humum*.<sup>8</sup> He is instead more concerned to identify and provide authoritative and positive examples of particular words in an isolated semantic context, in this case *humus*. The manner in which Varro achieves his goal is minimal and austere, and he pares down the poetry to suit his particular needs: poetry for him serves as an authoritative depository of formally recorded words.

Cicero, in those works published after the *Inu.*, also employs poetry for the purpose of brief authoritative or corroborative illustrations. In the *Orat.* he employs numerous quotations in sections 149-64 to illustrate a variety of features of the Latin language, such as hiatus and rhythm. At *Orat.* 157, for example, he quotes two discrete lines of verse from Terence's *Phormio* to illustrate, in answer to the demands of the Analogists, that the same poet uses both the form *nosse* and the form *nouisse*:

Quid quod sic loqui: 'nosse, iudicasse' uetant, 'nouisse' iubent et  
'iudicauisse'? quasi uero nesciamus in hoc genere et plenum uerbum recte dici  
et imminutum usitate. itaque utrumque Terentius:<sup>9</sup>

eho tu, cognatum tuom non noras?

post idem

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<sup>7</sup> The subject of the verb *putant* in the introduction to the quotation is not the preceding *poetae* mentioned at 5.22 (whom Varro mentions with reference to the connection they draw between *tera*, *terra*, and *sola terra*), but rather an undefined collective, frequent throughout the *L.* and which likely consists of the views of 'common-folk' (*populus*; cf. 5.7) and grammarians – cf. 5.45, 5.53, 5.120.

<sup>8</sup> The meaning of *cubitis pinsibant humum* is uncertain and *L.* 5.23 is the only place this verse occurs. Warmington 1956-67 ad loc. suggests that Ennius refers to an assembly of people, who are lying on the ground and listening to a speaker.

<sup>9</sup> Ter. *Phor.* 384, 390. (Note that our texts have *sobrinum* for *cognatum*).

Stilponem inquam noueras.

Cicero's presentation of these quotations is simple: he provides the name of the author (*Terentius*) and marks the second quotation as being from the same source (*idem*). These lines not only provide him with secure written evidence of the same author using the short and long forms *noras* and *noueras*, but, since these quotations are from the same work, they also constitute evidence which precludes any objections based on diachronic argumentation. The language of the quotations (*noras* / *noueras*) is fundamental to the demonstration and, once he has quoted the two lines, he does not engage further with the poetry. Thus, Cicero extracts Terence's verse purely for the purpose of authoritative evidence; the dramatic content, which involves an exchange between Demipho and Phormio concerning Antipho's relationship to Phanium, is secondary to the language itself and, in this sense, the function of the verse is comparable to Varro's use of poetry in the *L*.

If, however, we consider in broader terms the nature of poetry in the works of these two authors, we note a fundamental difference between Cicero's employment of poetry and Varro's. This difference concerns the presence or absence of editorial comments before a quotation, often in the form of a qualifying adverb. Varro, since he primarily employs poetry in the *L*. in a positive and corroborative sense, is less prone than Cicero to add such qualifications. Indeed, on the one occasion when Varro adds some form adverbial qualification before a quotation (*recte*), he merely reaffirms the positive nature of his poetic evidence.<sup>10</sup> Yet, when he feels it necessary, he will offer a different form of authorial presence, which serves to remind the reader that he

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<sup>10</sup> At *L*. 5.60 before Varro quotes a line of verse from Pacuvius, he points out that Pacuvius is right (*recte*) in saying that the *aether* adds life: *recte igitur Pacuius quod ait: "animam aether adiungat"* (= Pac. tr. 115 *ROL*).

has carefully considered his selections of poetry.<sup>11</sup> For example, at *L.* 6.89, he admits, before quoting a line of verse, that there is some dispute as to whether Plautus or Aquilius wrote the *Boeotia*, while at 7.82 he criticizes Ennius for making an error when he tried to imitate Euripides by giving an example of true roots of speech (*ἔτυμον*). This kind of authorial commentary, though there are few instances in the *L.*,<sup>12</sup> reassures the reader that Varro has exercised some measure of quality-control over the poetry he employs, which, due to the overwhelming presence of poetry in parts of books 5-7, might not otherwise have been the case.

Cicero, on the other hand, since he uses poetry to illustrate faults more often than Varro, employs a wide variety of editorial comments before a quotation in order to guide the reader as to the nature of the poetic evidence. For example, at *Orat.* 155, he comments that Ennius contracts ‘exceptionally’ or ‘unusually’ (*itaque idem poeta qui inusitatus contraxerat*),<sup>13</sup> while on several occasions he judges that Ennius (*Sen.* 50, *Amic.* 64, *Tusc.* 4.70), Pacuvius (*de Orat.* 2.187), Lucilius (*Fin.* 2.24), and Accius (*N.D.* 3.68; *Off.* 3.106) all supply verses which they have composed well (*bene*), truthfully (*uere*), or in a correct or fitting fashion (*recte*). Conversely, he remarks that a sentiment of Caecilius is rather faulty (*illud uero idem Caecilius uitiosius*, *Sen.* 25) and that one of Accius is false (*falsumque illud Acci*, *Tusc.* 2.13). The effect of such qualifications is that Cicero, in many cases through one of his characters, makes a

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<sup>11</sup> In fact, Varro confesses, at *L.* 8.107, that the store of poetry is so vast that he has been unable to include or discuss it all.

<sup>12</sup> For further instances of these authorial comments, see also, 7.11, where Varro, having quoted a line of verse from Accius, defends him from possible misinterpretation; 7.32, where, during a discussion of *canis* and *canes*, he supports Ennius’ use of *canes* for one dog on the basis of his following the earlier custom; 9.81, where he defends Lucilius against critics who feel his use of *decussis* and *decusibus* in the same line of verse proves that there is no regularity of declension; and 9.106, where he is unsure whether an error concerning the regularity of *lauari* should be ascribed to Plautus or the copyist (*librarius*).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Enn. sc.* 62 *ROL*.

narratological judgment on the verse and in the process shapes the reader's reception of the poetry.<sup>14</sup>

Thus far we have briefly considered how Varro and Cicero use quotations for a similarly succinct and illustrative purpose, but also that, due to the differing proportions of positive and negative quotations, there are some subtle differences between the approaches the two authors take to their poetic material. Next, I will examine a less subtle and more distinct feature of Cicero's use of poetry, that is: the variety of figures, in contrast to Varro, he attaches to a quotation and what impact this practice has on the meaning and interpretation of the poetry.

### ***The Verses Speak: Dramatic Characters and Generic Interlopers***

A major difference between Cicero's and Varro's employments of poetry concerns those occasions when a dramatic character or generic intermediary delivers a selection of verse. We noted above that, while Varro tends to name the poet in conjunction with the quotation, he occasionally varies his presentation of quotations to include the name of the play or of a character. On those occasions when a character introduces a quotation, we again find an austere environment: Andromeda *speaks* to Night (*itaque dicit Andromeda Nocti*, 5.19),<sup>15</sup> Epicharmus *speaks* about the human mind and the sun (*itaque Epicharmus cum dicit de mente humana ait ... idem de sole*, 5.59), Pacuvius' herdsman *speaks* about the morning-star (*ut ante solem ortum quod eadem stella uocatur iubar, quod iubata, Pacui dicit pastor*, 6.6), and Lucretia *speaks* about the time between dusk and dawn (*inter uesperuginem et iubar dicta nox intempesta, ut in Bruto Cassii quod dicit Lucretia*, 6.7). In all of these examples the character in question delivers the line of verse with a minimum of animation: Varro

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<sup>14</sup> Cf. Stoddard 2004: 167.

<sup>15</sup> Immediately following Andromeda's lines, we receive *et Agamemnon* and another line of verse.



supplies no adjectives, no adverbs, or sense of emotion. Following the quotations he does not mention any of the characters again, thus severing their involvement in the prose narrative.

Cicero, on the other hand, frequently assigns poetry to a character in a more vivid and fluid fashion. Salient examples of this propensity are two episodes which revolve around the figure of Hector in the *Tusc.* At 1.105, during a discussion about foolish superstitions with regard to the burial of or conduct towards corpses, Andromache mourns the treatment of Hector at the hands of Achilles as if it were a “most bitter state of affairs”:

Ergo hic ulciscitur, ut quidem sibi uidetur; at illa sicut acerbissimam rem  
maeret:

uidi, uidere quod me passa aegerrume,  
Hectorem curru quadriiugo raptarier.<sup>16</sup>  
quem Hectorem aut quam diu ille erit Hector?

Andromache (*illa*) is the subject of *maeret* and this emotive verb together with the superlatives *acerbissimam* and *aegerrume* create an apparent correspondence in tone and form between the prose and the quotation. It is clear, however, that Cicero (or the interlocutor M.) is mocking Andromache’s reaction to Hector’s fate: the quasi-parallelism between *sicut acerbissimam* and *aegerrume* playfully mimics and minimizes the severity of her grief, while, after the quotation, Cicero contemptuously echoes the verse with the phrase *quem Hectorem* (“Hector indeed!”).<sup>17</sup> This undoubtedly deliberate interplay between prose and verse thus creates a richer and

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<sup>16</sup> Enn. sc. 91-92 *ROL*.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Dougan 1905-24: ad loc. who equates *quem Hectorem* to *ποῖός* in Greek.

more pliable environment through which he is able to undermine the original poetic context in favor of its new prose surroundings.

Later, in the fourth book of the *Tusc.*, Cicero has M. discuss the emotion of ‘gladness’. During this discussion M. makes a technical and philosophical distinction between the terms *gaudium* and *laetitia* (*Tusc.* 4.66-67):<sup>18</sup>

Atque ut cauere decet, timere non decet, sic gaudere decet, laetari non decet,  
quoniam docendi causa a gaudio laetitiam distinguimus; illud iam supra  
diximus, contractionem animi recte fieri numquam posse, elationem posse.

Following this statement, M. quotes a line of verse wherein Naevius’ Hector rejoices at the praise he receives from Priam: *aliter enim Naeuianus ille gaudet Hector:*

“*laetus sum laudari me abs te, pater, a laudato uiro.*”<sup>19</sup> He then contrasts this type of proper ‘gladness’ with the improper sexual ‘gladness’ felt by “that man in Trabea”.<sup>20</sup>

A closer look at the introduction to Naevius’ verse reveals that Cicero, through M., has put into practice his theory concerning *gaudium* and *laetitia*: the verb *gaudet*, in the introduction, surprisingly anticipates and reflects the delight (*laetus*) Hector feels in the verse. Since he just informed us that *gaudium* is a fitting variety of joy, his use of the verb *gaudere* in the introduction to Naevius’ verse overrides the poet’s use of a form of *laetitia* (*laetus sum*) to indicate the joy Hector feels at his father’s praise. The juxtaposition of *gaudet* and *laetus sum*, then, re-defines and clarifies the sense of the

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<sup>18</sup> Cf. Graver 2002: 178: “Cicero means that *gaudium* and *laetitia* are not so carefully distinguished in ordinary usage, whatever may have been the case with Gr. *chara* and *hēdonē*.”

<sup>19</sup> Naeu. tr. 17 ROL.

<sup>20</sup> *Aliter ille apud Trabeam:*

*lena delenita argento nutum obseruabit meum,  
quid uelim, quid studeam. adueniens digito impellam ianuam,  
fores patebunt. de inproviso Chrysis ubi me aspexerit,  
alacris ob uiam mihi ueniet complexum exoptans meum,  
mihi se dedet* (*Tusc.* 4.67 = Trabea inc. fab. 1-5 CRF).

Cicero prefaces another quotation with the same phrase (*ille apud Trabeam*) at *Fin.* 2.13; cf. 4.35.

poetic vocabulary contained in the quotation. By using the verse in this way, Cicero illustrates and prioritizes the technical distinction that he, as opposed to the poet, makes between *gaudium* and *laetitia* for the purposes of teaching (*quoniam docendi causa a gaudio laetitiam distinguimus*, 4.67).

The productive nature of such prose additions to a quotation environment is clear – Cicero through the medium of prose interacts with the poetry in a way that challenges (and to some extent outdoes) the poet and contorts the original dramatic context. His attachment of such emotive verbs and adjectives to quotations, absent in Varro’s *L.*, not only vividly mirrors the contents of the respective verses, but, in the one instance, mocks and derides Andromache’s reaction to Hector’s plight, while, in the other, it adapts to the context of the surrounding philosophical discourse and terminology a famous tragic scene between Hector and Priam. The impact of these verbs (and adjectives) might seem minimal, but Cicero, by creating, external to the quotation, a character-focused atmosphere, colors and manipulates the poetry, thus increasing the bond between the two media and, at the same time, distancing the verse from the original source-text.

In addition to constructing character-focused quotations, Cicero, while Varro limits the speaker or source of a quotation to the poet, the play, or, on occasion, the character, often assigns a quotation to a figure not originally associated with poetic source-text. For example, one of the most frequent subjects of *dicere* introducing a poetic quotation in his treatises is an undefined ‘he’ or ‘they’. The mood and number of the verb in these cases varies: at *Luc.* 52 those of unsound mind (*insani*) say things like the famous words of Alcmaeon (*dicant*),<sup>21</sup> at *de Orat.* 2.257 a number of people

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<sup>21</sup> *Luc.* 52 (= Enn. sc. 37 ROL): *quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes furere sentiant et dicant aliquid quod non sit id uideri sibi, et cum relaxentur sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis “sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum aspectu”*; cf. *Luc.* 88 where we find the same quotation, but this time the voice is that of Alcmaeon.

interpret a quotation of Caecilius Statius in a new light (*dicant*),<sup>22</sup> at *Fin.* 5.29 an unspecified collective quotes Terence to support the notion that they know their own interests (*dicunt nec dubitant*),<sup>23</sup> and at *Tusc.* 3.44 an unidentified and generic man utters a quotation of Ennius spoken by Andromache (*dicat*).<sup>24</sup> Cicero's choice of ascribing lines of verse to a generic subject allows him and, in turn, the interlocutor, to increase and vary the employment of poetry. The presence of this generic intermediary again distances the verse from its original poetic context and, as a result, brings it closer to the prose work; the poetry becomes, within the prose narrative, part of the treatise's 'real world'.

This investigation of Cicero's and Varro's technical methods of quoting poetry has revealed several interesting and important – for our purposes of understanding better Cicero's art of poetic quotation – divergences between the two. Varro employs poetry in an almost exclusively positive sense, focuses heavily on individual words, and presents verse with a minimum of qualification and in a static manner. The linguistic nature of his work perhaps does not lend itself to a vibrant and varied use of poetry, but this does not negate the fact that Cicero, although he is capable of using poetry in a way similar to Varro, employs verse in a more adaptable, energetic, and subtle fashion than his contemporary.

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<sup>22</sup> *De Orat.* 2.257 (= Caecil. 251-53 *ROL*): *saepe etiam uersus facete interponitur, uel ut est uel paululum immutatus, aut aliqua pars uersus, ut Stati a Scauro stomachante; ex quo sunt non nulli, qui tuam legem de ciuitate natam, Crasse, dicant: "st! tacete! quid hoc clamoris? quibus nec mater nec pater / tanta confidentia? auferte istam enim superbiam."* For Bake's conjecture *Stati a Scauro stomachante*, see Komm. on 2.257.

<sup>23</sup> *Fin.* 5.29 (= Ter. *Hau.* 80): *itaque dicunt nec dubitant: "mihi sic est usus; tibi ut opus est facto, face."*

<sup>24</sup> *Tusc.* 3.44 (= Enn. sc. 363-65 *ROL*): *qui ita dicat*; these lines, from Ennius' *Andromache*, are spoken by Andromache herself, thus the speaker (*qui*) cannot be a character, but rather is a generalized figure who would speak similarly (*ita*). For anomalies associated with these lines of verse, see Jocelyn 1967: 243-45.

### *A Man for All Seasons: The Eminent Sextus Aelius*

Beyond select technical features of Cicero's and Varro's methods of quoting verse, it next remains to examine instances of poetry common to each author. Such a comparison, similar to that between the *Inu.* and the *Rhet. Her.*, will afford us the opportunity to observe in relief the more involved aspects of poetry in Cicero's prose works. All of the aspects which I have thus far examined take place at the local quotation-environment level, that is: the resonance of the poetry is confined to a strict and clearly defined area of the prose text. I now wish to demonstrate how Cicero, on a broader level, constructs an extended quotation environment and what significance the poetic material holds in these instances. I have selected for this purpose one particular quotation which is common to both authors; this quotation, from Ennius, revolves around the figure of Sex. Aelius, a noted legal figure. During the course of this case study not only will the characteristic style of Varro become more evident, but we will also observe the ways in which Cicero is able to cast and re-cast the same poetic material in different contexts – a key of doctrine of his and the Academic way of thinking.

At *L.* 7.46 Varro quotes three separate verses from Ennius to assist him in defining more exactly the word *catus*. The second of these lines contains the figure of Sex. Aelius (cos. 198 B.C.):

Apud Ennium:

iam cata signa fere sonitum dare uoce parabant,<sup>25</sup>

cata acuta; hoc enim uerbo dicunt Sabini. quare:

catus Aelius Sextus<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Enn. *Ann.* 487 *ROL*. I follow Warmington 1956-67 and Skutsch (= v. 450) in reading *fere* for *ferae*.

<sup>26</sup> Enn. *Ann.* 326 *ROL*.

non, ut aiunt, sapiens, sed acutus; et quod est:  
tunc coepit memorare simul cata dicta,<sup>27</sup>  
accipienda acuta dicta.

We can first note Varro's concise ascription of the opening verse to Ennius (*apud Ennium*). Then, in quick succession, he quotes the three separate lines of verse to demonstrate that the word *catus* means *acutus* rather than *sapiens*. The progression of these lines and his demonstration are elegant in their simplicity: the *cata signa* ('piercing, sharp instruments')<sup>28</sup> were making ready to resound, which, we know from the Sabines, is equivalent to *acuta signa*; on this basis (*quare*) Sex. Aelius is sharp-witted (*catus*) rather than, as some say, wise (*sapiens*) and, so too, are *cata dicta* sharp or pointed words. For Varro's purpose the content (rather than the context) of the quotations is key; nonetheless it is his brief explanations and commentary which make this passage a cohesive whole. He unites the prose and poetry, although the quotations remain discrete, through the explicit repetition of words contained in the verse, in this instance *catus* and *cata*. Again, the level of explanation and integration we find in this example is typical of other uses of poetry in the *L.*, where the quotation-environment is self-sufficient and comprises a clearly defined and strictly limited area of the prose text.<sup>29</sup>

Cicero employs the Sex. Aelius-verse a total of three times in his works – once in each of the *de Orat.*, *Tusc.*, and the *Rep.* – and in all three cases his emphasis shifts to suit the needs of his immediate argument. In the first instance, at *de Orat.* 1.198, the interlocutor Crassus quotes this line in order to provide an apt example of someone who, due to his knowledge of civil law, was honored by the greatest of poets:

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<sup>27</sup> Enn. *spuria*? 30 *ROL*.

<sup>28</sup> For *signa* as instruments especially with *canere*, see *ThLL* CANO 17 ff.

<sup>29</sup> See above 59-60 and n. 5.

Contra amplissimus quisque et clarissimus uir; ut ille, qui propter hanc iuris  
ciuilis scientiam sic appellatus a summo poeta est,  
egregie cordatus homo, catus Aelius Sextus<sup>30</sup>  
multique praeterea, qui, cum ingenio sibi auctore dignitatem reperissent,  
perfecerunt, ut in respondendo iure, auctoritate plus etiam, quam ipso ingenio,  
ualerent.

The prose and the verse are grammatically integrated: Crassus mentions and describes an *ille* the identity of whom the verse reveals. Crassus, rather than naming Ennius explicitly, notes in the introduction that the line originates from a *summus poeta* – an exemplary epithet of a kind not found in Varro and which takes on extra significance due to the fact that this quotation is the first in the *de Orat*. When Crassus introduces the *multique praeterea* (a phrase which continues the seamless integration between prose and verse) after the quote, the now defined figure of the *ille* (Sex. Aelius) becomes the representative of an amorphous class of men, who by extension share the characterization found in the preceding prose and quotation. Unlike at *L. 7.46*, then, Cicero's emphasis is not so much on individual words contained within the quotation, but rather on the context of the entire line, that is: Sex. Aelius, renowned for his skill in jurisprudence, was thus described by Ennius in these terms. Beyond Sex. Aelius' place of prominence amongst the multitude there is little in the way of elaboration: the mention of Sex. Aelius in this context is deemed adequate for interlocutors and audience alike and it serves as an authoritative illustration.

When Cicero uses this same line of verse in the *Tusc.*, his emphasis changes. On this occasion, at *Tusc.* 1.18, the interlocutor M., who is defining the nature of death

<sup>30</sup> Enn. *Ann.* 326 *ROL.*

(*mors*), discusses the theory of some that the heart or mind (*cor*) and the soul (*animus*) are equivalent (1.18):

Mors igitur ipsa, quae uidetur notissima res esse, quid sit, primum est uidendum. sunt enim qui discessum animi a corpore putent esse mortem; sunt qui nullum censeant fieri discessum, sed una animum et corpus occidere, animumque in corpore extinguere. qui discedere animum censeant, alii statim dissipari, alii diu permanere, alii semper. quid sit porro ipse animus aut ubi aut unde, magna dissensio est. aliis cor ipsum animus uidetur, ex quo excordes, uecordes concordisque dicuntur et Nasica ille prudens bis consul Corculum et “egregie cordatus homo, catus Aelius Sextus.”<sup>31</sup>

The Sex. Aelius-verse, without any ascription to Ennius, is again grammatically integrated into the prose text and caps a string of words which are derived from *cor* – *excordes*, *uecordes*, *concordes* – and the moniker which is ascribed to the two-time consul Nasica – *Corculum*. The specific mention of Sex. Aelius within the line itself neatly continues, together with P. Scipio Nasica (*Nasica*), the contrast between individuals and general figures (*alii*); a degree of specification which M. maintains following the quotation by his mention of the philosopher Empedocles. Cicero’s focus, unlike Varro’s at *L.* 7.46, is on *cordatus* rather than on *catus*, but otherwise his employment of this quotation resembles Varro’s use of the same in the *L.*

The third and final occasion when Cicero employs the Sex. Aelius-verse is at *Rep.* 1.30. Here, the interlocutor C. Laelius quotes this line to demonstrate to Q. Aelius Tubero, a Stoic and accomplished scholar, that Sex. Aelius is an example of someone whose pursuits are worthy of imitation (1.30):

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<sup>31</sup> Enn. *Ann.* 326 *ROL.*



. . . in ipsius paterno genere fuit noster ille amicus, dignus huic ad imitandum,  
 egregie cordatus homo, catus Aelius Sextus,<sup>32</sup>  
 qui “egregie cordatus” et “catus” fuit et ab Ennio dictus est, non quod ea  
 quaerebat quae numquam inueniret, sed quod ea respondebat quae eos qui  
 quaesissent et cura et negotio soluerent.

The beginning of this section, which follows a lacuna of some length, again contains a pronominal reference to Sex. Aelius (*ille*) which in this case Laelius qualifies with *noster* and *amicus*; the dramatic date of the dialogue, the Latin holidays of 129 B.C., permits Cicero to have Laelius refer to Sex. Aelius as a personal friend who was known to the interlocutors. Cicero further engages with the line of verse when he has Laelius repeat verbatim several words from the line – *egregie cordatus* and *catus* – as well as supplying the name of the poet in question, Ennius.<sup>33</sup> In this instance, Laelius emphasizes and defines both (*egregie*) *cordatus* and *catus*, a technique which resembles the separate emphases at *L.* 7.46 Varro (*catus*) and at *Tusc.* 1.18 M. (*cordatus*). Unlike the other three instances where this line occurs, however, the quotation-environment at *Rep.* 1.30 is not confined to a restricted area, since Laelius elects to discuss his *amicus* beyond the immediate quotation-environment.

After expanding upon what Ennius means by *egregie cordatus* and *catus*, Laelius points out that Sex. Aelius, when arguing against pursuits of C. Sulpicius Gallus (cos. 166), a noble with a penchant for astronomy, always had at the ready ‘that Achilles from the *Iphigenia*’ (1.30):

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<sup>32</sup> Enn. *Ann.* 326 *ROL*.

<sup>33</sup> Wilkins 1892, on *de Orat.* 1.198, maintains that “the quotation has been wrongly foisted in there by copyists.” Regardless, the practice of repeating verbatim words from a prior quotation is not unusual in Cicero’s works nor, as we have seen, is this level of grammatical integration.

Cuique contra Galli studia disputanti in ore semper erat ille de Iphigenia

Achilles:

astrologorum signa in caelo quid fit obseruationis,  
cum capra aut nepa aut exoritur nomen aliquod beluarum,  
quod est ante pedes nemo spectat, caeli scrutantur plagas.<sup>34</sup>

The manner of this introduction of the quotation while unusual is not unparalleled in the works of Cicero.<sup>35</sup> Most scholars (e.g. Warmington, Keyes) take *ille Achilles* to mean something akin to ‘words’, but the nature of the construction *ille de Iphigenia Achilles* creates an image much more vivid and dramatic than mere verbiage, an image where Sex. Aelius is to Gallus what Achilles is to Calchas, and, by extension, what Laelius is to Tubero. In the case of the last pair, however, Laelius (as Sextus) will seek to teach Tubero (a Gallus-like figure) about pragmatic matters rather than deride his current beliefs. Through this quotation, then, Laelius de-poeticizes the figure of Sex. Aelius as we are to picture him delivering these mocking lines in response to Gallus. That Sex. Aelius himself was introduced via a quotation only then to quote lines himself creates another layer in the dramatic fabric of the dialogue – a literary figure, familiar to the interlocutors, is given life and depth for the audience.

After Laelius has Sex. Aelius quote his favorite lines he reinforces the personal relationship which existed between them when he mentions that he often heard his friend speak and when he divulges the fact that Sex. Aelius preferred Ennius’

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<sup>34</sup> Enn. sc. 249-50 *ROL*.

<sup>35</sup> See, for examples of this kind of introduction, Jocelyn 1967: 325.

Neoptolemus to Pacuvius' Zethus.<sup>36</sup> At the end of this passage Laelius paraphrases another line of verse (1.30):<sup>37</sup>

Atque idem (multum enim illum audiebam et libenter) Zethum illum Pacuui  
nimis inimicum doctrinae esse dicebat: magis eum delectabat Neoptolemus  
Ennii, qui se ait "philosophari uelle, sed paucis; nam omnino haud placere."

The point Laelius makes by mentioning these dramatic characters is that Sex. Aelius, although he disagrees with Gallus concerning astronomy, also rejects Zethus' extreme hostility to learning in favor of Neoptolemus' more moderate attitude (we should not overlook, also, that Neoptolemus as the son of Achilles reinforces the affection Sex. Aelius has for the latter). That Neoptolemus said he "wanted to play the philosopher, but only a little" continues Laelius' poetic assault on the Stoic Tubero's belief-system. J. Zetzel argues that the occurrence of these quotations from Roman adaptations of Greek plays reflects the nature of the *Rep.* itself, that is: the *Rep.* seeks to appropriate and place into a Roman context a Greek theory.<sup>38</sup> In this sense, then, the placement of Ennius' line concerning Sex. Aelius at the beginning of the passage takes prominence, not only as a result of its being from a purely Latin work, the *Annales*, which celebrates Roman history, but also as a result of its containing the distinctly Roman figure, Sex. Aelius, whom Laelius effectively appropriates for the instruction of Tubero.

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<sup>36</sup> Probably a reference to a speech in the *Antiopa* of Pacuvius. Cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 2.155; *Rhet. Her.* 2.43.

<sup>37</sup> Probably from a play entitled either *Neoptolemus* or *Philoctetes*; Enn. sc. 400 ROL. We find the same quotation at *Tusc.* 2.1 and *de Orat.* 2.156; it is also cited by Aulus Gellius (5.15.9) and by Apuleius (*Apol.* 13). Cf., for a similar sentiment, Pl. *Grg.* 484c.

<sup>38</sup> Zetzel 1995: ad loc. Zetzel refers to the presence of three Latin quotations drawn from Greek tragedies, by which he presumably means also the reference to Pacuvius' Zethus from his play entitled *Antiopa* and not the quotation from Ennius' *Annales*.

To gain a full appreciation of the complexity surrounding Laelius' 'employment' of his friend Sex. Aelius, however, we need also to consider the discussion prior to *Rep.* 1.30. When L. Furius Philus joins Scipio and Tubero, he partakes in the astronomical discussion concerning the two suns already underway. In the course of this discussion both Philus and Scipio speak of Gallus in glowing terms: Philus refers to him as a *doctissimus* (1.21), while Scipio mentions that he and his father were very fond of him (1.23). Scipio further recounts Gallus' ability to dispel, in the minds' of soldiers, superstitious fears: *rem enim magnam adsecutus, quod hominibus perturbatis inanem religionem timoremque deiecerat* (1.24). This remark recalls the primary effect which Laelius claims Sex. Aelius' advice has on his clients: *sed quod ea repondebat quae eos, qui quaesissent, et cura et negotio soluerent* (1.30).<sup>39</sup> Bearing in mind the favorable picture of Gallus which Philus and Scipio paint, it becomes evident why Sex. Aelius (equally apt at dispelling care and trouble) is such an important figure in Laelius' arguments against the kind of abstract learning Tubero favors.

Sex. Aelius, for Laelius, represents the ideal of practical duties – his is an ability to remove fears founded upon tangible legal issues rather than those anxieties originating from abstract celestial issues. Sex. Aelius, in the hands of Laelius, becomes a weapon against the arguments of Philus and Scipio and, ultimately, a corrective enticement for Tubero, who, when Laelius has finished his account of the practical duties of a public man, requests to know more about these greater studies (1.31). Crucially, when Laelius consents to tell Tubero about such pursuits he makes it clear to him that he is discarding celestial matters in favor of those things which are before their very eyes: *ego autem haec, quae uidentur ante oculos esse, magis putem*

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<sup>39</sup> We can compare Tubero's comments when he arrives at Scipio's villa: *at tu uero animum quoque relaxes oportet*, 1.14). Tubero, then, is cognizant of the importance and desirability of having a relaxed mind.

*quaerenda* (1.31). The resonance between this statement and the final line from Sex. Aelius' favorite selection of poetry is unmistakable: *quod est ante pedes nemo spectat, caeli scrutantur plagas*. Laelius, who now holds Tubero's attention, has effectively disarmed the threat posed by Scipio, Philus, and Gallus through the agency of Sextus, and assumes Sextus' role as the instructor of practical duties.

Cicero's use of the Sextus-verse at *Rep.* 1.30 demonstrates well the important role a quotation plays in an expanded environment: the verse first serves as an authoritative and ornamental example, which in turn provides the basis for the introduction of Sex. Aelius' favorite lines of poetry and literary tastes. Laelius' initial focus on the words *egregie cordatus* and *catus* at *Rep.* 1.30 initially differs little from M.'s on *cordatus* at *Tusc.* 1.18 and Varro's on *catus* at 7.46. In the cases of *Tusc.* 1.18 and *L.* 7.46, however, the verse fulfils a modest role,<sup>40</sup> whereas in the *Rep.* it soon becomes apparent that the figure of Sex. Aelius is to take a momentary prominence in the narrative. Laelius formally introduces him through the medium of Ennius' poetry, from which literary existence Sex. Aelius emerges to become an active participant to the point where Laelius has him quote poetry. This poetic weapon, which Sex. Aelius deployed in his arguments with Gallus, Laelius utilizes for his instruction of Tubero, himself involved in the legal profession. That Sex. Aelius is an *amicus* of the interlocutors should not be overlooked – Laelius invokes their communal friend as an intellectual ally, one that allows him to avoid direct confrontation with his host Scipio and Philus. The level of complexity which surrounds the poetic quotations at *Rep.* 1.30 is absent in the works we have examined thus far, whether the *Inu.*, the *Rhet.*

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<sup>40</sup> Cicero's use of this line at *de Orat.* 198, while it also plays a narrow role in the prose text, is concerned with Sext. Aelius the man, who becomes, in effect, the illustrious representative for an amorphous group of men. The Sex. Aelius-quotation at *de Orat.* 1.198, then, modestly shares the idea found at *Rep.* 1.30 that Sextus is a man to be admired and emulated.

*Her.*, or the *L.*, and demonstrates the high level of sophistication with which Cicero employs poetry in his later prose works.

***Blank Verse: Varro's Res Rusticae***

We have now examined a small sample of quotations from the works of Cicero and Varro's *L.* A primary finding of this examination is that while Cicero and Varro overlap in their employments of poetry, Cicero alone employs poetry in an expansive and intricate manner – one perhaps more suited to the intricate nature of the dialogue. Again, the exclusively linguistic subject matter and nature of the *L.* prohibits any sweeping generalizations regarding the lack of any poetry employed in a similarly expansive and complex fashion, but an examination of Varro's rustically themed dialogue, the *R.*, will establish a fuller and fairer picture of his quotation-techniques as well as underscore Cicero's innovative and more complex use of poetry in Latin prose works. Not only does Varro rarely employ poetry in the *R.*, but the poetry he does employ strongly resembles his narrow use of poetry in the *L.*

Varro wrote the *R.* in 37 B.C., towards the end of his life and after the death of Cicero. Varro devotes the work to his wife, Fundania, and its purpose is to provide for her a practical manual on husbandry.<sup>41</sup> The work, in the form of a dialogue, comprises three books: the first book is devoted to agriculture, the second to domestic cattle, and the third to smaller farm-stock, such as poultry and bees. Poetic quotations in this work are scarce. This lack of poetic quotations is in large part explained by Varro's declaration at the beginning of the work that he will reject the Muses of Homer and Ennius in favor of the twelve rustic gods (*R.* 1.1.4):

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<sup>41</sup> *Quocirca scribam tibi tres libros indices, ad quos reuertare, siqua in re quaeres, quem ad modum quidque te in colendo oporteat facere* (*R.* 1.1.4).

Et quoniam, ut aiunt, dei facientes adiuuant, prius inuocabo eos, nec, ut  
Homerus et Ennius, Musas, sed duodecim deos Consentis; neque tamen eos  
urbanos, quorum imagines ad forum auratae stant, sex mares et feminae  
totidem, sed illos XII deos, qui maxime agricolarum duces sunt.

Varro then invokes the twelve gods – Jupiter, Tellus, Sol, Luna, Ceres, Liber, Robigus, Flora, Minerva, Venus, Lympha, and Bonus Eventus – and describes their roles in and importance to agriculture (*R.* 1.1.5-7).

After his invocation of these rustic divinities, Varro discusses his and other sources for the topic of agriculture. He first prefaces a list of more than fifty Greek and Roman prose authors who treat the subject of agriculture (*R.* 1.1.7-10) with the disclaimer that, if a reader feels a subject has not been covered in the *R.*, he should consult one of these experts. At the conclusion of this list he makes special note of the fact that, although Hesiod of Ascra, Menecrates of Ephesus, and others have treated the subject of agriculture in verse, they along with the register of prose authors have been surpassed in reputation by the Punic prose author Mago of Carthage (*R.* 1.1.10). Varro concludes his discussion of literary experts with the assertion that his work will be derived from three sources: his own practical observations, what he has read, and what he has heard from experts.<sup>42</sup> His detailed and elaborate outline of sources makes it clear to his readers that the work is to be firmly grounded in the practicality of experience and in the pragmatism of select prose offerings. He first pushes aside the Muses of Homer and Ennius in favor of the more appropriate rustic divinities and then appends the works of Hesiod, Menecrates, and others poets to an exhaustive list of

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<sup>42</sup> *Ea erunt ex radicibus trinis, et quae ipse in meis fundis colendo animaduerti, et quae legi, et quae a peritis audii* (*R.* 1.1.11).

prose works, all of which, he feels, Mago and other works deriving from him have surpassed.<sup>43</sup>

Despite Varro's disavowal of poetic sources there are nevertheless a few instances in the *R.* where he quotes portions of verse. Near the beginning of the first book the interlocutor Scrofa, when arguing that the knowledge of agricultural subjects is a necessary and great art (*ars*), states that it is also a science (*scientia*). A successful farmer must know the elements of this science which, Scrofa says, are equivalent to Ennius' elements of the universe: *eius principia sunt eadem, quae mundi esse Ennius scribit, aqua, terra, anima et sol* (*R.* 1.4.1).<sup>44</sup> Scrofa uses this poetry from Ennius (perhaps in the form of a paraphrase) in a corroborative sense and presents it in a very straightforward manner: he mentions the poet by name and emphasizes the literary nature of his source (*scribit*). In terms of content, Ennius' succinct mention of the basic elements obviates the need for any discussion concerning the vast question of universe's make-up or origins. By invoking the authority of Ennius, Scrofa not only adds a certain cachet to his register of the universe's elements, but also attaches a great importance to the science of agriculture by linking it inextricably to the fundamental composition of the cosmos.

Later in book 1, the interlocutor Stolo, when discussing grain crops, also quotes Ennius as an authoritative source:

Granum dictum quod est intimum soldum; gluma qui est folliculus eius; arista quae ut acus tenuis longa eminet e gluma, proinde ut grani apex sit gluma et arista. arista et granum omnibus fere notum, gluma paucis. itaque id apud Ennium solum scriptum scio esse in Euhemeri libris uersis (*R.* 1.48.1-2).

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<sup>43</sup> Compare, for example, Columella, who, besides quoting Mago often, also quotes Virgil extensively as well as writing the tenth book of his *de Re Rustica* in Virgilian hexameters.

<sup>44</sup> Enn. *Epicharmus* 3 *ROL*.



While this passage contains only a reference to a single word (*gluma*) rather than a quotation, it emphasizes the practical use which poetry has for Varro and his interlocutors.<sup>45</sup> The terms ‘beard’ (*arista*) and ‘grain’ (*granum*) are familiar to most people, but in the case of ‘husk’ (*gluma*) the rare nature of the term requires the aid of Ennius’ *Euhemerus*, the only place where Stolo knows it occurs.<sup>46</sup> Importantly, his use of Ennius to illustrate a single obscure word is also a common technique which Varro employs in the *L*.<sup>47</sup> In the process Stolo displays to his interlocutors a fitting level of expertise in this area of agriculture as well as a degree of knowledge in the literary world, thus exemplifying Varro’s stated desire to combine practical and written sources. So authoritative is Stolo’s explanation of grain crops and their constituent parts that, despite offering them the opportunity, his interlocutors ask him no questions.<sup>48</sup>

Besides these two references to words found in Ennius in the *R* there are two interesting instances of paraphrased quotations and one of a more traditional and fuller direct quotation. The paraphrased quotations occur within the dialogue, while the third more traditional quotation occurs during Varro’s introduction to the third book. As we shall see, there is a palpable difference between his employment of poetry depending on whether it occurs inside the dialogue proper or in an introduction.

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<sup>45</sup> Similarly, when Fundanius remarks near the beginning of the first book that crops face difficulty germinating or maturing in lands which are either too hot or too cold, he quotes a saying of Pacuvius to the same effect: *uerum enim est illud Pacui sol si perpetuo sit aut nox, flammeo uapore aut frigore terrae fructos omnis interire* (*R*. 1.2.5). The grammarian Festus (Lindsay 1913: 482), discussing the participial form *torrens*, quotes what seems to be the original verse from Pacuvius’ *Antiopa*: *flammeo uapore torrens terrae fetum exusserit* (= Pac. *tr.* 27 *ROL*).

<sup>46</sup> It is not entirely clear whether Ennius’ *Euhemerus* was a work of prose or verse. This confusion is due to the fragments which Lactantius preserves in prose; cf. Warmington 1956-67: ad loc. Note that here, however, Varro refers to *libris uersis*.

<sup>47</sup> See above n. 5.

<sup>48</sup> *Cum conticuisset nec interrogaretur, de nutritu credens nihil desiderari, dicam, inquit, de fructibus maturis capiendis* (*R*. 1.49.1).

Varro twice has one of his interlocutors quote from the same section of Plautus' *Menaechmi*. The first instance, near the beginning of the second book, occurs during a discussion of how long one should suckle animals. In particular, the aptly named interlocutor, Scrofa ('brood-sow'), is discussing how those pigs which are correctly suckled and thus may be offered up for sacrifice used to be called *sacres* (*R.* 2.1.20):

Fere ad quattuor menses a mamma non diiunguntur agni, haedi tres, porci duo.  
e quis qui iam puri sunt ad sacrificium, ut immolentur, olim appellati sacres,  
quos appellat Plautus cum ait "quanti sunt porci sacres?"<sup>49</sup>

Here, Scrofa cites Plautus to add weight or authority to a term: pigs suckled for less than two months may be offered up for sacrifice (*ad sacrificium*), a practice which is confirmed by the fact that Plautus refers to pigs as *porci sacres*. In the *Menaechmi*, however, the exact words which Menaechmus Sosicles uses to inquire about the price of *porci sacres* are as follows:

Responde mihi,  
adulescens: quibus hic pretiis **porci** ueneunt  
**sacres** sinceri?<sup>50</sup>

If, then, we recall that a traditional Varronian employment of poetry consists of a quotation containing particular words of interest followed by some form of linguistic commentary, we can see that Varro has Scrofa mimic this practice by omitting the

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<sup>49</sup> Cf. Pl. *Men.* 289-90.

<sup>50</sup> Pl. *Men.* 288-90.

section of verse and only supplying the linguistic outcome or words of interest – *porci sacres*.

When, later in the second book (*R.* 2.4.16), the interlocutor Cossinius quotes the same paraphrase during his discussion of pigs, his purpose is similar to that of Scrofa:

Cum porci depulsi sunt a mamma, a quibusdam delici appellantur neque iam lactantes dicuntur, qui a partu decimo die habentur puri, et ab eo appellantur ab antiquis sacres, quod tum ad sacrificium idonei dicuntur primum. itaque apud Plautum in *Menaechmis*, cum insanum quem putat, ut pietur, in oppido Epidamno interrogat “quanti hic porci sunt sacres?”<sup>51</sup>

As we can see, Cossinius describes the scene from the *Menaechmi* in more detail than does Scrofa<sup>52</sup> and he supplements Scrofa’s comments about the suckling of pigs in that we learn it is on the tenth day after birth that they are considered ‘pure’ (*puri*). Nevertheless, the paraphrased quotation fulfils a role similar to that at 2.1.20: Plautus again provides, in the same manufactured and short-hand fashion, corroborating and ancient evidence for the use of the word *sacres* to refer to pigs of certain age which are fit for sacrifice. Both here and at 2.1.20 the influence and the authority of Plautus’ words do not resonate beyond their initial point and there seems to be no intratextual awareness from Cossinius that Scrofa has just quoted the same paraphrase. The selection of this paraphrase primarily for its specific mention of the word *sacres* would, again, seem equally at home in the *L.*<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Cf. Pl. *Men.* 289-90.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Pl. *Men.* 292: *nam quidem insanum esse te certo scio*.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *L.* 5.97 where Varro also discusses *porci*.

The only time Varro employs a regular direct poetic quotation in the *R.* is at the beginning of the third book, when he points out that country life is older by far than city life. This quotation fulfills a function different from those we have seen either in the *R.* or the *L.* As part of his argument for the relative antiquity of country life, Varro points out that Thebes is the oldest Greek city, while Rome is the oldest city founded on Roman territory.<sup>54</sup> By way of showing the antiquity of Thebes compared to Rome, he quotes, at *R.* 3.1.2, two lines from Ennius' *Ann.*:

Nam in hoc nunc denique est ut dici possit, non cum Ennius scripsit:

septingenti sunt paulo plus aut minus anni,  
augusto augurio postquam inclita condita Roma est.<sup>55</sup>

Varro does not state when exactly he considers Rome to have been founded, but it is clear that he disagrees with Ennius' early date for the founding of the city (ca. 1100 B.C.).<sup>56</sup> He assumes the role of chronological expert at the expense of Ennius – whom he treats very much as a written source (*scripsit*) – and once he has established that he possesses greater knowledge of the foundation of Rome than the poet he applies this expertise to Thebes, which, he says, is some two-thousand and one-hundred years old.<sup>57</sup> It is not so much that Varro employs Ennius' verse in a highly negative sense, but rather that he uses its perceived inaccuracies to gain for himself a position of authority. The contents of the quotation are not crucial to his argument since by any

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<sup>54</sup> *Etenim uetustissimum oppidum cum sit traditum Graecum Boeotiae Thebae, quod rex Ogygos aedificarit, in agro Romano Roma, quam Romulus rex (R. 3.1.2).*

<sup>55</sup> Enn. *Ann.* 468-69 *ROL.*

<sup>56</sup> See Skutsch 1985: 314-15 for a discussion of Ennius' chronology; the latest date would be 880 B.C., which is still considerably earlier than the traditional date of 776 B.C. with which Varro is working.

<sup>57</sup> *Thebae, quae ante cataclysmum Ogygi conditae dicuntur, eae tamen circiter duo milia annorum et centum sunt. quod tempus si referas ad illud principium, quo agri coli sunt coepti atque in casis et tuguriis habitabant nec murus et porta quid esset sciebant, immani numero annorum urbanos agricolae praestant (R. 3.1.3).*

reckoning Thebes would be older by far than Rome, but the presence of the verse imparts a level of erudition and scholarly analysis to his argument. This quotation, then, occurring outside the dialogue differs from the four we have examined in both form and function – it appears in a fuller more direct form and it does not strictly concern an agricultural subject nor does the vocabulary of the quotation play a crucial role.

### ***Conclusion***

We have now seen that Varro's *R.*, in stark contrast to the *L.*, exhibits a conscious avoidance of poetry. On those occasions when an interlocutor quotes or paraphrases poetry the focus is on the words of the poet. The poetry is quoted in a succinct and off-hand manner and positively contributes to an immediate point rather than providing the basis for any detailed analysis. The one occasion when he quotes poetry outside the dialogue he does so in a negative fashion and quite differently from the ways in which he has his interlocutors quote verse. The tenor of the poetry in the *R.* is one of a written source – the poet is mentioned in every instance and the verb *scibere* is common – which reflects Varro's desire to combine his own personal experience and that of experts with written sources. He declared at the beginning of the *R.* that he prefers the rustic divinities to the Muses of Homer and Ennius and that the poetic agricultural works of Hesiod and Menecrates have been surpassed by Mago's treatise. This aversion to poetry manifests itself strongly in the *R.* and stands in stark contrast to books 5-7 of the *L.* Since Varro eschews a liberal use of poetry in his dialogue and since the poetry he does employ is of a limited nature similar to the *L.*, it underscores Cicero's more advanced use of poetry in his prose treatises – poetry which occurs not only with frequency, but which Cicero also employs in a variety of guises.

Now that we have observed a series of intertextual comparisons involving the works of Cicero, the *Rhet. Her.*, and Varro's *L.* and *R.*, I wish, in the next two chapters, to turn my attention to Cicero exclusively. The preliminary knowledge we have gained thus far that Cicero, unlike his contemporaries, employs poetry in an innovative, adaptable, fluid, and highly sophisticated manner, will best be strengthened through intratextual investigations of individual Ciceronian treatises, in particular the *de Orat.* (chapter 4) and the *Diu.* (chapter 5). These investigations will not only reveal, for example, further instances of richly colored quotation-environments and of the manipulation of verse, but also important interactions amongst the interlocutors (lacking in the case of Scrofa and Cossinius) based upon their attempts to appropriate and control poetic material. As I have intimated, for Cicero and his interlocutors, poetry is a valuable tool in an orator's arsenal: the presence of this foreign medium in a prose setting creates a situation in which poetry becomes public domain and becomes a key and flexible element – open to re-interpretation – in the various issues which the interlocutors of a dialogue discuss.

CHAPTER 4  
STAGED: POETIC OCCURRENCE AND RE-OCCURENCE IN THE *DE*  
*ORATORE*

***Rhetoric Revisited: The De Oratore***

In this chapter I will investigate intratextual instances of poetic quotations in Cicero's rhetorical treatise the *de Oratore* (*de Orat.*). This intratextual analysis considers, for the most part, poetic quotations which appear more than once in the *de Orat.* During the course of this investigation we will observe how Cicero employs the same poetry for different purposes and how an interlocutor uses and appropriates poetry as a means to combat opposing arguments. The role which poetry plays in these internal conflicts between the characters is again indicative of the adaptable and malleable nature of this foreign medium in a prose text.

Cicero completed the *de Orat.*, his first mature treatise, near the end of 55 B.C.<sup>1</sup> The work, a replacement for the *Inu.*, is considered to be the earliest extant Latin dialogue.<sup>2</sup> Its main interlocutors are L. Licinius Crassus and M. Antonius and the discussion, divided into three books, takes place at Crassus' Tusculan villa in September 91 B.C. only a few days before his death.<sup>3</sup> In terms of poetic quotations the

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<sup>1</sup> Cicero finished the book in the early winter of 55 B.C.; see *Att.* 4.13.2 (November 55 B.C.), *Fam.* 1.9.23 (September 54 B.C.); cf. *Att.* 13.19.4 (45 B.C.).

<sup>2</sup> There are two pieces of internal evidence in the *de Orat.* which indicate that Cicero considers it a replacement for the *Inu.*. First, at *de Orat.* 1.5 he criticizes the *Inu.* as an incomplete (*inchoata*) and unsophisticated (*rudia*) work. Second, he makes clear in the introduction to book 2 of the *de Orat.* his new aim: *nec uero te, carissime frater atque optime, rhetoricis nunc quibusdam libris, quos tu agrestis putas, insequare ut erudiam* (*de Orat.* 2.10). For the idea that the *de Orat.* is designed to be a 'non-textbook', see Dugan 2005: 81-90. For the literary dialogue at Rome prior to *de Orat.*, see Hirzel 1895: 428-32, Fantham 1972: 137-39.

<sup>3</sup> At *de Orat.* 1.24-25 there is a list of those initially present: L. Licinius Crassus (140-91 B.C.), M. Antonius (143-87 B.C.), Q. Mucius Scaevola (168/160-(?)87), P. Sulpicius Rufus (124/123-88 B.C.), and C. Aurelius Cotta (124-74/73 B.C.). For a historical overview of these personages, see May and Wisse 2001: 14-15.

*de Orat.* has the largest amount among the rhetorical works: at least fifty-four discrete units.<sup>4</sup>

The first book, following the prologue (1.1-23) and the setting of the dramatic scene (24-29), consists of four main parts: Crassus' argument that the orator needs to have a wide base of knowledge (30-95); Crassus' discussion of other matters important to oratory, e.g. natural ability (96-159); Crassus' further treatment of the orator's knowledge and the subject of Roman civil law (160-203); and Antonius' rejection of Crassus' claim that the orator needs such a broad base of learning (209-62).<sup>5</sup> There are only two direct quotations in this book, both from Ennius and both cited by Crassus, the first of which does not appear until section 198.<sup>6</sup>

The second book, containing the next day's debate, features the arrival of two additional persons: Q. Lutatius Catulus and C. Iulius Caesar Strabo. In this book, following an introduction and the announcement of the new arrivals (2.1-38), Antonius puts forward his own views on the orator: first he discusses the orator's subject matter (39-73), then he briefly criticizes the standard rules of rhetoric and offers some thoughts about the roles of natural endowment and imitation (74-98);

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<sup>4</sup> See above 8-9.

<sup>5</sup> This is a necessarily brief representation of the issues and topics discussed in the *de Orat.* For a more in-depth analysis of the structure of *de Orat.*, see Wisse 2002: 378-83. For a synopsis of this book and the second and third, see Murphy and Katula 2003: 167-78. Cf. May and Wisse 2001: 42-48.

<sup>6</sup> *De Orat.* 1.198 (= Enn. *Ann.* 326 *ROL*), 1.199 (= Enn. *sc.* 150-53 *ROL*). Fantham 2004: 146 points out that Cicero, although a great admirer of Ennius' *Annales*, employs very few quotations from this work in the *de Orat.*, reasoning that his focus is on speech and "on imparting to political and judicial situations an impressiveness worthy of tragic drama." It is true that quotations from other authors or, indeed, Ennius' plays far outnumber those from the *Annales*, but certain qualifications have to be made. First, although the *de Orat.* has only two definite quotations from the *Annales* (cf. 3.167 = Enn. *Ann.* du. 12 Sk.), this total is comparable to most other rhetorical and philosophical works of Cicero; the highest number of quotations from Ennius' *Annales* in a single Ciceronian treatise is five (*Rep.*, *Orat.*, *Sen.*) and several of his works contain none (*Leg.*, *Fin.*, *Top.*, *Amic.*, *Fat.*). Even the *Tusc.*, which has the highest total of poetic quotations in Cicero's works, contains only three from the *Annales* (Enn. *Ann.* 114, 326, 546 *ROL*). Second, although Fantham (p. 146) rightly points out that Cicero begins even the history of Roman oratory in the *Brut.* with a quotation from the *Annales*, the same is also true of *de Orat.* In fact, this quotation at 1.198 (= Enn. *Ann.* 326 *ROL*) establishes that Cicero (Crassus is the interlocutor) considers Ennius to be the greatest poet (*summus poeta*). The fact that this verse is drawn from the *Annales* might be incidental, but after one-hundred and ninety-seven sections it is perhaps as much a nod to the primacy of his *Annales* as it is to Ennius the poet.



following this preliminary material Antonius begins an account of how, in terms of invention and arrangement, an orator should handle a judicial case (99-216). Caesar then discusses wit (217-90), before Antonius discusses arrangement, deliberative oratory, ethos and pathos, panegyric, and memory techniques (291-367). There are considerably more quotations in the second book than in the first, most of which appear with regularity after section 158. The variety of identifiable poets is extensive: Plautus, Caecilius, Ennius, Terence, Pacuvius, Lucilius, and Novius.

The third book, which Crassus dominates, treats the subjects of style (*ornatus*), appropriateness (*decorum*), and delivery (*actio*). The book begins with accounts of the fate of the characters in the dialogue, including the death of Crassus, and of the setting for the afternoon's discussion (3.1-18). The specific topics which Crassus addresses when the dialogue resumes are as follows: the inseparability of style from matter (19-24); the various styles of eloquence (25-37); the purity and clarity of Latin diction (38-51); the ornate style and the relationship between eloquence and philosophy (52-96); the rules for embellishment (97-148); the ornate style in more detail (149-209);<sup>7</sup> and decorum and delivery (210-27). The third book contains the highest number of quotations, most of which appear in two concentrated clusters at sections 162-68 and 217-29. Again, there are quotations from a wide range of poets in this book, including Ennius, Plautus, Lucilius, Terence, Pacuvius, and Accius.

### ***Crassus: Re-quotation and Re-application***

Crassus often employs poetic quotations in the *de Orat.* to illustrate or support his arguments, especially in third book where he is the primary speaker. For the most part he provides poetic examples to illustrate features of language such as metaphors,

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<sup>7</sup> This section includes discussion of word choice (148-54), order (155-72), rhythm (173-98), and figures of speech (199-209).

neologisms, and emotion.<sup>8</sup> There are two occasions, however, when he re-uses a quotation which he has previously employed elsewhere. These re-quotations involve some measure of expansion from the previous employment and, in both cases, demonstrate the productive and flexible nature of poetry as a means of illustration.

At 3.96-103 Crassus discusses the rules for ornate style. He argues that ‘ornate’ rhetoric must be a balanced product, in that the ‘ideal orator’ (cf. 3.74) needs to apply ‘decoration’ (96) sparingly to the various parts of his speech and to take into account its content (103). Failure to achieve this balance in terms of decoration runs the risk of producing satiety and losing the attention of the audience, since it is only by an economical measure of decoration that the orator can ensure his audience’s senses do not become overwhelmed by unadulterated pleasure (100).

Near the end of his discussion of the rules for ornate style Crassus employs four poetic quotations in quick succession to illustrate the notion of moderating this decoration through the technique of emphasis (3.101-2). He pairs off these four quotes, with the second quotation of each pair representing the emphasis an actor gives to a line of verse by means of gesture (102):

Numquam agit hunc uersum Roscius eo gestu quo potest:

nam sapiens uirtuti honorem praemium, haud praedam petit,<sup>9</sup>  
sed abicit prorsus, ut in proximo:

sed quid uideo? ferro saeptus possidet sedes sacras,  
incidat, aspiciat, admiretur, stupescat. quid, ille alter:

quid petam praesidi ...<sup>10</sup>  
quam leniter, quam remisse, quam non actuose! instat enim

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<sup>8</sup> E.g. 3.157-58, 3.162, 3.164-65 (metaphors); 3.166-67 (allegory).

<sup>9</sup> This and next line = *tr. inc.* 98-99 *ROL*.

<sup>10</sup> This and next line = *Enn. sc.* 95, 101 *ROL*.

o pater, o patria, o Priami domus!

in quo tanta commoueri actio non posset, si esset consumpta superiore motu et exhausta. neque id actores prius uiderunt quam ipsi poetae, quam denique illi etiam qui fecerunt modos, a quibus utrisque summittitur aliquid, deinde augetur, extenuatur, inflatur, uariatur, distinguitur.

We do not know the context of the first pair of quotations (J. Ernesti suggests Ennius' *Hecuba*),<sup>11</sup> but the scene which they portray affords Crassus a good opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of gesture: the speaker's quasi-philosophical musings in the first line of verse are suddenly interrupted by the sight of the mysterious *ferro saeptus* in the second, and Roscius, as Crassus tells us, underplays the first line so that he might more emotively deliver the second (*sed abicit prorsus, ut in proximo ... incidat, aspiciat, admiretur, stupescat*, 3.102). The second pair of quotations is from Ennius' *Andromacha* and is part of Andromache's lament.<sup>12</sup> Crassus emphasizes the climatic nature of the second line, for the delivery of which Roscius has saved his energy,<sup>13</sup> when he makes it the subject of the verb *instat* ('imminent');<sup>14</sup> this 'imminent' line, then, containing anaphora, an ascending tricolon, and three vocatives evokes Andromache's despair and helplessness. Crassus, now satisfied that these four lines of verse have sufficiently displayed the correct procedure which an orator should employ to vary the ornamentation of his oratory, briefly concludes his discussion (104) and does not discuss the verses further.

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<sup>11</sup> Ernesti 1830: ad loc.

<sup>12</sup> It is clear from *Tusc.* 3.44-45 that these lines are from Ennius' tragedy *Andromacha*, where they are quoted along with other verses in which Andromache continues her lament (= Enn. sc. 95-100 *ROL*). Cf. also *Opt. Gen.* 18, *Tusc.* 1.85, 1.105.

<sup>13</sup> *In quo tanta commoueri actio non posset si esset consumpta superiore motu et exhausta (de Orat.* 3.102).

<sup>14</sup> For *instat* 'is imminent', see *OLD insto* 6b.

Later, at 3.183, Crassus reuses the first of the two lines from Ennius' *Andromacha* during a discussion of rhythm. This time, however, he quotes the line in its entirety: "*Quid petam praesidi aut exsequar? quoue nunc*".<sup>15</sup> Crassus points out that the rhythm of this line of verse (the meter in question is the cretic [˘ ˘ ˘]) is the same as that used by Fannius at the beginning of a speech: "*Si, Quirites, minas illius ...*"<sup>16</sup> Crassus, even though the metrical parallel between *quid petam praesidi* and *si, Quirites, minas illius* would have been sufficient for a comparison between cretics in verse and prose, wishes to emphasize that the rules which apply to orators are not as strict as those which apply to the poets.<sup>17</sup> His justification for extending the quotation is then clear: although an exact re-quotation of the verse would still contain two cretics (*quīd pētām praēsīdī*),<sup>18</sup> the fuller version contains an abundance of four. In contrast, the curtailed beginning of the prose is important since part of Crassus' argument is that the cretics in Fannius' speech could simply stop here (at either two or three) or they could continue (albeit at the risk of sounding overly metrical).<sup>19</sup> Thus, by expanding the line which he quotes from Ennius' *Andromacha* at 3.102 Crassus, at 3.183, provides a sound illustration of the necessarily rigid nature of poetic rhythm wherein the cretics (or any other metrical unit) must fill an entire line in a set number, while, in contrast, he only needs to cite the beginning of a line of prose.

Crassus also re-quotes, at 3.217, the second line from Ennius' *Andromacha* – "*o pater, o patria, o Priami domus!*" – which he uses at 3.102 in the context of

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<sup>15</sup> Enn. sc. 95 ROL.

<sup>16</sup> Fannius fr. 2 ORF. It is not clear whether these words are quoted as an example of three cretics or two. There are unambiguous cretics in *sī, Quīrītēs, mīnās* and a possible one with *īllīūs* if the second *i* in *illius* is taken as short; cf. Wilkins 1892: ad loc, Mankin (forthcoming): ad loc. In either event, this quotation constitutes a firm example of cretics (two or three) beginning a piece of prose.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *de Orat.* 3.184.

<sup>18</sup> Admittedly the shorter version would have obscured the fact that in the fuller version the final long syllable (the second *i* in *praesidi*) is lost due to the elision with *aut*, but the point would still have been clear enough.

<sup>19</sup> It is possible that Crassus, in not quoting any more than he does from the beginning of Fannius' speech, is being deliberately evasive and that the ambiguity of a possible third cretic is intentional.

gesture.<sup>20</sup> On this occasion, Crassus quotes the line during his discussion of an orator's delivery and emotion (3.213-27), in particular to illustrate the tone (*uocis genus*) of arousing 'compassion' and 'sorrow' (*miseratio ac maeror*). Crassus not only repeats this line, but he also provides two further verses from the same play, all of which he prefaces with a couplet from Ennius' *Medea* (3.217):

Aliud miseratio ac maeror, flexibile, plenum, interruptum, flebili uoce:

quo nunc me uertam? quod iter incipiam ingredi?

domum paternamne? ane ad Peliae filias?<sup>21</sup>

et illa:

o pater, o patria, o Priami domus!<sup>22</sup>

et quae sequuntur:

haec omnia uidi inflammari,

Priamo ui uitam euitari.

The application of tone to the line "*o pater, o patria, o Priami domus!*" complements Crassus' earlier discussion of gesture at 3.102. Now we can not only envisage the gestures which Crassus makes when he recites this line, but we are also privy to the tone of his voice. As a unit, the three quotations at 3.217 share a common theme: Medea mentions her father's house (*domus paterna*) and Andromache her father (*pater*) and fatherland (*patria*). In addition, Medea's mention of her father's house finds a parallel in Andromache's mention of the house of Priam (*Priami domus*). It seems likely that the two lines which Crassus quotes from Ennius' *Medea* were suggested to him by a section from a speech of C. Gracchus which he quotes earlier at

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<sup>20</sup> Enn. sc. 101 *ROL*.

<sup>21</sup> From Ennius' *Medea* (= Enn. sc. 284-85 *ROL*); cf. Eur. *Med.* 502-4.

<sup>22</sup> This and the next quotation are from Ennius' *Andromacha* (= Enn. sc. 101, 106-7 *ROL*).

3.214; Gracchus' speech contains, however, a reference to a maternal rather than paternal figure: "*quo me miser conferam? quo uertam? in Capitoliumne? at fratris sanguine redundat. an domum? matremne ut miseram lamentantemque uideam et abiectam?*"<sup>23</sup> Crassus' re-employment of this line at 3.217, then, supplements his earlier use of it at 3.102 and his addition of two subsequent lines from the same play constitutes a different form of expansion than we saw in the case of the other line from the *Andromacha* at 3.183.

We are now in a position to sketch the manner in which Crassus re-employs the two quotations from Ennius' *Andromache* which he first cites at 3.102. In the case of the first line, he expands the form found at 3.102 when he re-quotes it at 3.183: *quid petam praesidi ...* → *quid petam praesidi, aut exsequar? quoue nunc*. At 3.102 he uses this line during his demonstration of effective gestures when speaking, while at 3.183 he uses it to illustrate, in conjunction with a prose quotation, rhythm. Crassus thus employs this line for two very different purposes: both as an example of an underplayed line before an actor's gesticulations and as an example of the cretic meter. In the case of the second line from Ennius' *Andromache*, Crassus at both 3.102 and 3.217 quotes it in the same form: "*o pater, o patria, o Priami domus!*" At 3.102 he quotes this line as the gesturing counterpoint to the first line from the *Andromache*, while at 3.217 he uses it and two additional lines from the same play – *haec omnia uidi inflammari, / Priamo ui uitam euitari* – to demonstrate a sorrowful tone of voice. His re-employment of this second line is complementary: his performances first draw attention to gesture and then to tone, oratorical effects which, it is possible, he incorporated on both occasions. There is no conflict or inconsistency in how he emphasizes different aspects of the same verse, but on each occasion he adapts the

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<sup>23</sup> C. Gracch. *orat.* fr. 61 ORF.

poetry to suit the argument at hand and his re-employments succinctly underline the productive worth of re-quotation.

### ***Taking the Stage: The Orator and Emotions***

These two examples of re-quotation take place in a strict local environment and the interaction between the three sections (3.102, 3.183, and 3.217) is minimal. When, however, Crassus re-quotes, again during his discussion of tone (3.217), a quotation which Antonius cites earlier in the dialogue (2.193), there is an increased interaction between these two occurrences of the same poetry. The primary connection between Antonius' and Crassus' discussions in which this poetry appears is the notion of whether the orator's emotions may be real or feigned: Antonius strongly favors the notion that emotions are real, whereas Crassus admits to the usefulness of feigned emotions.

In order to illustrate this interaction, I will first examine the arguments which Antonius makes in favor of real emotions at 2.189-96 and then, in turn, those which Crassus makes concerning imitated emotions. Following these analyses, I will discuss an earlier section of the work (1.119-21) in which Crassus discusses the fear an orator feels at the outset of speech. This section, although it does not contain any poetic quotations, is nevertheless related to a quotation; indeed it is another example of re-quotation, one which Crassus employs to illustrate the orator's use of the tone of fear (3.218). This passage from book 1 (1.119-21) will not only shed light on the divergent views of Antonius and Crassus concerning emotions, but will also help us to understand better Cicero's thoughts on these kinds of emotions. Thus, while the focus of this analysis will be the role that these quotations play in their respective arguments at 2.193, 3.217, and 3.218, it is my intention to examine the influence of the poetry

beyond the local environments of the prose text and to determine how the use and re-use of this verse relates to the interactions between Crassus and Antonius.

In book 2 Antonius argues that in order for the orator to be successful he must himself feel the emotions he wishes to excite (2.189-96). As a means of introducing this topic Antonius mentions Crassus' earlier praise (at 2.124) concerning his handling of the defense of, among others, M'. Aquilius.<sup>24</sup> In order to reciprocate Crassus' commendation Antonius admits that he is accustomed to tremble (*horrere soleo*) at his interlocutor's oratorical performance in court (*de Orat.* 2.188):

Quae me hercule ego, Crasse, cum a te tractantur in causis, horrere soleo: tantis animi, tantus impetus, tantus dolor oculis, uultu, gestu, digito denique isto tuo significari solet; tantum est flumen grauissimorum optimorumque uerborum, tam integrae sententiae, tum uerae, tam nouae, tam sine pigmentis fucoque puerili, ut mihi non solum tu incendere iudicem, sed ipse ardere uidearis.

Antonius' description of Crassus' emotive style of oratory is littered with vivid and performative imagery: Crassus' passion, eyes, visage, gesture, and wagging finger accompany the flow of the most impressive and best words. The crescendo of this praise is that not only does Crassus seem to inflame the judge, but that he seems to be ablaze himself (*ipse ardere uidearis*).<sup>25</sup> Antonius' praise of Crassus' eloquence is, however, short-lived, and instead serves as a preamble to a protracted section in which

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<sup>24</sup> *Haec sunt illa, quae me ludens Crassus modo flagitabat, cum a me diuinitus tractari solere diceret et in causa M'. Aquili Gaique Norbani non nullisque aliis quasi praeclare acta laudaret (de Orat.* 2.188). M'. Aquilius (*cos.* 101 B.C.) prosecuted in 98 B.C. for extortion after suppressing the servile insurrection in Sicily, was successfully defended by Antonius (cf. 2.124-25).

<sup>25</sup> The notion of *ipse ardere* is a constant theme throughout Antonius' discussion of emotions and is an important component for him in ascertaining their genuineness. For a discussion of the phrase *ipse ardere* and for some thoughts on what it entails in this section of the *de Orat.*, see Wisse 1989: 257-69.



he extols his own virtues as an orator.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, as we shall see, in the following sections he expresses doubt over whether Crassus' oratorical emotions are in fact real.

After his praise of Crassus' oratory, Antonius states that it is necessary for emotions to be stamped or rather branded on the orator if he is to inspire the same feelings in the judge (2.189).<sup>27</sup> He adds, however, that if a feigned emotion has to be depicted then some more powerful art (*maior ars*) must be sought. Antonius, while he is not sure how the issue of real or feigned emotions stands with Crassus and others, tells the other interlocutors that this potential imitation of emotions does not concern him since he always experiences personally the emotions which he seeks to stir in others (2.189):

Nunc ego, quid tibi, Crasse, quid ceteris accidat, nescio; de me autem causa nulla est cur apud homines prudentissimos atque amicissimos mentiar: non me hercule umquam apud iudices aut dolorem aut misericordiam aut invidiam aut odium dicendo excitare uolui quin ipse in commouendis iudicibus iis ipsis sensibus, ad quos illos adducere uellem, permouerer.

This passage, coming directly after Antonius' praise of Crassus, appears to be more than his attempt to define or qualify the nature of oratorical emotions.<sup>28</sup> Having proffered two scenarios, real or feigned emotions, he is now unable to verify which of the two applies to Crassus and others: "As things stand (*nunc*), I do not know how it is with you and the others". Thus, Antonius' veiled criticism or, at the least, lack of endorsement concerning the reality of the others' emotions runs counter to his earlier

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<sup>26</sup> Cf. Zerba 2002: 307.

<sup>27</sup> Indeed, Antonius' phrase *impressi atque inusti* seems to suggest, in contrast to *ipse ardere*, a certain amount of permanence or increased reality.

<sup>28</sup> This latter half of 2.189 Wisse 1989: 258 describes as detailing the possibility of *ipse ardere*.

praise of Crassus' fiery oratorical performances. Antonius does not press this point further, however, and instead seeks to validate the claim that he, at least, is in possession of genuine emotions.

The first area which Antonius develops in his discussion of genuine emotions is the notion that the orator must be ablaze (*ipsum flagrantem*, 2.190) with the relevant emotion in order to sway the judge; he finishes this discussion with a comparison: flammable material requires a spark to burn just as the mind requires an inflamed and blazing orator to catch fire (2.190).<sup>29</sup> Following his impassioned description of an orator's emotive state, he claims that the authenticity of such a state is not a remarkable occurrence, since the very nature (*ipsa natura*) of the oratory which seeks to rouse emotions is bound to stir the speaker even more so than the audience (2.191). Initially, however, he struggles to provide for his interlocutors concrete examples of this commonplace phenomenon (2.192). Indeed, it is not until he elects to turn to poetry that Antonius, in his attempt to show that it is not extraordinary for a man to be roused to emotion so often, is able supply them with basic illustrations.

Antonius begins his poetic demonstration at 2.193 with the disclaimer that he finds nothing so unreal as poetry, the theatre, or stage plays. Following this qualification, he provides two quotations from Pacuvius' *Teucer*, a play or scene which he claims, in spite of the theater's inherent fictitiousness, he has often seen performed by an actor displaying vast emotion (2.193):

Sed, ut dixi, ne hoc in nobis mirum esse uideatur, quid potest esse tam fictum  
quam uersus, quam scaena, quam fabulae? tamen in hoc genere saepe ipse uidi,

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<sup>29</sup> *Vt enim nulla materies tam facilis ad exardescendum est, quae nisi admoto igni ignem concipere possit, sic nulla mens est tam ad comprehendendam uim oratoris parata, quae possit incendi, nisi ipse inflammatus ad eam et ardens accesserit* (*de Orat.* 2.190). Wisse 1989: 258 defines section 190 as the development of the necessity of *ipse ardere* first outlined in 189; for similar comparisons in the *de Orat.*, see 2.317, 3.69, 3.178-81, 3.222.

ut ex persona mihi ardere oculi hominis histrionis uiderentur spondalia illa<sup>30</sup>  
dicentis:

segregare abs te ausus aut sine illo Salamina ingredi,  
neque paternum aspectum es ueritus?<sup>31</sup>  
numquam illum ‘aspectum’ dicebat, quin mihi Telamo iratus furere luctu fili  
uideretur; at idem inflexa ad miserabilem sonum uoce:  
quom aetate exacta indigem  
liberum lacerasti orbasti exstincti; neque fratris necis  
neque eius gnati parui, qui tibi in tutelam est traditus?  
flens ac lugens dicere uidebatur.

Throughout this section Antonius acts as a member of the theatrical audience and his method of citation never deviates from this theatrical setting. His particular focus is on the way in which the actor, through his delivery, ‘seemed’ (*uideretur*) to convey emotions: the actor’s eyes *seemed* to blaze when he spoke his lines; the actor, when he said the word ‘mien’ (*aspectum*), *seemed* to be Telamo, angry and maddened by the grief for his son; and the actor *seemed* to be weeping and mourning when he delivered his lines in a low and plaintive tone. The illustrative benefits of the quotations are obvious: Antonius provides for his audience a familiar and vivid example of a man stirred by various emotions. The naturally fictitious nature of the dramatic scene, however, requires Antonius’ explanation if it is to serve as a valid example which is applicable to the orator’s genuine emotions.

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<sup>30</sup> Emendations of the phrase *spondali illa* are numerous, many of which are unconvincing. For further discussion, see Wilkins 1892: ad loc., Komm. ad loc.

<sup>31</sup> Taken together these two quotes form a whole: Pac. tr. 345-49 *ROL*. For a discussion of these lines, see Schierl 2006: fr. 243\*.

After his presentation of this theatrical scene, Antonius discusses the relationship between the actor's performance and the poet (2.193-94). Desiring access beyond the 'actor's mask', he searches for the origins of this performance, that is: the poet and his composition.<sup>32</sup> He argues that if the actor, although performing daily, always acts with emotion, then it is impossible that Pacuvius could have written this material in a calm and relaxed frame of mind (2.193). The actor, then, is the conduit of the poet's compositional fire and the real proof of genuine emotions is to be found in the nature of the product he performs, not the performance.

Antonius supports this inference that the actor's genuine performance is a reflection of the poet's emotive state when he says that he has often heard (*audiui*), and as Plato and Demosthenes are said to have written (*in scriptis relictum esse dicunt*), that no man can be good a poet who is not also on fire with passion and inspired by a kind of frenzy (2.194).<sup>33</sup> This testimony from Plato and Democritus not only continues the shift away from the performative environment of the stage into the literary world, but its overly vague (*saepe audiui*) and second-hand (*dicunt*) nature also casts doubt on whether Antonius has reliable access to or genuine belief in Pacuvius' emotive state during the composition of his material.<sup>34</sup> Thus, Antonius, as he was with respect to the emotions of Crassus and others, again finds himself in a position of uncertainty. This uncertainty, however, is a calculated move on his part, since, as we shall see, he soon makes it clear that he wants no part of this poetic or theatrical world, a stance which corroborates his declaration at the beginning of 2.193

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<sup>32</sup> It is not clear whether or not the actor is actually masked (Cicero at *de Orat.* 1.18 says that actors practice facial expressions; cf. *Diu.* 1.90.), but my point that Antonius desires access beyond the actor's performance on the stage supports both a literal and figurative interpretation.

<sup>33</sup> *Saepe enim audiui poetam bonum neminem – id quod a Democrito et Platone in scriptis relictum esse dicunt – sine inflammatione animorum existere posse et sine quodam afflatu quasi furoris* (*de Orat.* 2.194); cf. *Diu.* 1.80.

<sup>34</sup> This is, perhaps, in keeping with Antonius' pretense of not being terribly learned, e.g. *de Orat.* 2.3; cf. Komm. I pp. 93-94.

that nothing can be so unreal as poetry, the stage, and the theatre (*quid potest esse tam fictum quam uersus, quam scaena, quam fabulae?*).

Now that Antonius has shown, albeit imprecisely, that if the actor is emotionally excited during a dramatic performance, then so too must the poet be when writing, he moves, *a fortiori*, to the orator.<sup>35</sup> He begins his foray into the world of the orator with a demand that his interlocutors consider him as someone who acts with profound emotions when delivering a speech (2.194). To show that this is indeed the case he first distances himself from the analogous poet-actor relationship: his own speeches do not portray the old misfortunes and fictitious griefs of heroes and he is not the performer of another's persona but the author of his own (*neque actor essem alienae personae, sed auctor meae*; 2.194).<sup>36</sup>

It is at this point that Antonius draws upon a specific personal experience to confirm the veracity of his emotions: his defense of M'. Aquilius. In particular, he relates how he was overcome by the same compassion (*misericordia*) which he tried to stir-up in others (2.195):

Quem enim ego consulem fuisse, imperatorem, ornatum a senatu, ouantem in Capitolium ascendisse meminissem, hunc cum afflicto, debilitato, maerentem, in summum discrimen adductum uiderem, non prius sum conatus misericordiam aliis commouere quam misericordia sum ipse captus.

The dramatic and vivid nature of Antonius' description combined with his emotional attachment to his client is designed to confirm his status as the real-life equivalent of

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<sup>35</sup> The analogous actor-poet relationship in this section has been well noted – cf. Wisse 1989: 261, Fantham 2004: 144-45.

<sup>36</sup> It is interesting to note that Antonius here makes the distinction between an *actor* and an *auctor*; the perhaps more technical *histrion* at 2.193 now has no place in his oratorical world. For the use of actor in a judicial sense, see, for example, Cic. *Part.* 32.

the emotionally genuine actor.<sup>37</sup> But, of course, he is more than that – he is a combination of actor and poet and Aquilius is the tragic material that he draws upon. This close and personal association between the orator and his emotional source-material circumvents the potential ambiguities of knowing the truth of the stage and, more importantly, places Antonius in a position of absolute authority: he is both the creator and the guarantor of his genuine emotions.

Furthermore, since Antonius begins this section by recounting that Crassus had commended him for his performance in this trial (2.188), he uses this praise as an opportunity to draw his interlocutor back into the discussion. Significantly, when Antonius addresses Crassus he not only emphasizes the non-artistic means (*non arte*) which he employs to achieve genuine emotions, but also that he would not know what to say about such an art in any event (2.195):

Sensi equidem tum magno opere moueri iudices, cum excitaui maestum ac sordidatum senem et cum ista feci, quae tu, Crasse, laudas, non arte, de qua quid loquar nescio, sed motu magno animi ac dolore, ut discinderem tunicam, ut cicatrices ostenderem.

Antonius' line of argument in this passage recalls the beginning of 2.189, where he admits that that a rather powerful art (*maior ars*) would probably be required to feign emotions and that he does not know how things stand with Crassus and others in respect to genuine or feigned emotions (*nunc ego, quid tibi, Crasse, quid ceteris accidat, nescio*). In the end, through his personal sympathetic association with his client M'. Aquilius, he defines only himself as an orator who expresses real emotions,

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<sup>37</sup> So Zerba 2002: 308: "He claims absolute identity with Manius Aquilius, an identity enabled by commiseration for one whose status conforms closely with his own and whose suffering invites his sympathy."

while continuing to maintain his agnostic stance with respect to the emotions of the others.

We are now in a position to consider the overall role of the poetic quotations in Antonius' discussion of real or feigned emotions (2.188-95). At 2.188 he reciprocates the praise which Crassus gave him for his handling of various court cases; in particular he mentions Crassus' ability to inspire suitable emotions in the audience. These emotions, he maintains at 2.189, need to be real, they need to be stamped, indeed branded, on the orator himself (*impressi atque inusti*). Yet, while Antonius admits to the possibility that these emotions can be feigned, he claims that the art (*maior ars*) which is required to do so is beyond his ken since he genuinely feels the emotions that he wishes to inspire in his audience (2.189). His uncertainty about how other orators such as Crassus attain their emotional impact is due to a lack of access: Antonius has seen the blazing oratory of Crassus, but for him there can be no certainty that the emotions on display are real. Thus, in an effort to show his interlocutors that the expression of genuine emotions is not a surprising occurrence, Antonius turns to the fictitious world of poetry, the theatre, and stage plays (*sed, ut dixi, ne hoc in nobis mirum esse uideatur, quid potest esse tam fictum quam uersus, quam scaena, quam fabulae?* 2.193).

Antonius, as a member of the theatrical audience, admits that an actor can display believable and convincing emotions; nevertheless he desires access beyond the facade of the stage. The poet, he infers, is an integral part of the actor's end product: the actor, by necessity, plays his part with emotion because the poet at the time of composition was in a frenzy-like state (*quasi furoris*, 2.194). He portrays the poet-actor dynamic as a relationship analogous to the orator, but it is an analogy that he applies to himself alone and, moreover, is one in which he chooses not to partake or, rather, qualifies. As far as Antonius is concerned it is not possible to verify genuine

emotions by observation and, despite all the posturing and promises to the contrary, he can only speak for his own emotions: he is both the creator and executor of real-life tragedies (2.194), and his tragic material is the plight of his client with which he fully sympathizes (2.195).

Antonius' return to M'. Aquilius' trial at 2.195 and the focus he puts on his own genuine emotional conduct reveals the true and full function of the poetic quotations at 2.193. Antonius, once he recounts the trial, is no longer a member of the theatrical audience, but a participant in real-life oratory. Nonetheless, although he abandons the theater which he constructed from poetry and which he feels is analogous to the realm of the orator act, he puts it to another use. Antonius, when he elects to demonstrate the frequent occurrence of real emotions via the stage, invites his interlocutors to join him in the theater. Following the dramatic 'performance', he is the only member of the discussion to emerge from this theatrical construct and to possess unequivocally genuine oratorical emotions – Crassus and the rest of the group remain firmly seated amidst all of the uncertainty which surrounds the reality of the actor's emotions. As we shall see, however, the ambiguity of the theatrical world with all its potential arts is a place which Crassus is happy enough to inhabit.

### ***Finders Keepers: The Art of Poetic (Re-)Appropriation***

Towards the end of the third book Crassus, as we have seen, addresses the topic of delivery and emotions. At 3.214 he decries the fact that orators, whom he terms actors engaged in real life (*qui sunt ueritatis ipsius actores*), have abandoned the field of delivery, whereas the actors, mere imitators of reality (*imitatores autem ueritatis*), have appropriated it. He follows this assertion with what is almost certainly a reference to Antonius' statements at 2.189-96 concerning the orator and emotions (3.215):



Ac sine dubio in omni re uincit imitationem ueritas, sed ea si satis in actione efficeret ipsa per sese, arte profecto non egeremus. uerum quia animi permotio, quae maxime aut declaranda aut imitanda est actione, perturbata saepe ita est ut obscuretur ac paene obruatur, discutienda sunt ea quae obscurant, et ea quae sunt eminentia et prompta sumenda.

Crassus' use of the phrase *sine dubio* in this passage is an ironic jab aimed at Antonius, who, as we have seen, argues that a requisite skill of a successful orator is his ability to experience genuinely the emotions he wishes to excite in his audience.<sup>38</sup> Crassus, on the other hand, for whom reality is not always sufficient, not only admits that emotions must be expressed through delivery, but that they also must be imitated. His task, then, is to strip away those things which obscure emotions and to take up the prominent and clearly visible elements of emotions: the voice (216-19), gesture (220), and the face and eyes (221-23). And, when Crassus turns to the first of these categories, that dealing with the voice, the varieties of which fall under the regulation of an art (*nullum est enim horum generum quod non arte ac moderatione tractetur*, 217), he illustrates his arguments with numerous examples from the world of poetry.

The ten quotations which Crassus employs to demonstrate the various tones of voice that an orator should use form a set of examples which is analogous to the colors available to the painter.<sup>39</sup> The first tone of voice that he considers is anger; to illustrate this tone he employs three quotations – two most likely from Accius' *Atreus* and the same quotation from Pacuvius' *Teucer* which Antonius cited at 2.193 during his demonstration of an actor's emotions (3.217):

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<sup>38</sup> Cf. May and Wisse 2001: 291 n. 300; see, also, Wisse 1989: 198, 262-63.

<sup>39</sup> *Hi sunt actori, ut pictori, expositi ad uariandum colores (de Orat. 3.217); cf. 3.26, 3.98, 3.100.*

Aliud enim uocis genus iracundia sibi sumat, acutum, incitatum, crebro  
incidens:

ipsus hortatur me frater, ut meos malis miser  
mandarem natos ...<sup>40</sup>

et ea quae tu dudum, Antoni, protulisti  
segregare abs te ausus ...<sup>41</sup>

et

ecquis hoc animaduertet? uincite!<sup>42</sup>

et Atreus fere totus.

The introduction to the first quotation provides a concise and rigid structure for the topic under discussion: the various adjectives describe (and perhaps preview) the vocal ingredients which Crassus will use when he recites the lines in a tone of anger.<sup>43</sup> All three quotations are in some sense incomplete, which, perhaps, mirrors the rapid and abrupt tone of anger. The first and third quotations concern the brothers Thyestes and Atreus; the former is a brief account of the feast given by Thyestes, while the latter is Atreus' plea for someone to bind Thyestes. The second quotation, which, as Crassus point out, Antonius quoted earlier (at 2.193), is the beginning of Teucer's reproach of Telamo. Crassus has removed all extraneous considerations from the verses in an effort, as he promises, to strip away any obscurities associated with emotions. In fact, the only external reference to the original content or context of these quotations is a

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<sup>40</sup> This quotation is generally agreed by most editors to be from Accius' *Atreus* (= 196-97 *ROL*; cf., however, Jocelyn 1967: 416 who suggests that this quotation is from Ennius' *Thyestes*). This quotation occurs also at *Tusc.* 4.77, where it is similarly used in a discussion concerning *ira*.

<sup>41</sup> *Pac. tr.* 345 *ROL*.

<sup>42</sup> From Accius' *Atreus* (= *Acc. tr.* 198 *ROL*), apparently spoken by Atreus himself; cf. *Tusc.* 4.55.

<sup>43</sup> These terms are notoriously difficult to translate, see Fantham 2004: 294, May and Wisse 2001: 292 n. 301. For a fuller discussion on these terms, see Mankin (forthcoming): ad loc.

short tag at the end: *et Atreus fere totus*). This tag, I will argue, is a deliberate ploy by Crassus to highlight his re-use of Antonius' quotation from Pacuvius: the explicit reference to Antonius, the position of the quotation in the section and its shortened form, all reveal part of the strategy which he employs to address his interlocutor's views on emotions.

Crassus makes it explicit that he is borrowing, for his own purposes, a quotation which Antonius had previously employed at 2.193: *et ea, quae tu dudum, Antoni, protulisti*. His reuse of this quotation is not, however, a simple case of repetition. As we have seen, Crassus begins this section on the tone of anger with a quotation from Accius' *Atreus* (or Ennius' *Thyestes*),<sup>44</sup> then Antonius' quotation from Pacuvius' *Teucer*, and finally another from Accius' *Atreus*. As a result, the alternating speeches of Atreus and Thyestes in the first and third quotations share a connection, if not in source, at least in thought, a sequence and correlation which the quotation from Pacuvius interrupts. The phrase *et Atreus fere totus*, which either refers to the overall nature of Accius' *Atreus* or the speeches by the character Atreus, only emphasizes the oddity of the position which the quotation from Pacuvius holds.<sup>45</sup> By inserting Antonius' earlier Pacuvian quotation between two quotes from Accius in a section which he declares as Atrean, Crassus interrupts the natural sequence of the quotations. The interruption afforded by the Pacuvian quotation not only adds a sense of

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<sup>44</sup> See above n. 40.

<sup>45</sup> Jocelyn 1967: 325, 414 n. 7 appears to be alone in interpreting the phrase to mean "speeches made by a personage Atreus", which he uses to support his argument that Cicero nowhere names the title *Atreus*. Wilkins 1892: ad loc. is silent on the matter, but May-Wisse 2002: ad loc. translates "and thus almost the entire *Atreus*"; Sutton and Rackham 1942: ad loc. "and almost the whole of *Atreus*"; and Warmington 1956-67: for Pac. tr. 198: "yes, and well-nigh the whole of *Atreus* has such examples." Either way this is an unusual phrase; Jocelyn's similar examples (p. 325) of Cicero's "loose mode of introduction" do not shed any light on the matter, e.g. *ille de Iphigenia Achilles* 'the famous words of Achilles in the *Iphigenia*' (*Rep.* 1.30). In addition, instances where the titled play alone introduces a quotation in Cicero's treatises are rare and not comparable to the phrase we find here at *de Orat.* 3.217: *Orat.* 184 (= Enn. sc. 355 ROL): *uelut illa in Thyeste ... et quae sequuntur*; *Luc.* 51 (= Enn. *Epichar.* 1 ROL): *idemque in Epicharmo*; *Tusc.* 3.20 (= Acc. tr. 427 ROL): *ut est in Melanippo ... sed praeclare Accius*; 4.72 (= Turp. 115-16 CRF): *qualis in Leucadia est*.

spontaneity to Crassus' method of quotation, but also, by virtue of its emphatic link to Antonius, calls attention to the ironic (*sine dubio*) remarks which Crassus, at 3.215, implicitly directed towards his interlocutor concerning his views on emotions.<sup>46</sup>

Besides the emphatic placement of the quotation from Pacuvius, the shortened form in which Crassus re-quotes the verse also reinforces and increases the irony he aims at Antonius. The original verse as quoted by Antonius at 2.193 reads:

*“segregare abs te ausus aut sine illo Salamina ingredi, / neque paternum aspectum es ueritus?”*<sup>47</sup> Crassus at 3.217, by selecting only the first few words (*segregare abs te ausus*) to represent these lines (a form of intratextual *pars pro toto*), imparts to the verse a new and significant meaning. Antonius originally quoted this verse as evidence that an actor exhibits genuine emotions analogous to the orator, but, as we have seen, he rejected this comparison for himself. By abandoning his theatrical construct for real-world of oratory, he also distanced himself from his poetic quotations. In response, Crassus not only appropriates his poetry, he makes Antonius the surrogate subject of the quotation, the shortened form of which plays upon his abandonment: *segregare abs te ausus*. In this way, Crassus lets Antonius know that if he does not want to lay claim to poetry and the dramatic art, then he, a willing spectator at the theater, is happy to do so. Crassus, unlike Antonius, sees the value in regulating emotions through art (*ars*), which is a notion that Antonius not only twice rejects or claims to know nothing about (2.189, 195), but, on each occasion, mentions Crassus in connection with his views. Moreover, that Crassus appropriates this line of verse ostensibly to demonstrate the tone of anger, invites us to speculate, along with Antonius, whether or not the emotion on show is feigned or real.

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<sup>46</sup> See above 104.

<sup>47</sup> Pac. tr. 345-46 *ROL*.

On a basic level, Crassus' technique of re-quotation at 3.217 is a subtle reminder of the conversational and interconnected character of the dialogue: he mentions Antonius by name and repeats some of his earlier poetic material. On a more advanced level, however, it forms an important part in the disagreement between Crassus and Antonius regarding emotions, in particular that Crassus is content to accept without qualification this quotation as an example of the actor's art (i.e. the tone of voice expressing anger) and is perhaps not convinced by Antonius' claim to know nothing about the imitation, through an art, of emotions. Crassus' appropriation and employment of Antonius' quotation elevate the mocking tone of this passage, but the public nature of poetry precludes Antonius from any feeling of being wronged. Crassus, after all, is merely putting to use that to which Antonius relinquished his claim.

### ***Neologisms and Fear: Feigned Emotions Appearing Real***

Crassus' appropriation of poetry at 3.217 is not the only occasion when he re-quotes poetry in his section on the tone of delivery (3.216-19), since, as we have already seen, he re-uses, also at 3.217, a poetic quotation to demonstrate the tone of sorrow.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, at 3.218, in the passage which follows these two re-quotations at 3.217, he employs an expanded version of a quotation which he quoted earlier in the dialogue at 3.154. This quotation, it shall be argued, not only forms a part of Crassus' overall exchange with Antonius regarding the orator and emotions, but also reveals Cicero's opinion on the matter of oratorical emotions. Before we consider Crassus use of this quotation at 3.218 in conjunction with tone of voice, however, I will briefly examine the section (3.154) in which he first cites the shortened version.

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<sup>48</sup> See above 88-94.

At 3.154 Crassus quotes, together with an anonymous verse, a single line from Ennius' *Alcmeo*. He uses these quotations to illustrate neologisms, pointing, in particular, to the verb *expectorat*<sup>49</sup> and the epithet *uersutiloquas*:

Nouantur autem uerba quae ab eo qui dicit ipso gignuntur ac fiunt, uel coniungendis uerbis, ut haec:

tum pauor sapientiam omnem exanimato expectorat.<sup>50</sup>

num non uis huius me uersutiloquas malitias.<sup>51</sup>

uidetis enim et 'uersutiloquas' et 'expectorat' ex coniunctione facta esse uerba, non nata.

The introduction and quotation-environment are uncomplicated: Crassus' simple means of introduction (*ut haec*) draws attention to the quotations themselves and through his partial re-quotations after the lines of verse (*uersutiloquas* / *expectorat*) he makes explicit (cf. *uidetis*) those which words he considers neologisms. He does not comment further on the verse or discuss its contents.<sup>52</sup> The purely illustrative function of the quotations, wherein specific vocabulary is central to the demonstration, resembles the primary way in which Varro employs poetry in the *L.* and, to a lesser extent, the *R.*<sup>53</sup>

When Crassus, at 3.218, re-uses this quotation in his discussion of tone and delivery he adds a further four lines. In particular, after his 'Atrean' section on anger and following his demonstration of sorrow, he uses this expanded quotation to

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<sup>49</sup> For this rare word, cf. *Acc. tr.* 286, 598 *ROL*.

<sup>50</sup> *Enn. sc.* 26 *ROL*; cf. *Tusc.* 4.19.

<sup>51</sup> *Tr. inc.* 129 *ROL*.

<sup>52</sup> The brevity of this section may be explained by Cicero's reluctance to use neologisms in his rhetorical works, see von Albrecht 2003: 45-48.

<sup>53</sup> See chapter 3.

illustrate the tone of fear, which, he says, should be ‘low’, ‘hesitating’, and ‘despondent’ (3.218):

Aliud metus, demissum et haesitans et abiectum:

multis sum modis circumuentus, morbo, exsilio atque inopia;  
tum pauor sapientiam omnem exanimato expectorat;  
mater terribilem minatur uitae cruciatum et necem,  
quae nemo est tam firmo ingenio et tanta confidentia,  
quin refugiat timido sanguen atque exalbescat metu.<sup>54</sup>

The introduction to this quotation is in keeping with Crassus’ demonstrations of sorrow and anger: an explanatory introduction prefaces and explains the content of the verse in a perfunctory and non-literary manner without reference to or discussion of the original poetic content (although in this instance *metus* / *metu* creates a correspondence between prose and verse).<sup>55</sup> The expanded version of this quotation originally found at 3.154 contains a superfluity of words related to fear – to *pauor* and *exanimat*, we can now add, for example, *terribilem*, *timido*, *exalbescat*, and *metu*. Thus, as when he expands the line from Ennius’ *Andromache* to illustrate the cretic meter,<sup>56</sup> he has a similarly utilitarian reason for expanding this quotation.

Crassus, then, employs a part of the same quotation in his discussions of two disparate topics: neologism and tone of fear. At 3.154 the word *expectorat* provides an appropriate example of neologism, while at 3.218 the expanded version of the

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<sup>54</sup> From Ennius’ *Alcmeo* (Enn. sc. 25-29 R); cf. *Fin.* 4.62, 5.31. The speaker, Alcmeo, is currently in exile and in a state of near-madness from fear as a result of killing his mother Eriphyle. Cf. *Tusc.* 4.19.

<sup>55</sup> The quotation introductions for the remaining three categories of tone of voice (energy, joy, and distress) at 3.219 follow the same pattern. At 3.220 Crassus refers to the emotions as a whole (*omnes motus*) and applies to them the demand of gesture (*gestus*).

<sup>56</sup> See above 89-91.

quotation features an abundance of words denoting or associated with fear. That he uses the same quotation in both a shortened and expanded form is indicative of his familiarity with particular poetic material and, again, illustrates the malleable nature of poetry contingent upon the demands of the prose text.<sup>57</sup> A detailed examination of the expanded version, however, reveals a more complex and personal motive for why Crassus quotes these lines in particular.

The expanded version of the quotation found at 3.218 contains, in addition to the neologism *expectorat*, the unusual word *exalbescat*. This word occurs only four times in extant Latin (which perhaps qualifies it as another neologism): it appears twice in the *de Orat.* (once in the quotation from Ennius<sup>58</sup> at 3.218 and once at 1.121 – *exalbescam* – where Crassus discusses an orator’s fear); once in the *Luc.* (in the context of the fear one’s mind feels over true or false impressions – *exalbescerent*, 48); and once in Aulus Gellius (in the context of human blood – *exalbuit*, 12.1.12).<sup>59</sup> That this extremely rare word appears twice in the *de Orat.* is perhaps coincidental, but a comparison between the two passages where Crassus uses *exalbescere* (1.121 and 3.218) reveals a striking similarity in language and thought. An individual analysis of this passage at 1.121 will provide us with a better understanding of his discussion on the tone of fear, his view of emotions, and, as I noted, an indication of Cicero’s opinion on this matter.

Towards the middle of the first book Crassus and the others discuss the importance of natural ability for the good orator (1.113-33). Crassus is the first to speak (1.113-21), then, following an interlude (122), there is a procession of different speakers: Antonius (123-28), Crassus (129-30; 131-33), Sulpicius (131), and Cotta

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<sup>57</sup> For Crassus’ re-quotations of poetical material which he has previously cited, see above 88-94

<sup>58</sup> It also appears again in this Ennian line (= Enn. sc. 29 *ROL*) at *Fin.* 5.31, *Hort.* fr. 102.

<sup>59</sup> *An quia spiritu multo et calore exalbuit, non idem sanguis est nunc in uberibus, qui in utero fuit?* (Gel. 12.1.12).



(133). At the beginning of the discussion (118) Crassus makes it known that the orator's performance faces a great deal of scrutiny, even more so than an actor's performance, since in the case of the actor there is no constraint upon the audience to stay in attendance.<sup>60</sup> It is the task of the orator, then, to ensure that he satisfies both those who have the right to judge freely and the attendant audience: *est igitur oratori diligenter providendum, non uti eis satis faciat quibus necesse est, sed ut iis admirabilis esse uideatur quibus libere liceat iudicare* (1.119). This pressure for the orator to perform and to satisfy his audience leads Crassus to disclose to his interlocutors, whom he considers close friends, an opinion about orators which he has thus far kept to himself: the role that fear or nervousness (*timide*) plays in speaking (1.119).<sup>61</sup>

Crassus' concept of fear and public speaking revolves around three categories of orators (1.119-21).<sup>62</sup> The first category consists of those excellent orators who do not begin their speeches nervously (*timide*), and, as a result, lack shame (*impudentes*); he does not believe, however, that this category exists, since the better the orator the more he will be thoroughly frightened at the prospect of speaking (119-120). The second category involves those orators who, although not good speakers, are nervous when speaking (*commouetur in dicendo*), and, as a result, seem to lack shame (*impudens uidetur*; 120). The third category comprises those orators who are truly shameless (*uero non pudet*); these Crassus believes deserve punishment as well as reprimand (121).

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<sup>60</sup> *Itaque in iis artibus, in quibus non utilitas quaeritur necessaria, sed animi libera quaedam oblectatio, quam diligenter et quam prope fastidiose iudicamus! nullae enim lites neque controuersiae sunt, quae cogant homines sicut in foro non bonos oratores, item in theatro actores malos perpeti* (de Orat. 1.118).

<sup>61</sup> *Ac, si quaeritis, plane quid sentiam enuntiabo apud homines familiarissimos, quod adhuc semper tacui et tacendum putavi* (de Orat. 1.119).

<sup>62</sup> For a discussion of this passage, cf. Gunderson 2000: 205-9, Zerba 2002: 312-13.

It is at this point that Crassus elects to share with the group an episode from his youth: the prosecution of C. Papirius Carbo in 119 B.C.<sup>63</sup> His decision to draw on personal forensic experience recalls Antonius' account of M'. Aquilius' trial in book 2,<sup>64</sup> but, unlike Antonius, he includes rather than excludes the other members of the group in this illustration. They, like him, belong to the category of orators which is suitably frightened at the outset of a speech (1.121):

Equidem et in uobis animum aduertere soleo et in me ipso saepissime experior,  
ut et exalbescam in principiis dicendi et tota mente atque artibus omnibus  
contremescam. adolescentulus uero sic initio accusationis exanimatus sum, ut  
hoc summum beneficium Q. Maximo debuerim, quod continuo consilium  
dimiserit simul ac me fractum ac debilitatum metu uiderit.

The remarkably personal and dramatic details which Crassus relates here bear a strong resemblance to the lines of verse which he will quote at 3.218, not only in terms of general sense (the emotion and tone of fear), but also in vocabulary: *exalbescam* / *exalbescam*; *exanimatus* / *exanimato*; and *metu* / *metu*. At 1.121, however, his discussion of fear and speaking is of a personal nature and strictly contextualized, whereas at 3.218 he gives a more impersonal demonstration which concerns the tone of fear an orator might intentionally use.<sup>65</sup> Indeed, these two passages, both of which contain the rare verb *exalbescere*, are, in a sense, opposites: at 1.121 the fear Crassus feels is uninvited and particular, while at 3.218 the tone of fear is calculated and

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<sup>63</sup> Crassus was twenty-one at the time of this successful prosecution. The exact charges brought by Crassus against Carbo are not known; cf. Gruen 1968: 107-9.

<sup>64</sup> See above 100-1.

<sup>65</sup> This shift from universal precepts to the individual condition mirrors, of course, Antonius' progression at 2.193-94 from the analogy of the actor and poet to the oratorical world where he is the only inhabitant. See above esp. 103.

universal. Ultimately, however, Crassus views both these admixtures of fear and oratory as positive elements in the make-up of the (ideal) orator.

When he has completed his account of Carbo's trial and his disclosure of the fear which he experiences when he begins to speak, an interlude shifts the aspect of the dialogue from Crassus' speech to the reaction of his audience (1.122):

Hic omnes assensi significare inter sese et colloqui coeperunt. fuit enim mirificus quidam in Crasso pudor qui tamen non modo non obsesset eius orationi, sed etiam probitatis commendatione prodesset.

With this interlude Cicero provides for his readers a panoramic glimpse of the overall scene (*hic*). This increased viewing distance from the dialogue, however, results in a non-verbalized episode to which our access is limited to Cicero's narrative commentary and interpretation of the group's response: *assensi significare inter sese et colloqui coeperunt*. We only know that interlocutors agree with Crassus' words, but Cicero withholds from us the details of what was said among them.<sup>66</sup> It is under these murky conditions, then, that we must analyze the approval which Crassus receives from his friends.

During the interlude and resultant break in the narrative Cicero portrays the interlocutors as adjudicators. These adjudicators lie somewhere between the legal and theatrical audience in that they evaluate, in an unconstrained fashion (*libere*), the illustration which Crassus draws from the forensic world (cf. 1.119).<sup>67</sup> We witness from a distance the near instantaneous agreement of the party, which Cicero supplements for us: Crassus, he says, is a speaker in possession of a marvelous kind of

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<sup>66</sup> For other instances of *colloqui* in *de Orat.*, cf. 1.26, 1.33. Cf. Gunderson 2000: 208, Zerba 2002: 313.

<sup>67</sup> See above 111-12.

modesty (*mirificus quidam pudor*), a modesty which is the very opposite of the three categories he has just formulated and which, in turn, helps rather than hinders his oratory. What this scene entails, then, is the successful completion of the task that Crassus set the orator at the beginning of this section, that is, to seem admirable in the eyes of those who are free to pass judgment: *admirabilis* (1.119) > *mirificus* (1.122). After the interlude it is Antonius who resumes the dialogue and, in general, he agrees with Crassus, saying that the greater an orator's ability the more nervous he will be (*ita maxime is pertimesceret*, 1.123). His reasoning for this belief is that orators are judged more harshly than actors (1.123-25).<sup>68</sup>

To return, then, to Crassus' extended quotation from Ennius' *Alcmeo* at 3.218, the similarity of language and thought between this verse and the passage at 1.121 is clear. The backdrop to the quotation at 3.218 is his disagreement with Antonius' hard-line stance on genuine emotions and these lines of verse would appear to be familiar to and favored by to him because they invoke or remind him of some personal emotions. Crassus does not, of course, live in fear from having killed his mother as does Alcmeo, but the presence of the rare verb *exalbescere* in both passages is a strong indication that the two passages should be viewed in conjunction with each other. The lines between performance and sincerity are now blurred. That Antonius was witness to and agreed with Crassus' discussion at 1.122 concerning the role that fear plays at the beginning of a speech, now leaves open the possibility that, in light of Crassus' thoughts on emotions including the tone of fear, his account of fear at 1.121 involved some degree of oratorical art.

With respect to the comments which Crassus makes concerning the role fear plays in an oratorical setting, it is necessary to consider Cicero's admission, at the

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<sup>68</sup> By the end of the day's discussion, however, Antonius disagrees (1.258-59), in particular, with Crassus' contention at 1.129-30 that the orator is viewed more critically than the actor; cf. Wisse 2002: 381 n. 7.

beginning of his *Pro Rege Deiotaro* (45 B.C.), of the fear he feels when delivering a speech (*Deiot.* 1):

Cum in omnibus causis grauioribus, C. Caesar, initio dicendi commoueri soleam uehementius quam uidetur uel usus uel aetas mea postulare, tum in hac causa ita multa me perturbant ut quantum mea fides studi mihi afferat ad salutem regis Deiotari defendendam, tantum facultatis timor detrahat. primum dico pro capite fortunisque regis quod ipsum, etsi non iniquum est in tuo dumtaxat periculo, tamen est ita inusitatum, regem reum capitis esse, ut ante hoc tempus non sit auditum.

Cicero's disclosure in this passage mirrors that of Crassus in the *de Orat.*: his emphasis is also on the beginning of speaking (*initio dicendi*; cf. *in principiis dicendi*, *de Orat.* 1.122) and he employs a rich variety of words denoting fear or anxiety, e.g.: *commoueri ... perturbant ... timor*.<sup>69</sup> There can be no doubt, then, that we should equate Crassus' opinion on fear and speaking at 1.122 with that which Cicero reveals at the beginning of the *Deiot.*<sup>70</sup> In Cicero's case he seeks to create an empathetic patron-client relationship with Caesar, who, he hopes, will allay his fears;<sup>71</sup> in Crassus's case he seeks to demonstrate that the demands placed on the orator necessarily involve a measure of fear and, as a result, he wishes to reassure the younger members of his audience via his personal experience that this fear is in fact

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<sup>69</sup> Following this opening section, Cicero continues with this motif of fear: *conturber* (2) ... *extimescebam* (3) ... *perturbat* (4) ... *moueor* (5) ... *perturbationem* (6). For the admission of *timor* as a common technique for establishing a relationship with the judge, see Gotoff 1993: 200.

<sup>70</sup> For the connection between Crassus' statements at 1.121 and Cicero's own views, see, for example, Wilkins 1892: ad loc.; May and Wisse 2001: 85 n. 83. Cf., for similar accounts of fear in Cicero, *Diu. Caec.* 41-42, *Luc.* 2.64.

<sup>71</sup> *Deiot.* 4. For the idea that Cicero's aim here is to establish this relationship with Caesar, see Gotoff 2002: 257-58.

the mark of a good orator.<sup>72</sup> Crucially, in both cases there is a discernable rhetorical or oratorical aim – Cicero and Crassus divulge the fear they felt or are feeling in order to secure their audience’s approval.<sup>73</sup>

With this connection between the views of Cicero and Crassus concerning fear and public speaking in mind, we can now consider the overall situation between Crassus, Antonius, and Cicero regarding the emotion of fear. Intratextually, the expanded quotation which Crassus delivers at 3.218 in order to illustrate the tone of fear echoes, in terms of the obvious tenor and the repetition of rare vocabulary (*exalbescere*), his disclosure at 1.121 of the fear he felt during his prosecution of Carbo. This disclosure and Crassus’ discussion of the three categories of orators who feel or do not feel shame (119-21) meets with the universal approval of the group including Antonius. Intertextually, Crassus’ discussion at 1.121 is comparable to the fear which Cicero admits to feeling when delivering an oration. Thus, Cicero’s implicit approval of Crassus’ stance on emotions prompts us to regard his admission of fear at 1.121 in a new light. The success of Crassus’ ‘performance’ at 1.119-21 mirrors the success of a forensic court case. Both Crassus’ prosecution of Carbo trial (presumably) and Cicero’s defense of Deiotarus (unquestionably) involved the employment of fear as an oratorical device and it is this experience which Crassus draws upon, in vivid fashion, in order to secure the agreement of his friends. In turn, the similarities between Crassus’ re-telling of Carbo’s trial and the quotation from Ennius’ *Alcmeo* at 3.218 strongly suggest that Crassus, particularly at 1.121, employed an oratorical *ars* (cf. 3.215) to express or recreate his emotional state of fear.

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<sup>72</sup> This much is clear from Crassus’ insistence that his catalogue of the requirements of the ideal orator is not designed to deter young men from oratory (1.117) and that he includes his immediate audience in the class of orators that feel an appropriate amount of fear at the outset of a speech (1.121).

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Gotoff 1993: 198.

## *Conclusion*

What we have seen in this chapter is the influence which a select number of poetic quotations in the *de Orat.* have in both a local and a broader context and the utility, for the orator, of poetry. In particular, those instances of intratextual re-citation and allusion which I examined illustrate the tangible benefits which poetic quotations offer to a prose treatise, especially one in a dialogue format. Crassus, on three occasions, re-uses and re-adapts illustrative poetic material which he earlier cites: 3.102 → 3.183; 3.102 → 3.217; 3.154 → 3.218. These re-employments, which involve an expansion of the quotation in two of the cases, far from being repetitive, reinforce the notion that poetry is a productive and malleable tool of illustration. While Crassus employs the poetry to demonstrate an immediate topic in all six of the instances we considered, two of the re-quotations play a meaningful role beyond the immediate prose text in which they appear.

At 3.217, Crassus' appropriation and employment of a quotation which Antonius cites at 2.193 forms part of the broader debate concerning the emotions of the orator and creates a definitive point of contact between the two sides. Again, although this poetry plays a distinct and localized role, on a broader scale it also helps to unify and make clear the connection between the two sections (2.193, 3.217). We noted that Crassus begins his discussion of emotion and delivery at 3.215 with an ironic endorsement (*sine dubio*) of Antonius' earlier arguments in book 2 that reality beats everything in imitation. Crassus proceeds, however, to qualify his endorsement by stressing the useful roles which imitation and art play in conveying emotions (3.215-16). Following a discussion of the relationship between types of emotions and tones (3.216), he provides three examples of verse to illustrate the tone of anger, the second of which we have seen emphatically references Antonius' earlier use of the same quotation: *et ea quae tu dudum, Antoni, protulisti "segregare abs te ausus ..."*

(3.217). Crassus' very 'performances' of these quotations as if he were an actor is, then, a continuation of the ironic barrage which he aims at Antonius' insistence of the necessity of genuine emotions (2.189-96). Antonius, we recall, disavowed the theatrical model which he constructed and to which he invited the other members of the discussion – Crassus, then, is only too willing to remain in his seat and lay claim to the poetry which Antonius abandoned in favor of the real-world of oratory.

Crassus' appropriation of Antony's quotation not only strengthens his own case at his interlocutor's expense, but his re-employment and re-contextualization at 3.218 of a quotation which he had earlier quoted (3.154) finds a link with his discussion of the orator's fear at 1.121 as well as an intertextual parallel with the self-confessed fear which Cicero feels when delivering an oration. Cicero and Crassus both understand the benefits of producing emotion via artistic means, in light of which we must consider the possibility that Crassus deliberately infused his account of orators and fear with artistic emotion. The group's universal and quasi-juridical approval of Crassus' words, then, which Cicero relays to us through a panoramic interlude, substantiates the effectiveness of imitated (cf. *imitanda*, 3.215) emotions.

Overall, there is no unanimity between or true resolution of the arguments which Crassus and Antonius put forward in *de Orat.*, but poetry plays a part in allowing us to resolve certain issues. Poetic quotations in the *de Orat.*, especially when coupled with the continual emphasis in the dialogue on the theatrical world, demonstrate in a complex fashion the utilitarian value which emotions and the manipulation of emotions offer to the orator. Cicero, a figure ever present in the background of the *de Orat.*, steps forwards to endorse the views of Crassus, an endorsement which poetry plays no small part in revealing and confirming.

This intratextual analysis of poetry in the *de Orat.* has increased our knowledge of Cicero's art of quotation. In the hands of his characters poetry is a fluid



tool, able to be re-shaped, re-cast, and re-employed. In the next chapter we will observe how poetry functions in Cicero's philosophical dialogue the *Divina*. The unique two-book structure of this dialogue, where there is a strict division between the speeches of Quintus and Marcus, invites a close investigation of the ways in which poetry helps to structure this bi-fold narrative and how it helps to resolve key issues of the dispute over the nature of divination.

CHAPTER 5  
OVERTURNINGS: POETIC QUOTATIONS IN BOOK 2 OF THE *DE*  
*DIVINATIONE*

*A Tale of Two Speeches: The Structure of the De Divinatione*

Cicero's philosophical treatise the *de Divinatione* (*Diu.*), thought to be completed in two stages (before and after Caesar's assassination on 15 March, 44 B.C.), possesses an ostensibly simple two-book structure.<sup>1</sup> In the first book Quintus, the brother of Cicero, delivers a Stoic-derived defense of divination; in the second Marcus responds with an Academic refutation.<sup>2</sup> This strict two-fold division and exclusively familial aspect is unique among Cicero's dialogues.

The first book begins with an introduction to the work as a whole (1-7), an acknowledged connection with the *N.D.* (8-9), and an introduction to Quintus' argument (9-11a).<sup>3</sup> His argument begins with a discussion of divination as an observable even if inexplicable reality (11b-33) followed by separate defenses of natural (*natura*) divination (34-71) and artificial (*ars*) divination,<sup>4</sup> in particular examples of 'conjecture' (*coniectura*; 72-79a).<sup>5</sup> He next outlines general arguments in

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<sup>1</sup> The dramatic date of the dialogue, held at Cicero's Tusculan Villa, is roughly contemporaneous with its publication, mid-April to mid-May 44 B.C. For a discussion of the evidence and various arguments concerning the date of composition of *Diu.*, see Wardle 2006: 37-44.

<sup>2</sup> Although Quintus argues a largely Stoic case in *Diu.*, his probable preference for Peripatetic philosophy is nevertheless acknowledged at 2.100 (cf. *Fin.* 5.96). Marcus' adherence to the Academic system, on the other hand, is more in accordance with Cicero's own philosophical leanings, which he expressed at early stage (cf. *Inu.* 2.9-10); for further references, see Brittain 2006: xi n. 9.

<sup>3</sup> There are several excellent outlines of *Diu.*; see, for example, Schofield 1986: 64, Guillaumont 2006: 54-56 (book 1), 81-83 (book 2), and Wardle 2006: 21-23. The outlines here rely primarily on those of Schofield and Wardle.

<sup>4</sup> The division between artificial and natural divination is based upon the means by which the gods communicate their will to men; in the case of artificial divination the signs from the gods are indirect and require interpretation (e.g. Roman augury), in the case of natural divination the signs are direct (e.g. dreams); see Wardle 2006: 126-27.

<sup>5</sup> Wardle 2006: 165 on *Diu.* 1.24 defines 'conjecture' as "the process within artificial divination whereby the diviner deals with a divinatory phenomenon for which there are no exact parallels recorded in the lore of his art. In such cases the diviner has to extrapolate from the closest parallels he has."

favor of divination (79b-109): the existence of *uis diuina in animis* (79b-81), Stoic syllogisms (82-83), refutation of skepticism (84-87, 109), and the universality of divination together with historical examples from Roman augury (87-108). In the rest of the book (109-31) Quintus provides philosophical explanations (*rationes*) of divination, first treating natural divination (110-17), and then outlining primarily the Stoic theory of divination (118-31). A brief conclusion ends the first book (132).

The second book begins with a new introduction to the whole work (1-7),<sup>6</sup> after which Marcus presents various general philosophical arguments against divination (8-25).<sup>7</sup> Following this general refutation, Marcus provides a brief summary of Quintus' argument (26-27). He then launches an attack on various categories of artificial divination (28-99): haruspicy (*haruspicina*; 28-69), including entrails (28-41), lightning (42-49), and portents (49-69); auspices (*auspicia*; 70-83); a brief treatment of omens (*omina*; 83-84), lots (*sortes*; 84-87); and astrology with a particular emphasis on Chaldean *monstra* (87-99). He next introduces his attack on natural divination (100), but digresses in order to criticize the syllogisms of Chrysippus and Cratippus (101-9) before resuming his attack on natural divination with a discussion of prophetic frenzy (*furor oraculorum*; 110-8) and then dreams (*somnia*; 119-47). After this attack Marcus concludes the discussion with, in true Academic fashion, an implicit invitation to the reader to choose between the competing views (148-50).

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'Conjecture' in this sense, then, is not an uninformed guess, but the application of rationality to a body of data."

<sup>6</sup> The introduction (1-7) to book 2 is mainly personal in tone and considered to be wholly 'Ciceronian'; cf. Pease 1977: p. 24, Bringmann 1971: 191-94, Schäublin 1991: 343.

<sup>7</sup> Wardle 2006: 23 divides *Diu.* 9-25 as follows: divination's subject matter is pure chance (9-14); chance events are unpredictable (15-18); fate and predictability are incompatible ideas (19-25).

***Analytic Method: The Academic Nature of De Divinatione***

The orthodox interpretation of the *Diu.* is that Cicero, through the character Marcus, expresses his skepticism on divination and related Roman religious practices.<sup>8</sup> The approach that I shall take in this forthcoming analysis is not so much concerned with establishing Cicero's actual beliefs about the validity of divination, but rather with the interaction between Quintus and Marcus within the confines of the text. In this respect, the challenge that Marcus issues at the end of dialogue, where he outlines the approach of the Academic school of philosophy, is pertinent (*Diu.* 2.150):

Cum autem proprium sit Academiae iudicium suum nullum interponere, ea probare quae simillima ueri uideantur, conferre causas et quid in quamque sententiam dici possit expromere, nulla adhibita sua auctoritate iudicium audientium relinquere integrum ac liberum, tenebimus hanc consuetudinem a Socrate traditam eaque inter nos, si tibi, Quinte frater, placebit, quam saepissime utemur. mihi uero, inquit ille, nihil potest esse iucundius. quae cum essent dicta, surreximus.<sup>9</sup>

This concluding statement encourages the reader to consider the arguments of both books as a whole:<sup>10</sup> the various correspondences between the two speeches of Quintus and Marcus should be viewed and interpreted alongside each other, and no priority should be given to either view without due consideration of both sides of the

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<sup>8</sup> For a clear and concise overview of the orthodox scholarly position on *N.D.*, *Diu.*, and *Fat.*, see Rawson 1975: 241-45; cf. Beard 1986: 33-36.

<sup>9</sup> For the most part I follow, with the exception of punctuation, the text of Giomini 1975.

<sup>10</sup> This is the opinion also of Beard 1986; see, however, Schofield 1986: 56-60 who believes that the true 'authorial conclusion' occurs in preceding sections (2.148-49) where Marcus, in an 'Epicurean mood', condemns *superstitio*; cf. Wardle 2006: 14-15 for a succinct summary of the views of Beard and Schofield.

argument.<sup>11</sup> Accordingly, I will explore this interconnectivity between books 1 and 2 through the medium of poetry and in particular the roles that poetic quotations in the second book play in the dialogue, both in their local environment and in their supplementary relationship to material in the first book.

### ***The Poetic Content of the De Diuinatione***

In the *Diu.* both Marcus and his brother Quintus employ a variety of poetic quotations during the course of their arguments.<sup>12</sup> Quintus, in book 1, quotes approximately two hundred and twenty-seven lines of verse, whereas Marcus, in book 2, a considerably fewer fifty-five. As I have indicated the primary focus of this chapter will be the poetic material in book 2; it will be useful, however, first to provide an outline of the poetry used in both books of the *Diu.*

In book 1 Quintus employs a total of twenty-six poetic quotations which range from one to seventy-eight lines in length. He draws upon a variety of authors, but more than half of his total lines (114/226) are from Marcus' own poems or translations. The quotations, in order, are as follows:

Table 3  
Poetic Quotations in the *De Diuinatione* Book 1

<b>Author/ translator</b>	<b>Poetic Work</b>	<b><i>De Diuinatione</i> reference</b>	<b>No. of lines</b>
Cicero	<i>Prognostica</i> (3.1-6 Trag.)	1.13	6
Cicero	<i>Prognostica</i> (3.7-9; 4.4-9 Trag.)	1.14	9 (3/6)
Cicero	<i>Prognostica</i> (4.1-3 Trag.)	1.15	3

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Wardle 2006: 20: "Among Cicero's extant philosophical works *De Diuinatione* is unique in being a clash of Stoic and Academic views expressed in a dialogue through contemporary speakers without an explicit authorial conclusion."

<sup>12</sup> Reference to 'Cicero' indicates the author of *Diu.*, whereas 'Marcus' and 'Quintus' the characters within that work.

Table 3 (Continued)

Cicero	<i>Prognostica</i> (4.10-11 Trag.)	1.15	2
Cicero	<i>Prognostica</i> (5.1-3 Trag.)	1.15	3
Cicero	<i>De Consulatu suo</i> (6 FPL)	1.17-22	78
Pacuvius	<i>Teucer</i> (Pac. tr. 353-56 ROL)	1.24	4 <sup>13</sup>
Pacuvius?	<i>Dulorestes?</i> (tr. inc. 21-22 ROL)	1.29	2
Ennius	<i>Annales</i> (Enn. Ann. 32-48 ROL)	1.40-41	17
Ennius	<i>Alexander</i> (Enn. sc. 38-49 ROL)	1.42	12
Accius	<i>Brutus</i> (Acc. praetext. 17-28 ROL)	1.44	12
Accius	<i>Brutus</i> (Acc. praetext. 29-38 ROL)	1.45	10
Cicero?	Homer <i>Iliad</i> 9.363 (27 FPL)	1.52	1
Plautus	<i>Aulularia</i> 178	1.65	1
Ennius	<i>Alexander</i> (Enn. sc. 57-65 ROL)	1.66	9
Ennius	<i>Alexander</i> (Enn. sc. 66-67 ROL)	1.67	2
Ennius	<i>Alexander</i> (Enn. sc. 69-72 ROL)	1.67	4
Pacuvius	<i>Teucer</i> (Pac. tr. 373-74 ROL)	1.80	2
Anon.	Oracular utterance (53 FPL)	1.81	1
Cicero	<i>Marius</i> (20 FPL)	1.106	13
Ennius	<i>Annales</i> (Enn. Ann. 80-100 ROL)	1.107	20
Ennius	<i>Alexander</i> (Enn. sc. 73-75 ROL)	1.114	3
Ennius	<i>Annales</i> (Enn. Ann. 232 ROL)	1.114	1
Pacuvius	<i>Chryses</i> (Pac. tr. 104-6 ROL)	1.131	3
Pacuvius	<i>Chryses</i> (Pac. tr. 112-14 ROL)	1.131	3
Ennius	<i>Telamo</i> (Enn. sc. 332-36 ROL)	1.132	5 <sup>14</sup>

As we can see from this table, Quintus cites several authors for ten lines or more, thus displaying a propensity for quoting large portions of verse. This feature marks one major difference between his use of poetry and that of Marcus.

Marcus, as we noted, quotes far fewer lines of verse than Quintus (55:226), but the total number of his poetical passages is much closer in comparison (18:26).

Marcus likewise draws upon a variety of different authors, but does not employ any of

<sup>13</sup> Slight emendations to the introduction to this quotation produce two more lines of verse; cf. Ribbeck 1897: 153.

<sup>14</sup> There is some confusion as to where the quote from Ennius' *Telamo* (Enn. sc. 332-36 ROL; cf. Jocelyn 1967: 394-98) at 1.132 begins; see below 138 n. 38. In terms of the poetic content of book 1, I do not include any lines beyond Enn. sc. 332-36 ROL at 1.132 in the total.

his own poetic material other than partial re-quotations from a section of the *de Consulatu suo* (*Cons.*) which Quintus quotes in book 1, a Latinized passage from Homer's *Iliad*, and several possible one-line translations.<sup>15</sup> The poetic quotations which Marcus employs are as follows:

Table 4  
Poetic Quotations in the *De Divinatione* Book 2

Author/translator	Work	<i>De Divinatione</i> reference	No. of lines
Cicero?	Euripidean fragment? (45 <i>FPL</i> )	2.12	1
Cicero?	Greek proverb (55 <i>FPL</i> )	2.25	1
Ennius	<i>Iphigenia</i> (Enn. sc. 251 <i>ROL</i> )	2.30	1
Cicero	<i>De Consulatu suo</i> (6.36-38 <i>FPL</i> )	2.45 (= 1.19)	3
Ennius	<i>Iphigenia</i> (Enn. sc. 226-28 <i>ROL</i> )	2.57	3
Cicero	Homer <i>Iliad</i> 2.299-330 (23 <i>FPL</i> )	2.63-4	29
Ennius	<i>Annales</i> (Enn. Ann. 454 <i>ROL</i> )	2.82	1
Cicero?	Homer <i>Iliad</i> 9.236-37 (26 <i>FPL</i> )	2.82	1
Ennius	<i>Telamo</i> (Enn. sc. 328-29 <i>ROL</i> )	2.104	2
Ennius	<i>Alexander</i> (Enn. sc. 69 <i>ROL</i> )	2.112 (= 1.67)	1
Ennius	<i>Alexander</i> (Enn. sc. 73 <i>ROL</i> )	2.112 (= 1.114)	1
Ennius? <sup>16</sup>	Anonymous ( <i>tr. inc.</i> 13-14 <i>ROL</i> )	2.115	2
Cicero?	Oracular utterance (54 <i>FPL</i> )	2.115	1
Ennius	<i>Annales</i> (Enn. Ann. 174 <i>ROL</i> )	2.116	1
Ennius	<i>Annales</i> (Enn. Ann. 175-76 <i>ROL</i> )	2.116	2
Cicero?	Unknown Gk. source (56 <i>FPL</i> )	2.133	1
Pacuvius	<i>Amphio</i> (Pac. tr. 4-6 <i>ROL</i> )	2.133	3
Pacuvius	<i>Amphio</i> (Pac. tr. 9 <i>ROL</i> )	2.133	1

<sup>15</sup> The following are possible one-line translations of Cicero: three anonymous Greek fragments at 2.12, 2.25, 2.133, a Latinized translation of Homer at 2.82, and a common oracular utterance at 2.115; see table.

<sup>16</sup> On this anonymous tragic fragment (= *inc. inc. tr.* 18-19 *TRF*), Ribbeck says: *dubium uix est quin Enniana haec sint*. For a slightly different variant of the first line of this fragment, see Var. *L.* 7.17.

This table shows that apart from the long Homeric passage Marcus' preference is for one to three-line quotations, some of which are re-quotations of Quintus' earlier poetic material.

Marcus' almost exclusive reliance on smaller quotes suggests that his purpose in using poetic quotations differs from that of Quintus. B. Krostenko writes of what he perceives to be the difference between Quintus' and Marcus' rhetorical strategies in *Diu.* and their respective uses of poetry:<sup>17</sup>

... another difference in the rhetorical strategies of M. and Q., their use of poetry... Not only does Q. quote four times more poetry than M., and more frequently *in extenso*, but M. and Q. use poetry in different ways, which is of course what really matters. With one exception, M. quotes bits and pieces, virtually in passing, and generally to anchor already established points ... Several quotes are pressed into service as aphorisms, without regard to the character or context of the original play. The odd quote may serve sarcastic or ironic purposes. The only *in extenso* passage, a rendering of Homer (2.63-64)—which M. pointedly says he produced “at leisure” (*ut nos otiose conuertimus*)—is used to expose to ridicule the practices of the seer Calchas (mentioned by Q. at 1.72). In short, poetry is in no way central to M's argument. ... The same is not true of Q. While Q. sometimes uses poetry in the same way as M., Q. also occasionally quotes poetic passages at length for their evidentiary value.

This brief mention is virtually all that Krostenko has to say on Marcus' use of poetry in book 2 of *Diu.*; he instead focuses on the reasons why Cicero inserts so many poetic

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<sup>17</sup> Krostenko 2000: 366-67. For an analysis of Quintus' use of poetic and prose citations in *Diu.* in a Stoic context, see Spahlinger 2005: 109-29.



passages from his own poetry into the mouth of the character Quintus. In one sense, Krostenko is right to suggest that the poetry Marcus employs does not fulfill the same illustrative or substantial function as that of his brother; this does not mean, however, that it plays an insignificant role, but only that its primary function differs.

Marcus, as we shall see, frequently assigns to the poetic quotations he employs, regardless of their tenor, an important function in the structure of his immediate argument. Moreover, the influence of these quotations often extends beyond their local environment and finds a direct correspondence to Quintus' arguments in book 1. It is on several of these intratextual correspondences that I will focus; through a case-by-case analysis of select poetic quotations we will see that, far from being an after-thought, they often provide structure for Marcus' arguments and pertinent counterpoints to Quintus' contentions.

### ***An Inauspicious Beginning: Digression and Allusion***

Marcus' first poetic quotation appears at 2.12. This single line of verse, which he terms *quidam Graecus uulgaris*, defines the best prophet and supports the notion that there is no such thing as divination:<sup>18</sup>

Vide igitur, ne nulla sit diuination. est quidam Graecus uulgaris in hanc  
sententiam uersus:

bene qui coniciet, uatem hunc perhibebo optimum.  
num igitur aut quae tempestas impendat uates melius coniciet quam  
gubernator aut morbi naturam acutius quam medicus aut belli  
administrationem prudentius quam imperator coniectura assequetur?

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<sup>18</sup> Cic. 45 *FLP*. This quotation may derive from Euripides, quoted at Plu. *Mor.* 432 c.

This quotation, a derisive commentary on the future and thus *post factum* predictive success of the seer, appears without literary context.<sup>19</sup> Marcus indicates, however, the poetic nature of the material (*uersus*)<sup>20</sup> and extracts from it material for the subsequent prose (*uates, coniciet, coniectura*). He takes advantage of the quotation's vague nature and interprets its thought in absolute terms, transferring the seer into the province of the helmsman, physician, and general. He thus defends the idea that there is no divination (via conjecture) by reducing the original content of the verse to absurdity.

Marcus further utilizes this series of hypothetical situations to address a perceived inconsistency in Quintus' argument. First, he states that Quintus carefully withdrew divination both from conjectures based upon skill (*ars*) and good judgment (*prudentia*) and from those perceived via the senses or skilled professionals.<sup>21</sup> Second, he asserts that Quintus defined divination as "the prediction and presentiment of those things which occur by chance" ("*diuinationem esse earum rerum praedictionem et praesensionem quae essent fortuitae*," 2.13).<sup>22</sup> Marcus declares this definition to be an inconsistency in Quintus' argument, since the presentiment possessed by the physician, helmsman, and general is likewise of those things that occur by chance. At this point, he reintroduces the line of argument suggested by the quotation: *num igitur aut haruspex aut augur aut uates quis aut somnians melius coniecerit aut e morbo euasurum aegrotum aut e periculo nauem aut ex insidiis exercitum quam medicus,*

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<sup>19</sup> Krostenko 2000: 366 n. 41 considers this quotation among those that serve a sarcastic or ironic purpose.

<sup>20</sup> *Versus* is the most common literary term which Cicero employs to refer to a forthcoming quotation, e.g. *Orat.* 147, 163, 166, *N.D.* 3.66, 3.79. In the singular this term can refer to a line of verse or several collectively, see *OLD uersus* 5a.

<sup>21</sup> Quintus makes this claim, or rather something similar to this claim, at 1.111, where he discusses certain men who can make predication (*auguria*) not as the result of divine inspiration (*diuini impetus*), but by their own reason (*ratio humana*); then, at 1.112 he mentions physicians, steersmen, and farmers. Cf. 1.24.

<sup>22</sup> Quintus' definition of divination in book 1 is as follows: *id est de diuinatione, quae est earum rerum quae fortuitae putantur, praedictio atque praesensio* (*Diu.* 1.9).

*quam gubernator, quam imperator?* (2.13). With this reiteration of the quotation's content Marcus ends this section and, thus, the poetry's formal involvement in the prose narrative.

The two sections (2.12-13) which Marcus constructs from the *quidam Graecus uulgaris* quotation unfairly represent Quintus' earlier arguments. In particular, his second observation that Quintus defined divination as "the prediction and presentiment of those things which occur by chance" involves a certain amount of trickery based around Stoic reformulation.<sup>23</sup> Most relevant to our purposes, however, is the way in which the quotation contributes to the structure of these passages.

Initially, Marcus employs the quotation to support his conclusion that there is no such thing as divination; the contents of the verse, although de-contextualized, outline a scenario in which anyone who conjectures well (*bene coniciet*) can be considered the best seer. The commonplace nature of this thought (*uulgaris*) absolves Marcus of any responsibility for its rather bold claim, but it is one which he nonetheless builds upon in the subsequent prose when he sarcastically applies this concept of conjecture to the physician, the helmsman, and the general (2.12). He acknowledges, however, that Quintus has removed conjecture from his definition of divination, whereupon he reveals that his brother's definition of divination is the prediction and presentiment of things that occur by chance (2.13). With these two premises in place Marcus declares that Quintus has actually contradicted himself because the presentiment of the physician, helmsman, and general also involves those things that occur by chance (2.13). This leads to a redefinition of the post-quotation

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<sup>23</sup> For the notion that Marcus' misrepresentation of his brother's arguments at *Diu.* 1.9 is due to Quintus' use of Posidonius' reformulated definition (in response to the attacks of Carneades), see Wardle 2006: p. 122 on *Diu.* 1.9, Pease 1977: ad loc. The presence of *putantur* at 1.9 also suggests that Marcus' objection might be somewhat unfair; cf. Schäublin 1991: ad loc.

musings, whereby not only is the possibility of conjecture reintroduced, but Quintus' arguments are now subject to its implications.<sup>24</sup>

So, while the relationship between the poetic quotation and Quintus' definition of divination seems subsidiary, it actually establishes one of Marcus' methods when he quotes poetry. The *uersus Graecus uulgaris* creates a general environment which serves to introduce a certain topic, in this case the existence of divination and the related inconsistency of Quintus. The initial tenor of the quotation and Marcus' subsequent analysis, although derisive, provide a basis from which he constructs his refutation of Quintus' arguments including the concept of conjecture. That the end of section 2.13 features a reformulation of Marcus' analysis immediately after the quotation demonstrates the organizational capacity of the verse. Thus, even though the tenor of the quotation is sarcastic and its contents are not strictly indispensable to Marcus' arguments concerning his brother's definition of divination, the verse plays a central role in the initialization, progression, and finalization of sections 2.12-13.

The quotation at 2.12 reveals a distinctive feature of the Marcus quotes in book 2: the verse fulfills a localized and organizational function and plays a part in Marcus' allusion to Quintus' arguments in book 1. The remainder of this investigation will treat those quotations in book 2 which he similarly employs as part of his immediate argument but the function of which also extends beyond the local quotation-environment and thus creates a bridge between the two books. To this end, it is

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<sup>24</sup> Pease 1977: ad loc. is of the opinion that the verse and subsequent prose at 2.12 (*est quidam ... adsequetur*) represents "a less than satisfactory doublet for the last sentence of 2.13". In other words, Pease believes that Cicero's copyists erroneously included both the rough draft at 2.12 (*est quidam ... adsequetur*) and the revised version at 2.13 (*num igitur ... imperator*). This theory fails to recognize the careful development of this section as it stands. Marcus progresses from general and hypothetical statements to the specifics of Quintus' arguments; Marcus' reformulation, at 2.13, of the comments he makes immediately after the verse is the result of this progression, and, taken as a whole, sections 2.12-13 constitute an expanded, yet pleasingly self-contained, quotation-environment.

helpful to divide these quotations whose influence extends beyond the local text-segment into two discernible sub-categories.

First, I will examine three instances in book 2 where a poetic quotation is part of a passage which refers to an episode from book 1: 2.30 → 1.112; 2.104 → 1.132; and 2.115 → 1.37.<sup>25</sup> Second, I will examine an instance where Marcus at 2.112 re-quotes two portions of two poetic quotations from book 1 found at 1.67 and 1.114. I will consider these four instances of poetic quotation in book 2 in turn, placing particular emphasis on the ways in which the poetry shapes the organization of Marcus' arguments and on the ways in which it helps Marcus to counter Quintus' arguments in book 1.

### ***Storytelling: Democritus and Pherecydes***

Near the beginning of his attack on the artificial divinatory practice of haruspicy (28-69) Marcus, at 2.30, quotes a line of verse most likely from Ennius' *Iphigenia*: *Democritus tamen non inscite nugatur, ut physicus, quo genere nihil arrogantius: "quod est ante pedes, nemo spectat, caeli scrutantur plagas."*<sup>26</sup> The original Ennian context of this line, as we have seen at *Rep.* 1.30, is Achilles' derision of Calchas' prophecy at Aulis.<sup>27</sup> Cicero, as at *Rep.* 1.30 when he places the words in the mouth of Sex. Aelius, assigns this verse to a third-party figure, Democritus. In this instance, however, he strips this line of any literary references, which perhaps helps to

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<sup>25</sup> There is further instance where Marcus employs a poetic quotation in a section (2.64-65) that references an earlier story of Quintus (1.72). At 1.72 Quintus mentions the seer Calchas: *alia autem subito ex tempore coniectura explicantur, ut apud Homerum Calchas, qui ex passerum numero belli Troiani annos auguratus est*. Marcus at 2.64 makes it explicit that he addressing these previous points of Quintus: *nam illud mirarer, si crederem, quod apud Homerum Calchantem dixisti ex passerum numero belli Troiani annos auguratum; de cuius coniectura sic apud Homerum, ut nos otiosi conuertimus, loquitur Agamemnon ...* (*Diu.* 2.64). The quotation Marcus quotes at 2.64-65 is, in fact, the longest that he employs: twenty nine lines from Homer's *Iliad* (=23 *FPL*; cf. *Hom. Il.* 2.299-320). In the Homeric account of this episode the speaker was not Agamemnon, but Odysseus; cf. Ewbank 1933: ad loc.

<sup>26</sup> Enn. sc. 251 *ROL*.

<sup>27</sup> For the use of this verse at *Rep.* 1.30, see above 72-76.

obscure the fact that he has Democritus speak a line of verse which was not written until over one hundred years after his death.<sup>28</sup> Nonetheless, if we proceed from the assumption that Democritus, as a representative of the *physici*, delivers this line in jest (*nugatur*), then he does so at the expense of astrological prophecy or, at least, those who scour the skies in lieu of what is at their feet.

Following the quotation Marcus makes it known that Democritus approves the divinatory power of entrails to the extent that their condition and color indicate crop-yields and future health and sickness (2.30). Marcus, then, adroitly reverses Democritus' teasing criticism of astrological prophecy, and his disparagement of this practice finds, in his opinion, an equally objectionable parallel in the eminently earthbound crops and states of constitution; if the astrologers spend too much time looking to the skies, then Democritus' approval of the inspection of animals' entrails swings the balance too far in the opposite downwards direction. This endorsement, Marcus sarcastically adds, constitutes a further joke (*ludus*) on the part of Democritus, who, we are told, is so amused with his jests and trifles (*nugae*) that he ignores the variations in the livers of different oxen thus invalidating any inference made from them (2.30).

After his attack on Democritus' belief in the divinatory power of entrails Marcus turns to Quintus, who earlier (1.112), he says, told a similarly amusing story about Pherecydes' ability to predict earthquakes based upon the appearance of water drawn from a well: *an hoc eiusdem modi est quale Pherecydeum illud quod est a te dictum?* (2.31).<sup>29</sup> Marcus points out, however, that, although such stories are often mentioned in learned discussions (*scholis*), one does not have to believe them all.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Democritus b. 460-57 B.C.; Ennius 239-169 B.C.

<sup>29</sup> Pherecydes of Syros was thought to be the first writer of Greek prose, composing a work probably entitled *On the Nature of the Gods* or *Theologia / Theogonia*.

<sup>30</sup> For *schola* as a 'lecture' or 'discussion', cf. *Luc.* 81: *ille nescio qui qui in scholis nominari solet; Tusc.* 1.7: *scholas Graecorum more habere auderemus*.

Significantly, Quintus does not, at 1.112, attribute the status of ‘diviner’ (*diuinus*) to Pherecydes for this particular predictive ability, but rather the title of natural philosopher (*physicus*). Thus, it is not only Quintus’ designation of *physicus* which connects Pherecydes to Democritus, but also, in turn, Marcus’ ironic exclamation of Democritus as a ‘blessed mortal’ (*o mortalem beatum!*, 2.30). Marcus’ mention of Pherecydes at 2.31 is not so much a refutation of Quintus’ story, as it is a qualification: Quintus, although correct in not ascribing the power of divination to Pherecydes, is mistaken in giving any credence at all to his supposed capacity to predict earthquakes via the coloration of water. If Democritus’ approval of the inspections of entrails was ironically too far removed from astrological star-gazing, then Pherecydes’ delving into wells is even more so.

It is only after this discussion of Quintus’ story about Pherecydes that we realize his story forms a digression within the attack on Democritus.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, Marcus’ mention and refutation of Quintus’ story at 2.31 consumes less than a third of sections 30-32, and at the beginning of 32 he makes it clear that he is still focused on Democritus (2.32):

Verum sint sane ista Democritea uera; quando ea nos extis exquirimus? aut quando aliquid eius modi ab haruspice inspectis extis audiuimus? ab aqua aut ab igni pericula monent; tum hereditates, tum damna denuntiant; fissum familiare et uitale tractant; caput iecoris ex omni parte diligentissime considerant; si uero id non est inuentum, nihil putant accidere potuisse tristius.

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. Schäublin 1991: ad loc.

This, however, is the last time that Marcus mentions Democritus in his discussion of entrails and, as we can see, he instead focuses on haruspicy and entrails in general.<sup>32</sup> In fact, he does not actually return to the historical figure of Democritus after the digression, but to a de-personalized version (*Democritea*). This objectification allows him to isolate Democritus' belief in divination by means of entrails and apply the particulars of this belief to a broader context.

In this respect, we can further account for the insertion of Quintus' story about Pherecydes into this primarily Democritean context if we consider that Marcus introduces Pherecydes in a similarly de-personalized manner: *Pherecydeum illud* (2.31). The measure of doubt which Marcus creates with respect to Pherecydes' ability to predict earthquakes, he then transfers to Democritus or, rather, to 'those Democritean (true) things': *uerum sint sane ista Democritea uera* (2.32). This is where the contrast lies: the story of Pherecydes is not true, but let those Democritean *things* be true (for now). Marcus, through his retelling of the Pherecydes-story, purposely undercuts the validity of Democritus' views on entrails despite his apparent generosity in considering them, for the moment, true.

Furthermore, the doubt that the Pherecydes-story casts upon Democritus' beliefs at 2.30 also extends to Quintus' treatment of Democritus towards the end of the first book, where he provides a similar account of his approving attitude towards the inspection of entrails (1.131):

Democritus autem censet sapienter instituisse ueteres, ut hostiarum  
immolatarum inspicerentur exta; quorum ex habitu atque ex colore tum

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<sup>32</sup> The next time that Marcus mentions Democritus is at 2.57 when he reports his explanation of why cocks crow during the day; cf. 2.120, 133, 137.



salubritatis, tum pestilentiae signa percipi, non numquam etiam, quae sit uel  
sterilitas agrorum uel fertilitas futura.

The verbal and conceptual parallels between this account at 1.131 and Marcus' at 2.30 are clear: in both cases Democritus is said to approve of divination of entrails in so far as their condition (*habitus*, 1.131 / *habitus*, 2.30) and color (*color* / *color*) can indicate health (*salubritas* / *salubritas*), sickness (*pestilentia* / *pestilentia*), and the success or failure of crop-yield (*sterilitas, fertilitas* / *tenuitas, ubertas*). Thus, Marcus reminds Quintus that he needs to exercise more care with respect to the stories he believes: Pherecydes' supposed ability to predict earthquakes, despite being mentioned in learned discussions, is nonsense, and likewise Democritus' opinion that entrails possess a divinatory capacity does not make it true.

The relationship between the quotation, Democritus, and Quintus' story first hinges upon the association of humor and wit; a perhaps surprising connection in light of Marcus' comment, at 2.25, that there is no place for jocularitas in matters so serious (*sed in rebus tam seueris non est iocandi locus*). The basic function of Ennius' verse is clear enough: it provides Marcus with a means to introduce the figure of Democritus in a lighthearted and off-hand manner. Immediately, however, he reverses the situation and makes Democritus, the 'laughing' philosopher, and his beliefs about the entrails the objects of derision. The transition from the quotation to this derision (*uerum*, 2.30) parallels the transition from Pherecydes back to Democritus (*uerum*, 2.31). Democritus might poke fun at star-gazing, but he holds equally laughable beliefs about entrails; Quintus might believe the similarly humorous story about Pherecydes (*an hoc eiusdem modi est, quale Pherecydeum illud quod est a te dictum?*, 2.31), but he should not believe this or those views of Democritus (*uerum sint sane ista Democritea uera*, 2.32). The connection between the accounts of Democritus at

2.30-32 and at 1.131 must be inferred, but Marcus, after his refutation of two loosely related examples at 1.112 and 1.131, shifts his focus from these colorful historical figures to soothsayers in general, who, after all, are the real targets, not the *physici*. Marcus' attack on these two *physici*, then, is just as much an opportunistic attack on Quintus as it is on Democritus and Pherecydes.

### ***Poetic Quotations and Inference: Refutation through Supplementation***

The second instance in book 2 where a poetic quotation is part of a passage which refers to an episode from book 1 occurs at 2.104. Here, Marcus is attempting to show that Stoic logicians accept premises that not everyone concedes, premises which, even if granted, do not at all establish what they wish to prove. By way of example Marcus first takes the premise “if the gods exist, they are well-disposed towards men” (*‘si sunt di, benefici in homines sunt’*, 2.104),<sup>33</sup> and then invokes the authority of Epicurus, who, he says, will not grant the validity of this argument due to his belief that the gods do not worry about themselves or others.<sup>34</sup> Following Epicurus' testimony he then draws upon the familiar Roman figure of Ennius: *an noster Ennius? qui magno plausu loquitur assentiente populo: “ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam caelitem / sed eos non curare opinor quid agat humanum genus.”*<sup>35</sup> In this quotation, Ennius literally and figuratively takes center stage; the voice of the original dramatic character is obscured and Ennius and his well-received quasi-philosophical

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<sup>33</sup> This is a reformulation of the Stoic argument cited at 2.102: *at neque non diligunt nos (sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici)*. Cf. Pease 1977: on 2.104.

<sup>34</sup> *Quis hoc uobis dabit? Epicurusne? qui negat quicquam deos nec alieni curare nec sui* (Diu. 2.104). This is the first of Epicurus' κύρια δόξαι (Diog. L. 10.139 = 71 Usener): τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλω παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται. Cf. Cic. *N.D.* 1.45, 51; *Leg.* 1.21.

<sup>35</sup> Enn. sc. 328-29 *ROL*.

content come to the fore.<sup>36</sup> Marcus, then, combines the forces of Ennius and Epicurus in order to expose the shortcomings of the Stoic syllogism.

Beyond its local environment at 2.104 this quotation is also an allusion to further lines from Ennius which Quintus quotes at 1.132. Here, Quintus concludes his argument in favour of divination with disparaging remarks towards certain kinds of diviners (1.132):

Nunc illa testabor, non me sortilegos neque eos, qui quaestus causa hariolentur,  
ne psychomantia quidem, quibus Appius, amicus tuus, uti solebat, agnoscere;  
non habeo denique nauci Marsum augurem, non uicanos haruspices, non de  
circo astrologos, non Isiacos coniectores, non interpretes somniorum; non enim  
sunt ii aut scientia aut arte diuini, sed

superstitiosi uates impudentesque harioli  
aut inertes aut insani aut quibus egestas imperat,  
qui sibi semitam non sapiunt, alteri monstrant uiam;  
quibus diuitias pollicentur, ab iis drachumam ipsi petunt.  
de his diuitiis sibi deducant drachumam, reddant cetera (*Diu.* 1.132).<sup>37</sup>

These lines of verse appear to be directed at an unspecified class of diviners, but the precise details of the scene are hard to determine and Quintus introduces these verses with no context or references to the play and character.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Telamo is the original speaker of these lines (*dixi* and *dicam*), which concern the untrustworthiness of diviners' advice; cf. Jocelyn 1967: 400 who notes the possibility that Ennius introduced Epicurean sentiments into his version of the *Telamo*.

<sup>37</sup> Enn. sc. 332-36 *ROL*; cf. *N.D.* 3.79.

<sup>38</sup> It is not clear whether *sed* immediately before the verse belongs to Ennius or Cicero. Some commentators believe that Ennius' quote should begin earlier, in particular from *non habeo denique nauci*. For a summary of the various arguments and emendations associated with this section, see Nice 2001 who argues that the material prior to the quotation is primarily the creation of Cicero and embodies the view of the Roman elite towards foreign forms of divination. Cf. Jocelyn 1967: 397-98

Immediately following the quotation, however, he reveals that Ennius is the author of the verse and he provides a prose paraphrase of what the poet says only a few lines earlier (1.132):

Atque haec quidem Ennius, qui paucis ante uersibus esse deos censet, sed eos non curare opinatur, quid agat humanum genus. ego autem, qui et curare arbitror et monere etiam ac multa praedicere, leuitate, uanitate, malitia exclusa diuinationem probo.

Quintus feels compelled to divulge the contents of the lines which precede his quotation since they conflict with his view that the gods care for men. He is happy to employ Ennius' testimony to illustrate the worthlessness of some diviners, but, at the same time, is aware that he and his source material, although they both admit to the existence of the gods, hold conflicting views over the question of whether the gods care for what the human race does. Quintus, then, displays a reasonable measure of circumspection in the employment of his poetic source and willingly exposes a flaw in Ennius' thinking.

This qualification, however, is not sufficient for Marcus, who, it is clear, has in mind Quintus' comment after the Ennian quotation (1.132) when he quotes the lines verbatim at 2.104: "*ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam caelitem / sed eos non curare opinor quid agat humanum genus*".<sup>39</sup> Marcus does not feel compelled to paraphrase or quote the earlier lines from Ennius, since Quintus has already supplied them (1.132), but he still acknowledges them after his quotation at 2.104: *et quidem*,

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who, in agreement with Vahlen, not only attributes *sed* to Cicero, but also the phrase *susperstitiosi uates impudentesque harioli*.

<sup>39</sup> Enn. sc. 328-29 ROL.

*cur sic opinetur rationem subicit; sed nihil est necesse dicere quae sequuntur.*<sup>40</sup> The subject of the verbs *opinetur* and *subicit* is Ennius, and *opinetur* appears also at 1.132 while *subicit* contrasts with the phrase *paucis ante uersibus*. Marcus tacitly grants to Quintus that the behavior of disreputable diviners is the reason for the opinion that the gods do not care for men, but he takes issue with the way his brother has used his evidence. By approaching the statements of Ennius with the already held belief that the gods do care for men, Quintus has committed an error similar to his Stoic friends: *tantum sat est intellegi id sumere istos pro certo quod dubium controuersum sit* (2.104).

The episode, therefore, between Marcus and Quintus concerning whether or not the gods, if they exist, are well-disposed to men revolves around an intricate interplay between direct and indirect quotations. Quintus first quotes Ennius to support his own argument (the worthlessness of some diviners, 1.132), yet also points out, but does not directly quote, a point he disagrees with (the gods do not care what humans do, 1.132) in the same source. In turn, Marcus, although Quintus treats his evidence in a circumspect manner and he admits to his selective method, seizes upon this admission and quotes the ‘missing’ lines (2.104), which he then uses to illustrate the specious nature of the Stoic syllogism. Marcus considers Ennius’ comment that “the gods, although they exist, do not care for what mankind does” to be inseparable from the criticism of diviners that follows; to treat these two sections of verse in isolation and accept one but not the other, as Quintus does at 1.132, invalidates the authoritative benefits that poetry provides.

These two passages, at 1.132 and 2.104, are, in a sense, opposites: Quintus quotes what Marcus will merely allude to and Marcus quotes what Quintus has

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<sup>40</sup> At least one other line likely comes between these two passages: *nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis; quod nunc abest* (Enn. sc. 330 ROL; cf. Cic. N.D. 3.79).

paraphrased. In both cases the focus of the brothers is on Ennius' formal and quasi-philosophical argument: there is no literary context beyond the identification of the poet, who, it seems certain, does not even originally speak these lines. Quintus' concern is to illustrate various kinds of disreputable diviners, whereas Marcus' concern is the fallibility of the Stoic syllogism. Taken together these two passages (1.132 and 2.104) highlight the duplicitous nature of this evidence, and Marcus, while he never explicitly refers to his brother's earlier comments and quotation from Ennius, in true Academic fashion, engages in a subtle, yet sarcastic, form of source-criticism. The poetic quotations at 1.132 and 2.104 play meaningful roles in their local environments, while the complementary relationship between the two sections of verse creates an intratextual connection beyond these confines and requires the reader to consider the two passages in tandem, which, of course, bears witness to Cicero's Academic announcement at the end of the dialogue.

### ***Poetic Quotation and the Destruction of Oracles: Croesus Crosses the Halys***

The third and final instance I will consider in book 2 where poetry forms a part of a passage which refers to an episode from book 1 occurs at 2.115-18 when Marcus discusses the veracity of oracles; these sections, containing four poetic quotations, are in response to Quintus' defense of oracles at 1.37-38. I will first outline the arguments which Quintus makes in book 1 and then those of Marcus in book 2. As we will see, Marcus at 2.115-18 first expands upon Quintus' specific arguments at 1.37-38 and then, with the assistance of a quotation at 2.115 which details the fall of Croesus, refutes Quintus' theory of oracular decline.

At 1.37 Quintus discusses prophetic oracles in the context of natural divination (*naturalis diuination*).<sup>41</sup> His treatment of this topic is brief and he first provides a list of those to whom Pythian Apollo gave oracular responses.<sup>42</sup> The list includes general mention of the Athenians, the Spartans, the Tegeans, the Argives, and the Corinthians, but only one specific reference, to Croesus: *quae Croeso Pythius Apollo, ut de naturali diuinatione dicam, quae Atheniensibus, quae Lacedaemoniis, quae Tegeatis, quae Argiuis, quae Corinthiis responderit quis ignorat?* (1.37). He further notes that Chrysippus collected a vast number of these oracular responses, together with witnesses, but that they require no repeating since Marcus knows them well: *collegit innumerabilia oracula Chrysippus nec ullum sine locuplete auctore atque teste; quae, quia nota tibi sunt, relinquo* (1.37).<sup>43</sup>

Following this brief register and mention of Chrysippus' oracular volumes, Quintus offers, at 1.37, a quasi-syllogistic defense as to why the oracle at Delphi produced true prophecies in the past: if it did not, he says, it would never have been so frequented, so famous, and so packed with gifts from peoples and kings of every land.<sup>44</sup> Now that he has argued for the historical veracity of the Delphic oracles he places an objection in the mouth of his imaginary dissenter, who states: "This (i.e. popularity of the Delphic Oracle) has not been the case for a long time" (*idem iam diu*

<sup>41</sup> In sections 1.34-38 Quintus initiates his defence of natural and artificial divination. 1.34 begins with a restatement of the distinction first made in the *partitio* (1.11-12), while the latter half of 34 contains a short digression on oracles (*oracula*) and oracles given by lot (*sors*). 1.35-36 include restatements of arguments also made in the *partitio* at 1.11-12: the arguments from antiquity (*uetustas*), common consensus (*consensus omnium*), and the notion that divination works even if we do not know or cannot see how.

<sup>42</sup> In comparison to the two sections that he spends on oracles (1.37-38), Quintus devotes twenty-seven to dreams (1.39-65). At 1.6 it is claimed that Chrysippus devoted one book to oracles and one book to dreams: *accessit acerrimo uir ingenio, Chrysippus, qui totam de diuinatione duobus libris explicauit sententiam, uno praeterea de oraculis, uno de somniis*. The title *de Somniis* is not attested outside of Cicero (cf. *Diu.* 2.134, 144); see, also, Del Corno 1969: 52-57, 135-37.

<sup>43</sup> For Chrysippus' book *On Oracles*, see *Diu.* 1.6; cf. Phot. s.v. νεοττός: Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ χρησµῶν. For the fragments of this work, see SVF 2.1202-3, 1205-6.

<sup>44</sup> *Defendo unum hoc: numquam illud oraculum Delphis tam celebre et tam clarum fuisset neque tantis donis refertum omnium populorum atque regum, nisi omnis aetas oraculorum illorum ueritatem esset experta* (*Diu.* 1.37).

*non facit*, 1.37).<sup>45</sup> He responds to this objection by saying in a rather circular manner that, since the Delphic oracle at present holds a lesser reputation because the veracity of its prophecies is less eminent (*minus excellit*), thus it would not have had so great a reputation in the past had its veracity not been of the highest level.<sup>46</sup>

Quintus next provides, at 1.38, an alternative explanation for oracular decline, suggesting that time has possibly played a part in the dissipation of ‘that terrestrial power’ (*uis illa terrae*) which kindled the mind of the priestess. He views the dissipation of this terrestrial power as analogous to rivers that have dried up or changed their course,<sup>47</sup> and ends his defense of oracular veracity with an admission that this is actually a broad topic of inquiry (*magna quaestio*) and therefore may be explained variously. What he feels is not in contention, however, is the fact that for many centuries the oracle was truthful: to claim otherwise is to overturn the entire record of history: *modo maneat id quod negari non potest, nisi omnem historiam peruerterimus, multis saeculis uerax fuisse id oraculum* (1.38).

Let us now turn to book 2. At 2.115 Marcus challenges Quintus’ arguments concerning oracular activity and offers his own explanation for its decline. He begins this section by quoting an anonymous couplet addressed to Apollo: *sed iam ad te uenio* “o sancte Apollo qui umbilicum certum terrarum obsides / unde superstitiosa

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<sup>45</sup> For Quintus’ use of this technique of placing words into the mouth of an objector at 1.37 (cf. *Diu.* 1.24, 35, 60), known as *anteoccupatio* (‘anticipation of objections’) or *prokatalipsis* (‘seizing in advance’), see Wagenvoort 1952; cf. *de Orat.* 3.205.

<sup>46</sup> *Vt igitur nunc minore gloria est, quia minus oraculorum ueritas excellit, sic tum nisi summa ueritate in tanta gloria non fuisset* (*Diu.* 1.38). The precise sense of Quintus’ argument is unclear; it would seem that he is claiming here that the Delphic oracle still produces true prophecies, but on a smaller, less notable scale, not that the accuracy or truth of these has diminished. So Wardle 2006: 205: “Consultation of Delphi continued but on a much reduced scale, so that one Pythia sufficed. What Quintus stresses, however, is that the clearly divine, remarkable instances of prophecy seem to have disappeared.”

<sup>47</sup> *Potest autem uis illa terrae quae mentem Pythiae diuino afflatu concitabat euanuisse uetustate, ut quosdam euanisse et exaruisse amnes aut in alium cursum contortos et deflexos uidemus* (*Diu.* 1.38).



*primum saeua euasit uox fera.*” (2.115).<sup>48</sup> This quotation is a continuation of the immediately preceding section (to which we will return), where Marcus has just posed the question of whether he, Cato, Varro, Coponius, or the latter’s crazy oarsman is more likely to have understood the decrees of the immortal gods (2.114). He initially seems to employ this quotation, then, in order to narrow the focus from the gods in general to Apollo specifically.

After the quotation Marcus continues his apparently personal address to Apollo when, in the subsequent prose, he mentions the god’s oracular utterances found in the volumes of Chrysippus: *tuis enim oraculis Chrysippus totum uolumen impleuit* (2.115). The oracles contained in these volumes consist of four types: those that Marcus thinks were false; those that were true by chance, as happens very often in every utterance (*omnis oratio*); those that were so equivocal and obscure that their interpreter needs an interpreter, and the lot itself (*sors ipsa*) had to be referred back to lots (*sortes*); and those that were so ambiguous that they needed the services of a dialectician (2.115).

To illustrate the falsity of Apollo’s oracles Marcus provides a specific oracular response (2.115):

Nam cum illa sors edita est opulentissimo regi Asiae:

Croesus Halyn penetrans magnam peruertet opum uim,<sup>49</sup>

hostium uim se peruersurum putauit, peruertit autem suam.

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<sup>48</sup> 13-14 *inc. inc. tr. ROL* – Warmington prints *optines* for *obsides*, following a version of the first line found at Var. *L.* 7.16 (= Manilius 3a *FPL*; cf. Courtney 1993: 110-11). On this anonymous tragic fragment at *Diu.* 2.115 (= *inc. inc. tr.* 18-19 *TRF*), Ribbeck says: *dubium uix est quin Enniana haec sint.*

<sup>49</sup> Cic. 54 *FPL*. The line ending *opum uim* occurs, in the form *opum ui*, twice in Ennius’ *Annales*: *aedificant nomen, summa nituntur opum ui* (Enn. Ann. 394 *ROL*); *Romani scalis: summa nituntur opum ui* (Enn. Ann. 164 *ROL*); and once at Verg. *A.*: *pro se quisque uiri summa nituntur opum ui* (12.552).

There are several notable features in this compact quotation-environment. The *illa* in the introduction anticipates the forthcoming example and marks the *sors* as famous.<sup>50</sup> The quotation stands in apposition to *sors* and the introductory phrase *opulentissimo regi Asiae*, in reference to the subject of the quotation Croesus, creates a further contextual connection between the prose and verse. Finally, Marcus' description of the outcome of the prophecy draws upon the vocabulary of the quotation (*uim, peruersum, peruertit*). As a whole these three clauses – the introduction, the quotation, and post-quotation comments – represent the temporal progression of Croesus' journey: the introduction to the quotation notes that a *sors* was given to Croesus, the *sors*-quotation obliquely describes the intended action of Croesus, and the prose after the quotation outlines Croesus' interpretation of the *sors* and the final outcome. Marcus treats this episode in a historical manner and the function of the quotation seems to be purely illustrative.

He is not, however, content with this historical scenario. First, he questions the actual veracity of the *sors*, claiming that it would have been true in either case (*utrum igitur eorum accidisset, uerum oraculum fuisset*, 2.116). Second, he increases his Academic skepticism by asking why he should believe that this oracle was given to Croesus at all (*cur autem hoc credam umquam editum Croeso?*, 2.116). Marcus then transfers his uncertainty concerning the oracular response to Herodotus (the main source for the fall and folly of Croesus)<sup>51</sup> and questions whether his account of this episode should be more believable than Ennius' story about Pyrrhus (*aut Herodotum cur ueraciorem ducam Ennio? num minus ille potuit Croeso quam de Pyrrho fingere Ennius?*, 2.116).

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<sup>50</sup> Cf., for example, *illa* at *Diu.* 1.14.

<sup>51</sup> For Croesus, the last king of Lydia who was ousted by the Persians in 547/546 B.C., in Hdt., see 1.47.3, 53.3, 55.2, 85.2, 91.1-3.

This progression from the Greek historian Herodotus to the Latin poet Ennius prompts Marcus to introduce a quotation from Ennius' *Annales* which details an oracle given to Pyrrhus: *quis enim est qui credat Apollonis ex oraculo Pyrrho esse responsum: 'aio te, Aeacida, Romanos uincere posse?'* (2.116).<sup>52</sup> He then discredits the veracity of this oracular response to Pyrrhus in several ways: (1) Apollo never spoke in Latin; (2) the oracle is not known to the Greeks; (3) Apollo had already ceased to make verses by the time of Pyrrhus; and (4) Pyrrhus, despite Ennius' claim that the sons of Aeacus are a race more martial than intellectual (provided in the form of another quotation), would still have recognized the equivocation of the verse (2.116). Marcus concludes his interpretation of the response given to Pyrrhus with a return to Croesus' equally equivocal response, commenting sarcastically that the response given to Croesus might have deceived Chrysippus, but that given to Pyrrhus would not even have deceived Epicurus (*nam illa amphibolia quae Croesum decepit, uel Chrysippum potuisset fallere, haec uero ne Epicurum quidem!*, 2.116).

If we now compare sections 2.115-16 to 1.37-38, the connection is clear: Marcus not only raises the topic of Apollo and his oracular utterances at 2.115, but also the volumes of Chrysippus (which Quintus mentions) and gives as a specific example the oracular response given to Croesus (the only particular individual whom Quintus names). Furthermore, he uses the comparable evidence of Ennius and his account of Pyrrhus not only to cast doubt on whether the oracular response was ever delivered to Croesus, but also, if it was, to point out the gullibility of anyone who would not have noticed the equivocal nature of both. This, however, is only a part of Marcus' refutation of oracles; indeed, as we shall see, he makes it clear that the main question is yet to be addressed (*sed, quod caput est ...*, 2.117). The answer he will give to this question not only continues his intratextual dialogue with Quintus'

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<sup>52</sup> Enn. *Ann.* 174 *ROL*.

arguments at 1.37-38, but also reveals the full role which the poetic quotation detailing Croesus' oracular response plays in his refutation.

After Marcus has finished his comparison between the oracular responses given to Croesus and Pyrrhus he refocuses his enquiry (2.117). He wishes to know the reasons why the Delphic oracles are not pronounced in his age (and have not been for a long time), and why it is that they are now held in such contempt (2.117). Although these questions are in obvious reference to those points which Quintus raised at 1.38, Marcus first invokes anonymous prophetic apologists to answer them.<sup>53</sup>

These (Stoic) apologists, he says, claim that the passage of time dissipated the power (*uis*) of that place (sc. Delphi) whence came those subterranean exhalations that inspired the priestess to utter oracles.<sup>54</sup> He does not, however, find this theory convincing: one would think that they are speaking about wine (*uinum*) or fish-pickle (*salsamentum*), which do, in fact, evaporate. Marcus' mention of wine and fish-pickle humorously recalls, of course, the river-analogy which Quintus makes at 1.38 in order to explain the possible disappearance of *uis* over time. He also argues that no length of time is able to destroy a natural and, as the Stoic apologists' definitions of *uis* make clear, divine power (2.117). Marcus now feels that he has refuted Quintus' claim that this terrestrial force (this *uis terrae*, 1.38) has vanished over time on the basis that it is impossible that a divine force can dissipate. It is important to remember, however, that Quintus put forward this theory of dissipation as only a possible and not incontrovertible explanation for the decline of the Delphic oracle's preeminence (1.38). The task still remains, then, for Marcus to address Quintus' claim that oracles were at one stage actually true.

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<sup>53</sup> Since these questions refer to points Quintus makes at 1.38, this could then explain the force of *isto* in the phrase *isto modo* ('in that way of yours [sc. Quintus]'). It is also possible, however, that *isto* could be in reference to Apollo himself and the way in which his oracular responses work.

<sup>54</sup> *Hoc loco cum urguentur, 'euanuisse' aiunt 'uetustate uim loci eius, unde anhelitus ille terrae fieret, quo Pythia mente incitata oracla ederet'* (Diu. 2.117).

To this end Marcus first asks at the end of 2.117 two questions: ‘When did this power disappear? Was it after men began to be less credulous?’ (*quando ista uis autem euanuit? an postquam homines minus creduli esse coeperunt?*). Next (at 2.118) he shares an anecdote about Demosthenes and Philip of Macedon: *Demosthenes quidem, qui abhinc annos prope trecentos fuit, iam tum φιλιππίζειν Pythiam dicebat, id est quasi cum Philippo facere. hoc autem eo spectabat, ut eam a Philippo corruptam diceret.*<sup>55</sup> Marcus deduces from this story about Philip’s bribery that there were surely other instances also when the Delphic oracles were not sincere (*quo licet existimare in aliis quoque oraculis Delphicis aliquid non sinceri fuisse*, 2.118). The Stoics, on the other hand, he maintains, absurdly prefer to believe that something (i.e. *uis*), which, according to Marcus if it did exist, would be eternal, dissipated to the point of nothingness, rather than rejecting what should not be believed (i.e. accounts of prophetic veracity).

This criticism of the Stoics’ beliefs ends Marcus’ discussion (2.115-18) of the veracity of oracular responses and, in turn, his refutation of Quintus’ twin claims at 1.37-38 that the Delphic oracle produced true prophecies in the past and that the terrestrial power (*uis terrae*) of the oracle possibly dissipated over time. He concludes that the popularity of the Delphic oracle has waned because people, other than the Stoics, are no longer as credulous. In this sense, Marcus has redefined the notion of *uis*: for him *uis* is not so much a divinely inspired power but rather it is the credibility and authority of oracular responses. It is in respect to Marcus’ redefinition of *uis* that I wish to examine in detail particular elements of oracular response given to Croesus which Marcus quotes at 2.115. I aim to demonstrate how the specific language of the quotation both underpins the immediate argument which he makes concerning the

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<sup>55</sup> Cf. D. 287.1, Aeschin. 72.14.

veracity and decline of oracular responses and, in turn, helps him to counter the contentions of his brother.

The oracular response given to Croesus, as we have seen, is thus (2.115):

Nam cum illa sors edita est opulentissimo regi Asiae:

Croesus Halyn penetrans magnam peruertet opum uim,<sup>56</sup>  
hostium uim se peruersurum putauit, peruertit autem suam.

In particular, I wish to draw attention to certain words which appear both in the quotation and in the prose that follows: the nouns *uim* / *uim* and the verbs *peruertet* / *peruertit*.<sup>57</sup> A consideration of these words will show how the specific language of the Ciceronian quotation mirrors and aids the arguments which Marcus makes against Quintus' views concerning the veracity of oracles and the possible dissipation of *uis*.

In the context of the quotation the phrase *magnam opum uim* refers to that which Croesus will overthrow or destroy (*peruertet*) when he enters (*penetrans*) the Halys river. In the prose analysis which follows the quotation Marcus first interprets the oracular response from the point of view of Croesus: the Lydian king thought that he would destroy the *uis* of his enemies; Marcus then reveals the actual outcome: Croesus in fact destroyed his own *uis*. It is, of course, this very ambiguity which Marcus considers to be the problem with oracular responses and his subsequent clarification of the rather vague phrase *magnam opum ... uim* as *hostium uim* and *suam* (sc. *uim*) is seen from the point of the view of the actual historic result.<sup>58</sup> After all, if

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<sup>56</sup> Cic. 54 *FPL*.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. a Greek variant of this oracular response: Κροῖσος Ἴλυν διαβάς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καταλύσει (Arist. *Rhet.* 1407a). In addition, there is a much later Latin variant from Calcidius (4th-cent. A.D.): *perdet Croesus, Halyn transgressus, maxima regna* (Calcid. 19 *FPL*).

<sup>58</sup> Cicero's *magna opum uis* differs noticeably from both phrases found in Greek and Latin variants (see above n. 57): μεγάλη ἀρχή and *maxima regna*. Admittedly, Cicero maintains the degree of the adjective, but *regna* corresponds to ἀρχή more so than to *opum uim*. The former two terms commonly

Croesus was told that crossing the Halys would result in the overthrow of his own power it is unlikely that he would have made the journey. I want to consider, then, the ambiguous *uis* present in this oracular response not only in the context of the historic result but in broader terms within the text of the *Diu.*, that is: as an allusion to Quintus' *uis terrae* in book 1 (1.36-38).

As we have seen, at 1.38 Quintus ends his discussion concerning *uis* with the following statement: *sed ut uis acciderit magna enim quaestio est; modo maneat id quod negari non potest, nisi omnem historiam peruerterimus, multis saeculis uerax fuisse id oraculum*. Marcus, however, does not so much overturn all of history at 2.115-18 as revise it, taking particular issue with the assertion that over many centuries the oracle was truthful (*uerax*). Quintus' use of the verb *peruerterimus* in this passage resembles the language of Cicero's translation of this oracular response (*peruertet*) and the presence of the verb *uis* at 1.38 (mirroring the noun *uim* at 2.115) adds, I would suggest, a further playful, Ciceronian, touch. The version of the oracular response given to Croesus, which Marcus quotes, operates on two levels.

First, it serves as a basic illustrative example of a reported and famous oracular prophecy (*illa sors edita est opulentissimo regi Asiae*, 2.115), which, in turn, Marcus discredits by attacking the reliability of Herodotus through a comparison he makes with Ennius' palpably false Roman example of Pyrrhus (2.116-17). Second, the difference in the language Marcus uses to express the inherent equivocation of such responses (i.e. the *magnum opum uim* as opposed to the *hostium / suam uim*) reflects to some extent the reason why, in his mind, oracular credibility has declined. Cicero's translation of the very response given to Croesus, which according to Quintus is authorized by the *uis terrae* that kindles the *mens* of the priestess (1.38), playfully

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refer to an empire (ἀρχή, e.g. Hdt. 1.91, Thuc. 4.128; *regna*: Cic. *Ver.* 5.168, *Mil.* 87; Verg. *A.* 1.338), whereas *uis* although it may refer 'military, or fighting strength' (*OLD uis* 24), appears to be an elaborate (and somewhat obscure) way of saying μεγάλη ἀρχή.

predicts the impending decline of oracular activity: *magnam peruertet opum uim*. Croesus' misadventure across the Halys takes on a symbolic function: all oracular responses are of this equivocal nature, which, in the end, people began to recognize. The power (*uis*) of oracles has disappeared not because it evaporated like wine or, as Quintus claims, a river, but because of an increasing recognition that their equivocal predictive capacity is worthless as is exemplified in the case of Croesus crossing the Halys. The actual verse *sors*, then, plays a central role in Marcus' arguments against oracular credibility.

### ***Disiecti Membra Versus: The Furor of Cassandra***

The final instances of poetic quotation that I will consider in book 2 constitute direct re-quotations of poetry from book 1. The intratextual connections between books 1 and 2 such re-quotations create is obvious, but, as we shall see, these recycled quotations also have a bearing on the passage in book 2 (2.115-18) we have just examined.<sup>59</sup> During his refutation of natural divination (2.110-48), specifically in discussing the topic of prophetic furor (*furor*, 2.110-18), Marcus re-quotes at 2.112 poetic material which Quintus employs in book 1 at 1.67 and 1.114. Quintus employs the first of these quotations, at 1.67, during his initial defense of natural divination (1.37-71), in particular prophetic furor (*furor*, 1.66-69). The second quotation, at 1.114, Quintus employs in his second defense of natural divination (1.110-17), in particular ecstatic prophecy (*furibunda mens*, 1.114-15). Marcus, by re-quoting these two quotations from 1.67 and 1.114 at 2.112, draws together the two topics of natural divination in which frenzy (*furor/furibunda*) plays a part. I will first examine the sections in which Quintus cites this poetic material (1.67 and 1.114); there we will

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<sup>59</sup> There is one other instance of re-quotation in *Diu.* At 2.45 Marcus re-quotes (= Cic. 6.36-38 *FPL*) three lines from the seventy-eight of his *Cons.* that Quintus quoted at 1.17-22 (= Cic. 6 *FPL*). For a treatment of this quotation in *Diu.*, see Krostenko 2000: 380-85, Wardle 2006: p. 145 on *Diu.* 1.17.



also see Roman *exempla* and an *ad hominem* argument, both of which Marcus will address at 2.112-14.

Quintus, at 1.66-69, briefly discusses prophetic frenzy (*furor*). In order to illustrate this frenzy or furor Quintus employs at 1.66-67 three poetic quotations from Ennius' *Alexander*, all of which revolve around the Greek prophetic figure of Cassandra.<sup>60</sup> The context of these quotations is uncertain, but they seem to come from the recognition scene similar to that of Euripides' Ἀλέξανδρος where Cassandra foresees the evil that Alexander will bring upon Troy.<sup>61</sup>

Quintus uses the first of these quotations, at 1.66, to introduce the topic of prophetic frenzy (*furor*) and he quotes, without introduction, nine lines of verse:

Inest igitur in animis praesagatio extrinsecus iniecta atque inclusa diuinitus. ea  
si exarsit acrius furor appellatur cum a corpore animus abstractus diuino  
instinctu concitatur.

sed quid oculis rapere uisa es derepente ardentibus?  
ubi illa paulo ante sapiens †uirginali† modestia?  
mater, optumatum multo mulier melior mulierum,  
missa sum superstitiosis hariolationibus;  
†neque† me Apollo fatis fandis dementem inuitam ciet.  
uirgines uereor aequalis, patris mei meum factum pudet,  
optumi uiri. mea mater, tui me miseret, mei piget.  
optumam progeniem Priamo peperisti extra me. hoc dolet:

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<sup>60</sup> For the reasons why Quintus' treatment of *furor* (1.65-69) is so concise, see Wardle 2006: p. 270 on *Diu.* 1.66-69. See Jocelyn 1967: 205 for various arguments concerning the original order of these verses.

<sup>61</sup> The Greek 'model' of Ennius' *Alexander* is thought to be either Sophocles' or Euripides' Ἀλέξανδρος; cf. Jocelyn 1967: 202.

men obesse, illos prodesse, me obstare, illos obsequi.<sup>62</sup>  
o poema tenerum et moratum atque molle. sed hoc minus ad rem.

The speaker of the first two lines is either the chorus leader or, as most editors assume, Hecuba,<sup>63</sup> while for remainder of the quotation Cassandra addresses her mother Hecuba. At this stage Cassandra, although she acknowledges that divine possession is imminent, is self-possessed and the words are her own.<sup>64</sup> It is not surprising, then, that Quintus subsequently admits that this ‘tender’ (*tenerum*), ‘expressive’ (*mollis*) poem,<sup>65</sup> which is well-suited to Cassandra’s character (*moratum*), is beside the point (*sed hoc minus ad rem*).<sup>66</sup> After citing nine lines of verse, he has failed to find the proper inspiration in his own example.

Since this initial quotation was unable to illustrate prophetic *furor* sufficiently, Quintus provides another passage from Ennius’ *Alexander* which, he maintains, will provide a more appropriate example (1.67):

Illud quod uolumus expressum est ut uaticinari furor uera soleat.  
adest adest fax obuoluta sanguine atque incendio.  
multos annos latuit. ciues ferte opem et restinguite.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Enn. sc. 57-65 *ROL*, 32-40 Jocelyn. I use for this and the remaining two quotations from Ennius’ *Alexander* the text of Jocelyn.

<sup>63</sup> Jocelyn 1967: 207 n. 7.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Timpanaro 1996: 28-29.

<sup>65</sup> This is the only occasion when an interlocutor in Cicero’s rhetorical and philosophical works refers to a quotation as a *poema* (‘poem’). There are, however, a few references to specific poems at *de Orat.* 1.217, Empedocles: *Empedocles physicus egregium poema fecerit*; at *Ac.* 1.9, Cicero: *atque ipse uarium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti*; and at *Diu.* 2.111, Ennius: *non esse autem illud carmen furentis cum ipsum poema declarat*.

<sup>66</sup> The terms *tener* and *mollis* are associated with the neoteric aesthetic. For *tener* as ‘neoteric poet’, see Buchheit 1976: 48-50. At *Cic. Brut.* 38 Theophrastus is described as the first to modulate oratory and to give to it the qualities of *tener* and *mollis*; cf. *Brut.* 132 where Xenophon’s style (*sermo*) is described as *mollis*. For *moratum* as ‘exhibiting [the appropriate] *mores*’, cf. *Cic. Top.* 97, Ps. Acro ad *Hor. Ep.* 2.3.319-20. See, also, Krostenko 2000: 369.

<sup>67</sup> Enn. sc. 67-68 *ROL*.

These two lines, which provide an indirect answer to the verses spoken by either the chorus leader or Hecuba at the beginning of the first quotation,<sup>68</sup> refer to the moment when Cassandra becomes aware of Alexander's presence and points at him.<sup>69</sup>

Cassandra prophesizes in metaphorical language (e.g. *fax*) and her demeanor is now more representative of prophetic furor or frenzy. Quintus does not analyze this quotation afterwards, but instead introduces a third and final quotation from Ennius' *Alexander*.

In the introduction to the third quotation, at 1.67, Quintus not only identifies, for the first time, the figure in the quotations as Cassandra, but clarifies the change in her status now that a god (*deus*) is employing her as vessel to deliver prophetic visions. Accordingly, it is not Cassandra who speaks the forthcoming lines of verse, but the god (1.67):

Deus inclusus corpore humano iam, non Cassandra, loquitur.

iamque mari magno classis cita  
texitur. exitium examen rapit.  
adueniet. fera ueliuolantibus  
nauibus compleuit manus litora.<sup>70</sup>

This 'negative-identification' of Cassandra through the presence of the god represents the final stage of Quintus' poetic illustration of prophetic furor: that of divine possession.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> So Jocelyn 1967: 207.

<sup>69</sup> For this recognition scene, see Scodel 1980: 35-36.

<sup>70</sup> Enn. sc. 69-72 *ROL*, 43-46 Jocelyn.

<sup>71</sup> It seems probable that Quintus has omitted some verses between the second and third quotations, since Cassandra's prophecy here is of the Greek fleet sailing to Troy to avenge the abduction of Helen; cf. Jocelyn 1967: 209.

After the third quotation Quintus curiously admits that he seems to speaking ‘tragedies’ and ‘stage-plays’: *tragoedias loqui uideor et fabulas*, 1.68. His mention of literary genres with respect to this verse is comparable to his designation of the first quotation as a ‘poem’ (*poema*). There (at 1.66) he deemed that the quotation was insufficient for his purpose of demonstrating prophetic *furor* (*o poema tenerum et moratum atque molle. sed hoc minus ad rem*), while here, at 1.68, this somewhat dismissive admission again casts doubt upon the appropriateness of the poetry.

The progression of 1.66-68 appears to be haphazard: Quintus quotes, but does not find applicable, nine lines of verse; he then quotes two more quotations that better illustrate prophetic frenzy (1.67), after which he declares that he seems to speaking tragedies and stage-plays (1.68). This admission reflects his critical attitude towards the reliability of poetic material,<sup>72</sup> but it also seems to be a product of the subject matter under discussion (*furor*): Quintus is first unable to channel the appropriate poetic passage to illustrate prophetic frenzy and provides a relatively detailed analysis as to why (1.67), then, after he is able to draw upon two pieces of appropriate material the second of which features the god speaking (*deus loquitur*) through Cassandra, Quintus ‘emerges’ from the prophetic in an apparent state of bemusement (*loqui uideor*). This need not be seen as a genuine state of post-prophetic bewilderment, but his pattern of direct quotation followed only then by the recognition of its literary nature mimics, I would suggest, the state of someone after being possessed by a god: once Quintus ends his delivery of the passage which he feels illustrates well prophetic frenzy he hurriedly reduces it to a fictional example (*tragoediae / fabulae*) while at the

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<sup>72</sup> Cf. 1.42 where Quintus, immediately following a quotation from Ennius’ *Annales* (= Enn. Ann. 32-48 *ROL*), appears to question the truthfulness of poetry: *haec, etiamsi ficta sunt a poeta, non absunt tamen a consuetudine somniorum*. Jocelyn 1989-90: 39 takes Quintus’ words to mean that Ennius’ version of the dream had no literary predecessor. Wardle 2006: p. 214 on *Diu.* 1.42, however, suggests that Quintus’ comment concerns the question of historicity and genre and constitute a defensive stance on his part.

same time employing the same language he ascribes to the god (*loquitur / loqui uideor*). In quoting these scenes of prophetic possession, Quintus, whether genuine or feigned, has momentarily and seemingly succumbed to their dramatic power as would any good stage-actor delivering material of this sort.<sup>73</sup>

Following the third and final quotation and his admission that he seems to be speaking tragedies and stage-plays, Quintus dispenses with poetry as a means of illustrating his argument and turns instead to a consideration of Marcus' personal history and of contemporary Roman events. In particular, Quintus relates at 1.68-69 an incident dealing with the same kind of prophetic furor which he heard from Marcus himself (*at ex te ipso non commenticiam rem, sed factum eiusdem generis audiui*, 1.68). This incident involves C. Coponius, the commander of the Rhodian fleet, who, Quintus tells us, came to Marcus when he was stationed at Dyrrhachium and related to him a prophetic prediction made by his Rhodian rower, a *uaticinor*. This rower had foreseen that Greece would be bathed in blood within thirty days, that Dyrrhachium would be pillaged, that there would be a flight by sea, and that those fleeing would behold the pitiable sight of conflagrations behind them, but that the Rhodian fleet would have a swift journey home (1.68). Quintus further reports that, although Marcus was unconcerned, M. Varro and M. Cato, who were also present at Dyrrhachium, were greatly perturbed,<sup>74</sup> and that a few days later a messenger arrived in flight from Pharsalus and reported the loss of the army. The rest of the prophecy was soon fulfilled, the contents of which Quintus, at 1.69, narrates in breathless detail: the granaries were plundered and their store scattered about the streets and alleys; Marcus and his companions, greatly alarmed, boarded their ships and, when they looked back to the town at night, saw burning merchant vessels, which the soldiers

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<sup>73</sup> See above 97-100.

<sup>74</sup> That Varro was still alive to corroborate the story adds an element of credibility; cf. Wardle 2006: 276.

had set on fire because they did not want them to follow. Quintus ends his recollection of this prodigious event with the comment that Marcus and his companions, after they had been deserted by the Rhodian fleet, realized that the prophet was, literally, “true” (*postremo a Rhodia classe deserti uerum fuisse sensistis*, 1.69).

This *ad hominem* argument ends Quintus’ discussion of prophetic frenzy, but, as we shall see, Marcus will respond, at 2.112-14, both to his brother’s account of Coponius and to his re-use of one of the poetic examples from Ennius’ *Alexander*. First, however, it is necessary to examine a section (1.114) in Quintus’ second discussion of natural divination (1.110-17), where he employs another quotation from Ennius’ *Alexander*. Here, Quintus wishes to illustrate the connection between a *furibunda mens* and oracular utterances (1.114):

Multos nemora siluaeque, multos amnes aut maria commouent, quorum  
furibunda mens uidet ante multo, quae sint futura. quo de genere illa sunt:

eheu uidete:

iudicauit inclitum iudicium inter deas tris aliquis,  
quo iudicio Lacedaemonia mulier Furiarum una adueniet.<sup>75</sup>

This quotation details Cassandra’s prophecy of Alexander’s judgment in favor of Aphrodite. Quintus, however, provides no literary context and he employs the quotation purely as an example of prophetic frenzy (*quo de genere illa sunt*). He follows this quotation with one line of verse from Ennius’ *Annales*, which together with that from his *Alexander* provide examples of predictions that are made in verse.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Enn. sc. 73-75 *ROL*. Again, I follow here the text of Jocelyn 1967: 77.

<sup>76</sup> Enn. *Ann.* 232 *ROL*.

The doubt which Quintus expressed concerning his poetic examples at 1.66-67 is absent in this case, but he supplies, at the beginning of 1.115, supplementary Roman examples: *similiter Marcius et Publicius uates cecinisse dicuntur; quo de genere Apollinis operta prolata sunt*. Quintus also mentions the seer Marcius at 1.89,<sup>77</sup> but nothing more is known of Publicius and, in fact, he is mentioned only here, at 1.115, and later by Marcus at 2.113.

Now that we have seen the ways in which Quintus employs these quotations at 1.66-67 and 1.114, we can turn our attention to Marcus and his re-quotations. Marcus, during his attack on natural divination, in particular prophetic frenzy (2.110-18), re-quotes, at 2.112, the beginning of two of the verses from Ennius' *Alexander* found at 1.66 and at 1.114:

At multi saepe uera uaticinati, ut Cassandra:

iamque mari magno ...<sup>78</sup>

eademque paulo post:

eheu uidete ...<sup>79</sup>

Marcus' introduction to the first of these quotations is an imagined objection (presumably) of Quintus, which he answers immediately after the second re-quotation: *num igitur me cogis etiam fabulis?* (2.113). Marcus attacks the worth of such myths as authoritative sources (2.113): they can be delightful (*delectas*), can be supported by words (*uerba*), thoughts (*sententiae*), rhythm (*numeri*), and melody (*cantus*), but

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<sup>77</sup> At *Diu.* 1.89 the reference is to the Marcian brothers (*Marcii fratres*) whereas at 1.115 it is to a single Marcius (which is the more common); cf. Liv. 25.12.2. For a discussion of the pluralising, see Pease 1977: on *Diu.* 1.89, Wardle 2006: p. 320 on *Diu.* 1.89.

<sup>78</sup> Enn. sc. 69 *ROL*.

<sup>79</sup> Enn. sc. 73 *ROL*.

nevertheless they should not impart any credence (*fides*) or authority (*auctoritas*) to fabricated events (*res commenticiae*).

Quintus, however, as we have just seen, supplemented his poetic examples with real life events: first when he related the episode of Coponius at 1.66 and then when he mentioned the verse prophecies of Marcius, Publicius, and Apollo at 1.115. Accordingly, Marcus, following his denunciation of the validity of myths, next addresses the prophecies of Publicius, the Marcian prophets, and Apollo (2.113). These three *exempla* share the fact that they are purportedly historical rather than mythical, but Marcus, using the same principle which he used in discussing myths, discredits their reliability due to some of them being obviously false (*ficta aperte*), some being senseless chatter (*effutita temere*), and none being believable to either the average (*mediocris*) or prudent man (*prudens*).<sup>80</sup>

Marcus continues this criticism of Quintus' historical examples when, at 2.114, he addresses the case of Coponius, the specific and personal *exemplum* which Quintus related at 1.68. Marcus again prefaces his refutation with a comment that, on this occasion, is explicitly directed to Quintus: '*quid?*' *inquies*, '*remex ille de classe Coponi nonne ea praedixit, quae facta sunt?*' (2.114).<sup>81</sup> Marcus reasons that, although the oarsman did indeed foretell what came to pass, this prediction was nothing more than what everyone at the time feared would happen (2.114). The oarsman, he adds, was merely expressing in a demented (*demens*) state what he feared would happen when he was in his right mind (*sanus*).

Marcus finishes his refutation of the Coponius-episode with a statement which I briefly mentioned above (p. 143), that is: the mention of the immortal gods as a group: *utrum tandem, per deos atque homines, magis ueri simile est uesanum remigem*

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<sup>80</sup> *Quorum partim ficta aperte, partim effutita temere numquam, ne mediocri quidem cuiquam, non modo prudenti probata sunt* (Diu. 2.113).

<sup>81</sup> Cf. *inquies* at 2.57, 2.117.



*an aliquem nostrum, qui ibi tum eramus, me, Catonem, Varronem, Coponium ipsum, consilia deorum immortalium perspicere potuisse?* (2.114). Immediately following this statement Marcus, as we have seen, directly addresses Apollo both with the phrase *sed iam ad te uenio* and a subsequent quotation ‘*o sancte Apollo ...*’. This seems a natural and clear enough progression, since Marcus, by narrowing the focus from the immortal gods in general to Apollo specifically, continues the discussion of Apollo’s oracles which he mentioned at 2.113. There is, however, a certain degree of ambiguity present.

When Marcus begins 2.115 with the phrase *sed iam ad te uenio*, it is not immediately clear whom he means to address. The beginning of 2.115 marks the end of a series of refutations which Marcus makes against his brother’s arguments at 1.66-69 and 1.114-15. The culmination of this series is Marcus’ refutation of Quintus’ *ad hominem* argument, which includes a direct address to Quintus (*inquies*, 2.114), concerning the Coponius’ oarsman at 1.68-69. Yet, the entire subject matter of 2.115 also covers specific prophetic material which Quintus had mentioned at 1.37: Apollo, Chrysippus’ oracular volumes, and Croesus, and, as Marcus later admits, is part of a digression: *sed quod caput est* at (2.117). It would be reasonable, then, based on the progression of the previous sections, to assume initially that Marcus is addressing Quintus. And, even when, at the beginning of the quotation (*o sancte Apollo ...*, 2.115), Apollo is revealed as the object of Marcus’ apostrophe, the ambiguity, I suggest, is still present.

Quintus, as we have seen, quoted several passages from Ennius’ *Alexander* including one which explicitly detailed the god’s possession of Cassandra (1.67). The theatrical elements associated with Quintus’ performance coupled with the juxtaposition of the god’s speaking (*deus ... loquitur*, 1.67) and his realization that he has been doing something similar (*loqui uideor*, 1.68) invites the suggestion that

Marcus means to address mockingly Apollo through his most recent vessel, Quintus. Marcus, on the other hand, does not perform a similar theatrical performance of Cassandra's prophetic utterances: through his extreme shortening of the quotations at 2.112 he avoids re-enacting Cassandra's frenzied utterances and avoids mention of the god's presence or possession.

On a structural level Marcus, by re-quoting Quintus' poetic material from 1.67 and 1.114, draws together at 2.112-14 elements from his brother's two separate defenses of natural divination (1.37-71, 1.110-17). At 2.112 Marcus re-quotes the beginning of the first line of poetic passages found at 1.67 and 1.114. Following these re-citations, he discusses at 2.113 the figures of Publicius, Marcius, and Apollo, all of whom Quintus mentioned at 1.115 immediately after a quotation from Ennius' *Alexander* at 1.114. Marcus, at 2.114, then turns to the story of Coponius and his rowing which Quintus told at 1.68 immediately after another quotation from Ennius' *Alexander* at 1.67. By beginning 2.112 with two partial re-quotations from 1.67 and 1.114, he combines into one location specific points which Quintus makes in those sections which follow the quotations (1.68, 1.115). Thus, although the re-quotations, at 2.112, themselves might offer little in terms of pertinent content, they combine into one section (2.112-14) Quintus' two separate defenses of natural divination (1.37-71; 1.110-17) as well as serving as a succinct, convenient, and contextualized starting point for Marcus' refutation of this topic.

### ***Conclusion***

In the preceding investigation we examined five separate instances of poetry in the second book of *Diu*. The focus of these examinations was on both the local quotation-environment and the subsequent connection Marcus' arguments have with material, prose or verse, in book 1. We have seen that, although many of the poetic

quotations which Marcus employs are, in terms of length, insubstantial, their various functions are nevertheless important.

The first instance I examined, at 2.12, occurs during Marcus' presentation of general philosophical arguments against divination (2.8-25). His employment of this quotation revealed an important function of poetry in book 2: while the quotation fulfills a regular localized and organizational function, the *quidam Graecus uulgaris* also implicitly plays a part in refuting particular arguments which Quintus makes in book 1. The remaining three instances which I considered in book 2, however, play a more explicit part in Marcus' refutation of Quintus' arguments (2.30 → 1.112; 2.104 → 1.132; and 2.115 → 1.37) and one instance where he re-quotes earlier verses in an effort to refute his brother's arguments (2.112 → 1.67, 1.114).

First, at 2.30 Marcus has the natural philosopher Democritus deliver in jest a verse from Ennius which pokes fun at star-gazing. In connection with Democritus' laughable beliefs Marcus retells a similar story which Quintus told about Pherecydes' ability to predict earthquakes (1.112) and, by implication, warns his brother that he should also not believe, as he does at 1.131, these same kinds of reports concerning Democritus. Second, at 2.104 Marcus quotes a section of verse – possibly from Ennius' *Telamo* – in connection with the refutation of Stoic syllogisms. In turn, Marcus uses this verse, which is to be read in conjunction with a section of verse from the same play found at 1.132, to charge Quintus with being careless in his treatment of (poetic) source material and, in turn, his criticism of Stoic syllogisms now applies to his brother's earlier arguments. The third instance where Marcus' poetic material plays a part in his refutation of Quintus' arguments occurs at 2.115. Here, Marcus is concerned with the topic of oracular credibility and decline and he structures this entire section around material which Quintus mentions at 1.37: Apollo, Chrysippus' oracular volumes, and Croesus. In the sections prior to the arguments which he makes

in 2.115-18, Marcus at 2.112 re-quotes in partial form two lines from Quintus' earlier poetic examples (1.67, 1.114). He uses these re-quotations at 2.112 to compress and draw together Quintus' two discussions concerning natural divination and, following the re-quotations, he addresses various historical *exempla* which Quintus discussed after the quotations in book 1 (1.66-69 and 1.114-15). His refutation of the final *exemplum*, the case of Coponius' demented, prophetic oarsman, brings Marcus back to the beginning of 2.115, whereupon, as we have seen, an ambiguity arises as to the identity of Marcus' addressee: Quintus or Apollo.

These analyses of poetry in book 2 of *Diu.* have highlighted several important features of Cicero's art of quotation: the application of poetry to philosophical topics; the use of poetry as an organizational tool for Marcus' arguments in book 2 and as a direct means of engendering a greater sense of interconnectivity between books 1 and 2; and the importance of poetry and allusions to poetry in vividly drawing together discrete passages and thereby helping us to achieve a more cohesive (and Academic) reconstruction of the issues involved. The variety of roles which these quotations play in both local and broader environments belies any claim that their contribution to Marcus' philosophical arguments is minimal. Thus, just as the orator skillfully utilizes poetry in *de Orat.*, the philosopher, in the *Diu.*, is equally adept at employing, appropriating, and overturning the meaning, of poetic quotations.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

The central focus of this study has been that Cicero possesses a definite art of quotation, in particular the quotation of poetry. Before Cicero there was no established art of poetic quotation in Latin prose literature and the underlying principal of my investigation has been to consider the occurrence of poetry in the context of the prose narrative; the archaeology of Cicero's sources, while an important aspect in the study of his works, should not obscure or devalue the various productive functions of the poetry we have before us.

In seeking to illustrate the nature of his art of quotation, I undertook a series of examinations of poetry not only in Cicero's philosophical and rhetorical treatises, but also in other contemporaneous or near contemporaneous Latin prose texts. An initial intertextual comparison between the *Inu.* and *Rhet. Her.* revealed that in their hands poetry is a pliable substance – both authors extract, manipulate, and interpret poetry in order to provide recognizable and fitting forms of rhetorical illustration. Yet, while the Auctor only employs poetry in the *Rhet. Her.* to illustrate faults, Cicero, in the *Inu.*, casts poetry in more than one role: poetry, for him, is capable of demonstrating or supporting positive arguments as well as faults. Cicero's broader application of poetry in the *Inu.* not only sets his art of quotation apart from the Auctor's, it also foreshadows the dichotomous and variegated roles which poetry will play in his later dialogues.

The dearth of contemporary Latin prose works containing poetic quotations gave rise to intertextual comparisons between the role of poetry in Cicero's later treatises with that found in Varro's contemporaneous linguistic treatise the *L.* and in his near contemporaneous dialogue the *R.* If the Auctor's use of poetry is

characterized by his propensity to employ quotations in order to illustrate faults, then Varro's use of poetry in his linguistic treatise the *L.* is the near opposite, since in this work the language of poetry constitutes the primary sustenance for his etymological antiquarianism. His rustically themed dialogue the *R.*, on the other hand, displays a deliberate and conscious avoidance of poetry. Moreover, the limited poetry which does appear in this dialogue resembles, to a large extent, Varro's rigid and linguistically focused employment of verse in the *L.*

In comparison, Cicero not only frequently quotes poetry in many of his philosophical and rhetorical dialogues, he does so in a more varied, malleable, and innovative manner than Varro. For example, we saw how Laelius, at *Rep.* 1.30, brings his friend Sex. Aelius to life from the pages of Ennius in order to serve as a model of instruction for Tubero; how M., at *Tusc.* 1.105, has Andromache lament the treatment of Hector, a reaction for which he mocks her; and how, on several occasions, generic intermediaries deliver lines of verse, thus adding a sense of depth to the 'realism' of the dialogue. Furthermore, in the case of Sex. Aelius, we observed the influence which poetry has on the prose narrative when it operates in an extended environment. The verse, while necessarily still confined to a strict portion of text, exerts itself beyond the local boundary which exists between poetry and prose and contributes meaningfully to the interaction between these two disparate media.

This capacity for poetry to shape and affect the narrative in such an extended fashion became even more apparent when we observed how various Ciceronian interlocutors contest the control of poetry throughout the course of their arguments. Cicero's view in the *Inu.* that poetry is a valuable means of providing both positive and negative illustrations, he now transfers to the characters within his dialogues. For example, Crassus, in the *de Orat.*, not only appropriates for his own use a line of verse which Antonius had previously quoted, but he also, in turn, uses the same verse to

attack the views of his opponent. This appropriation of quotations within a dialogue emphasizes an important aspect of poetry, its publicly accessible nature. Cicero, after first selecting a quotation for his composition, has a character deliver it during the course of the discussion, whereupon another character is then able to re-use it for his own purposes. Crucially, the notion that poetry is public domain extends to the reader's reception of and involvement with the text and by extension also involves Cicero's program to bring to a Roman audience a series of Greek philosophical and rhetorical theories.

He initiates this program with the *de Orat.* and continues it with several other treatises which treat topics such as the ideal state, the laws, and the best kind of oratory. He does not, however, simply transcribe earlier Greek works, but shapes and adapts them to fit a Roman context. The various categories of poetry he quotes in these treatises – Latinized Greek poetry, early Latin poetry and Cicero's own poetry – all contribute to his Romanization of these Greek theories and provide for the reader a vivid and distinctly Roman means of access to and interaction with the treatises.

His Latinized quotations, which embody and strengthen the strict Latin format of the prose environment, symbolize the synthesis of Greek and Roman thought found in his treatises. Latinized Greek poetry, while it unmistakably calls attention to the fact that these treatises are written by a Roman for a Roman audience, also maintains an important link between the two literary and intellectual worlds, serving both as an acknowledgment of the underlying Greek thought and as a sharp reminder of its current Romanization. When presented with Latin translations of Greek poetry the Late Republican reader – who, in all likelihood, is unfamiliar with Cicero's Greek philosophical and rhetorical source-texts – obtains a sense, however indirect, of the original Greek position on a variety of topics. In addition, a reader who is familiar

with the Greek versions of poetic quotations is able to critique the form and function of the Latin translations and thereby to engage with the text on a deeper level.

Latin quotations, on other hand, distance the Romanized treatises from their Greek counterparts. Whether or not Latin poetry is a direct replacement for Greek poetry its presence in the context of originally Greek philosophical and rhetorical theories emphasizes the temporal and intellectual divide that now lies between the Greek and Roman literary worlds. Quotations from the Early Roman poets, which Cicero carefully employs so as to avoid any charge of anachronism, constitute chronological documents which date and firmly place the treatises in a Roman setting. This Early Latin poetry, a store of distinctly Roman material scattered amongst renditions of obscure Greek theories, not only helps to escort these reworked philosophical and rhetorical theories into the Republican age but also promotes the worth of domestic literature in the context of intellectual discussions. Moreover, a Republican reader's likely familiarity with this poetry naturally increases the level of interaction between the reader and the text.<sup>1</sup>

Cicero inclusion of his own poetry, remarkable due to the near absence of any other contemporary Latin poetry in his treatises, is a more complex situation. The reasons why he neglects the works of contemporaneous poets, such as Catullus or Lucretius, remain unclear, but they may include a genuine fondness for early poetry, a desire to endorse his own poetry, a question of access to and awareness of contemporary poetry, the unsuitability of contemporary poetry for rhetorical and philosophical themes, or, even, some form of personal pressure stemming from the political climate of the Late Republic.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, Cicero's poetry – again carefully employed to avoid a charge of anachronism – vividly stamps his philosophical and

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<sup>1</sup> For the argument that the works of Early Latin poets, especially of the tragedians, were well known to the members of Rome's elite, see Goldberg 1999: 52-57.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., for example, Krostenko 2000.



rhetorical treatises as products of the current Late Republican age and places them at their greatest temporal distance from the earlier Greek works. And, even though it is difficult to know how familiar a reader would have been with Cicero's poetry,<sup>3</sup> its presence at the very least supports the notion that poetry is part of the public domain and also imparts a contemporary and thus dynamic element to his Romanization of Greek theories.

A final and most intrinsic component of Cicero's art of quotation is his overall application of poetry to philosophical and rhetorical themes. His treatises, even though they are traditionally divided between philosophical and rhetorical, represent a mixture of philosophy and rhetoric.<sup>4</sup> That such an amalgamation exists is evident, for example, in the *de Orat.* when Cicero argues that the orator must acquire a thorough base of philosophical knowledge in order to master the field of rhetoric (e.g. 3.19-24, 52-90, 104-147). Thus, while he often uses poetry to illustrate succinctly rhetorical topics such as rhythm and hiatus, he also makes quotations from Ennius or Lucilius or Accius relevant to a deeply intellectual combination of philosophy and rhetoric. His adept handling of poetry ensures this level of relevance whether or not the poets were originally concerned with philosophical and rhetorical topics, although, admittedly, it is not always easy or, indeed, possible to determine the original context of a quotation.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, the problem of determining the precise context or meaning of a quotation is, as we have seen, exacerbated when interlocutors re-use the same poetry for different purposes.<sup>6</sup> Yet, it is no coincidence that these divergent interpretations of

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<sup>3</sup> In fact, besides Cicero's conscious preservation of his own poems in his treatises little is known about their contents and the conditions under which they were written; cf. Ewbank 1933: 10-19.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Gaines 2002: 445-480 for discussion of Cicero's fusion of rhetoric and philosophy in the *Part. and Top.*

<sup>5</sup> Pacuvius, for example, demonstrates a clear penchant for incorporating Greek natural philosophy and Stoic and Epicurean ideas into his plays; cf. *Rhet. Her.* 2.43; *Hor. Ep.* 1.18.41-44.

<sup>6</sup> This is further complicated by Cicero's re-employment of the same poetry intertextually; a phenomenon in need of further study.

poetry accord neatly with the (perhaps overly simplistic) belief that Cicero is a follower of the New Academy and an admirer of its skeptical stance. If we not only recall that several instances of poetry in book 2 of the *Dei.* should be viewed in conjunction with certain arguments and quotations found in book 1, but also keep in mind Cicero's invitation to the reader at the end of the work to consider both sides of the debate (2.150), we gain a keen appreciation of how this skeptical stance infuses his use of poetry and characterizes his art of quotation.

No specific topic of Cicero is undeserving of study, including his frequent use of poetry in his treatises. This has been a study of the borders between two disparate media, poetry and prose. It is by looking at and beyond these borders, or zones of interaction, that subtle distinctions emerge to prominence, allowing fresh and unexpected insight. By examining occurrences of poetic quotations in Cicero's works we have seen not only the various ways in which he employs, adapts, and reshapes poetry for his compositional purposes, but also the important functions which these quotations fulfill within the expanse of the prose narrative. Poetic quotations in his treatises are representative of his desire to make publicly available a Romanized version of Greek philosophical and rhetorical theories, and support his convictions that knowledge of this literary medium is an essential part of the orator's make-up and is a valuable tool of instruction and a source of learning for the philosopher.

My approach to studying the poetry in Cicero's works was necessarily selective. That the store of poetic quotations in Cicero's corpus is vast necessitated narrowing my field of evidence to poetry in the treatises. My method of inquiry resulted in a further narrowing of the evidence: repetition, allusion, and re-quotation were the criteria by which I selected specific employments of poetry for investigation. While these restrictions were necessary for the scope and aim of my study, there remains the allure (and material) to carry out further investigations of poetry in the

works of Cicero. In particular, if poetry contributes to the Romanization of Greek theories and assists the reader's reception and understanding of his treatises, then a more detailed examination of the reader-text dynamic with a particular focus on the reader's personal experience of, for example, public theatrical performances might reveal interesting and important social connotations within the narrative.

In addition, there remains the opportunity to investigate quotations in the works of later Latin authors, whether these quotations constitute those poetic fragments which Cicero and other Late Republican writers also quote or those instances where we possess the extant poetic source-texts, for example quotations from Plautus or Virgil. In the meantime, it is my hope that the above findings have furthered not only our understanding of Cicero's use of poetry and his art of quotation but also, by way of contrast, the role which poetry plays in other Late Republican Latin prose narratives.

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